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COI-ONKI, IIOI'SK 



THE REAL 
COLONEL HOUSE 

BY 

ARTHUR D. HOWDEN SMITH 

Author of 
''Fighting the Turk in the Balkans," Etc. 




NEW X5|r YORK 
GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY 



'/!■, ■/- 



COPYRIGHT, 1918, 
BY GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY 



COPYRIGHT, mis, BY THE NEW YORK EVENING POST CO. 
PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

JUN 17 1918 



©CI.A497786 



Y 



TO 

HAROLD J. LEAROYD 



AUTHOR'S NOTE 

This is an intimate biography only in 
the sense that it reflects my own inter- 
pretation of Colonel House based upon 
an acquaintance and friendship of sev- 
eral years. It is in no sense official for 
I have not sought access to confidential 
papers nor have I asked for undue con- 
fidences from Colonel House. 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER PAGE 

I A Man More Misunderstood than 

Mysterious 13 

II From a Western Boyhood to an 

Eastern College 22 

III Truth and Fiction about His Busi- 

ness Affairs 32 

IV Steadfast Refusal of Public Of- 

fice 42 

V Behind the Scenes in His Own 

State 54 

VI Watching Events and Biding His 

Time 64 

VII Gaynor as a Presidential Possi- 
bility 75 

VIII Rise of Wilson's Presidential Star 85 

IX Wilson on the Road to the White 

House 96 

X Happenings at the Baltimore Con- 
vention 107 

XI Good Judgment in a Ticklish Cam- 
paign 116 

ix 



contIsnts 

CHAPTER PAOB 

XII Formation of Mr. Wilson's Cab- 
inet 127 

XIII His Part in National Currency 

Reform 139 

XIV Foreseeing the World War . . 150 

XV The President's Warning to Eu- 
rope 162 

XVI America Face to Face with War 176 

XVII "The Freedom OF the Seas" . . 187 

KVIII Problems Raised by the Submarine 197 

XIX President Wilson's Second Cam- 
paign 209 

XX Last Efforts for Peace . . . 222 

XXI His Share in the Conduct of the 

War 237 

XXII At the Head of the American War 

Mission 247 

XXIII Preparing for the Peace Con- 

ference 262 

XXIV His Estimate of President Wilson 274 

XXV Methods of Work and Ways of 

Relaxation 286 

XXVI His Political Aims AND His Future 296 



ILLUSTRATIONS 
Colonel House Frontispiece 

PAGES 

Colonel House at Twenty 26 

The Apartment at No. 115 East 53RD 
Street, New York City 80 

A Corner in Colonel House's Study Where 
He Interviews His Callers .... 144 

Entrance to Devonshire House, London . 252 

The Latest Picture of Colonel House 
with the President, Taken September, 
1917 276 



XI 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 



THE 

REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

CHAPTER I 

A MAN MORE MISUNDERSTOOD THAN 
MYSTERIOUS 

COLONEL E. M. House— or plain Mr. 
House, as he prefers to be called — of Texas, 
is one of the most remarkable characters in Amer- 
ican history. He stands forth commandingly, in 
a period of political turmoil and evolution, which 
has produced such contrasting figures as Wood- 
row Wilson, Theodore Roosevelt, Wilhelm H. 
of Germany, David Lloyd George, Raymond 
Poincare, and General Ludendorfif. Five years 
ago he was unknown to the public of this country. 
To-day his name has become a household word 
throughout the world. After President Wilson 
himself, no man in public life exerts so dominant 
an influence upon international affairs as this 
slim, quiet gentleman, who holds no office, who 
represents no special interest, who has no selfish 
ends to serve. 

13 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

This may sound like eulogy. But it is not. A 
great deal may be said or written about Colonel 
House, but summed up in a simple phrase, his 
power for good or ill is based simply upon his 
disinterestedness. He holds a power never 
wielded before in this country by any man out of 
office, a power greater than that of any political 
boss or Cabinet member. He occupies a place 
in connection with the Administration which 
is anomalous, because no such place ever existed 
before Woodrow Wilson became President of 
the United States. He holds this power, and he 
occupies this place because the President knows 
that he can absolutely rely upon his unselfish 
service. 

If you don't believe this, consider the proposi- 
tion strictly from a utilitarian point of view. 
President Wilson is a very definite-minded indi- 
vidual, and two things he does not tolerate are 
inefficiency and disloyalty. Is it likely that 
Colonel House would have lasted so long if he had 
not satisfied the President on these two points? 
There is no use arguing that the President might 
have been deceived. A man in Colonel House's 
position has plenty of enemies, who dislike him 
or are jealous of his influence, and these would 
be quick to inform against him, if the opportunity 
occurred. The Republican National Committee 
has had every episode of House's life ransacked 

H 



MORE MISUNDERSTOOD THAN MYSTERIOUS 

for evidence which would justify an attack upon 
him, and, through him, upon the President. But 
the cleverest detective has been unable to discover 
anything worth using. 

Why ? Because Colonel House is not in politics 
for himself, never has been in politics for him- 
self, and has no personal ambitions to satisfy. 
He plays politics because he loves poli- 
tics, because he cannot resist the pleasure of 
directing men and policies, any more than the 
born artist can keep his hands off paint-tubes and 
brushes. He is that rare individual in American 
life, the man who is provided with a comfortable 
Income, who craves no addition to his worldly 
Wealth, and takes advantage of being relieved of 
the necessity of toil to devote himself to the wel- 
fare of his party and his country. 

The real Ctdonel House is not a man of mys- 
tery, neither is he a "Texas Sphinx" — whatever 
that may be! — or an errand-boy for the Presi- 
dent, a sort of fetch-and-carry Man Friday, with 
a phonograph attachment. All of these roles and 
many more have been assigned to him. The 
plain truth is that there is nothing mysterious 
about Colonel House. He is one of the frankest, 
openest men in the world, and to those who know 
him one of the two or three greatest Americans 
of this political generation. Until President 
Wilson writes his autobiography we shall not 

15 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

know the extent of the influence House has had 
upon the President's pohcies. Colonel House will 
never breathe a word to indicate it; but there is 
ample excuse for assigning him credit as chief 
adviser in the formation of all of the Presi- 
dent's important decisions. 

Of his perspicuity in counsel, his sagacity and 
political foresight there has been ample testi- 
mony from Mr. Wilson and other Democratic 
leaders. It is safe to say that nobody appre- 
ciates Colonel House's value so highly as does the 
President. The President was fifty-five years 
old when they first met — an age when men, and 
especially men of Mr. Wilson's character, do not 
make close friendships readily — yet they became 
comrades at once, and their friendship has 
ripened and strengthened in the stormy years 
since past, until it has grown to be one of the 
most beautiful of which history has record. For 
it is a friendship based upon service. Colonel 
House's sole object is to help Mr. Wilson in his 
difhcult task, and in helping him to help all 
Americans and all mankind, and to the President 
the advice of this man of crystal-clear vision and 
rigid fairness means acceleration of his gigantic 
projects for humanizing modern civilization. 
The net gainers by the cooperation are the Re- 
public and the world. 

Americans as a whole have not understood 
i6 



MORE MISUNDERSTOOD THAN MYSTERIOUS 

Colonel House, and perhaps they may be forgiven 
for this. For one thing, Colonel House stepped 
into semi-public life with a fixed aversion to pub- 
licity, and to understand the man it is necessary 
to recognize that this aversion, which is wholly 
without aflfectation, is the keystone of his char- 
acter. He detests public attention of a personal 
nature. For instance, he is always willing to 
talk to any one who has a right to know about 
the public questions of the day, yet he will shy 
like a wild colt from the prospect of a character 
sketch. For a long time it was difficult to get a 
photograph of him, but finally he was broken to 
the camera, and he is now willing to pose on any 
legitimate occasion. 

He prefers to work quietly toward his deter- 
mined goal. This does not mean that he works 
mysteriously. He is quite open and above-board. 
But he has a theory that you do not need to call 
in the town brass band, enlist spellbinders, and 
hire a press agent to accomplish any worth-while 
purpose. This is not an American theory, but 
adapted to American ways and problems it has 
worked with surprising success. Indeed, what- 
ever House puts his hand to has a way of work- 
ing out satisfactorily. In business he would be 
called, not a man of mystery, but a wizard, 
for his gift is precisely that gift of the leaders 
of the world of capital and industry — the gift of 

17 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

conception and foresight, combined with ability 
in organization. 

Another reason for popular misunderstanding 
of House's character is the fact that no political 
leader ever before in this country occupied the 
place he created for himself. If you doubt this, 
cast your eye over the Administrations from 
Washington's on. There have been Presidential 
favorites, confidants, private advisers, boon-com- 
panions, cupmates. But never was there a man 
the President relied upon, who had no finger in 
the political pie. Mark Hanna, for example, cut 
nearly as important a figure in McKinley's time 
as does Colonel House to-day. But Hanna was 
the political boss incarnate. Colonel House has 
no axes, business or political, to grind. He has no 
worthy henchmen to land jobs for. He is not try- 
ing to build up political machines in this or that 
State. Patronage means nothing to him. 

"Yes, I know he must be a great man," said a 
corporation head. "He's shown that. Wish we 
could get him on our board. But what I want 
to know is: What's his game? What's he get- 
ting out of this? There never lived a man who 
worked for nothing." 

Cynical as it may seem, this man's argument 
has the germ of truth in it. He was quite cor- 
rect in saying that "there never lived a man who 
worked for nothing." Colonel House works for 

i8 



MORE MISUNDERSTOOD THAN MYSTERIOUS 

the pleasure of doing things, big things, impor- 
tant things — and, therefore, interesting things. 
He has all the money he needs, and he enjoys de- 
voting his talents to promoting the efficiency of 
American government, increasing the prestige of 
the Republic abroad, and furthering the winning 
of peace for a war-weary world. In his own 
words : 

"People ask what I get out of it. My answer 
is that the only work that is worth while, the' 
only work that brings satisfaction, is the work 
that is unselfish. I say this without desiring to 
be ostentatious. Examine yourself, and you will 
find it to be true. Consider men like Gen. 
Goethals or Charles W. Eliot. Imagine the won- 
derful pleasure, the heart-warming satisfaction, 
Goethals gained from building the Panama Canal 
on his meager salary of an engineer officer of the 
regular army. Or the satisfaction Dr. Eliot 
must have derived during the years he devoted 
to Harvard University. Take a man like Harri- 
man. I have always thought that he was not 
guided solely by personal ambition in his career. 
Underneath all his achievements was the desire 
to do things, and his gratification in accomplish- 
ment would have been much greater if he had not 
had to acquire a fortune along with it. 

"Some people who do not care for pecuniary 
rewards, on the other hand, do like the purely 

19 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

honorary badges of success. I happen not to 
care for the badges, either. Honors are all very 
well in their way, but I get more pleasure out 
of something I have done without reward, other 
than the appreciation of my friends, than I could 
from all the money and decorations in this coun- 
try and Europe." 

That is House. 

Barring payment of his traveling expenses 
when he went abroad on official missions, he has 
never received a cent from the United States or 
any other Government. His modest personal 
fortune, as will be shown later on, has suffered, 
rather than increased, in consequence of his pre- 
occupation with public affairs. The sum total 
of his reward so far for services of inestimable 
worth, has been the gratitude of the President 
and of the few persons who were cognizant of the 
debt the country owed him. 

An extraordinary man, who was once de- 
scribed in Figaro of Paris, as "circulating imper- 
turbable amidst the noisy circles, which, weighed 
down by intrigues, combinations, shameless bluff, 
and impossible deals, form the American elec- 
toral world!" 

This description is not altogether pleasing to 
Americans or even to Colonel House, himself, but 
it shows that Europeans have grasped more defi- 
nitely than Colonel House's countrymen, the nov- 

20 



MORE MISUNDERSTOOD THAN MYSTERIOUS 

elty of his position in our public life. Men of this 
type have been known abroad for over a century, 
particularly in England, where the concentration 
of heritable wealth has developed the political 
dilettante, who could afford to mingle in politics 
without price or sordid aim. But it is question- 
able whether any country has produced a man, 
who has divorced himself so completely from 
practical politics, who has played the game so 
steadily with impersonal motive. 

And it is flatly unjust to describe the man who 
nominated and elected four Governors of Texas, 
who picked Woodrow Wilson as the logical Dem- 
ocratic candidate for the Presidency in 1912, who 
helped materially to secure Wilson's nomination 
at the Baltimore Convention and to direct his 
two campaigns, who foresaw the world war a 
year before it happened, as a political dilettante. 
He is a political genius, this gray, quiet-voiced 
man, with the shrewd, unwinking eyes and the 
level voice. In Europe already they are speak- 
ing of him as the foremost expert on inter- 
national politics among the statesmen of the 
Entente Allies. They believe in him because in 
1914 and 191 5 he prophesied events which oc- 
curred in 1916 and 1917. 



21 



CHAPTER II 

FROM A WESTERN BOYHOOD TO AN EASTERN 
COLLEGE 

EDWARD MANDELL HOUSE was born 
in Houston, Texas, July 26, 1858. His 
father was Thomas William House, and his 
mother before her marriage was Mary Elizabeth 
Shearn, daughter of Judge Shearn, one of the 
well-known early jurists of the State. He was 
the youngest of seven children. The Houses 
were of Dutch extraction, but the family had 
been domiciled in England for many generations 
before coming to this country. The elder House 
was one of that indomitable army of pioneers 
who created the famous tag of the '30s and '40s, 
of the last century— ''G. T. T.," gone to Texas— 
which was pasted on office-doors in every city 
of the Eastern States, and all over the British 
Isles. He arrived in Texas when it was still a 
section of the Mexican Republic, then plunged in 
a bloody welter of civil strife after the brief- 
lived empire of Iturbide. 

He fought under Sam Houston's lieutenant, 
General Burleson, grand-uncle of the present 

22 



iWESTERN BOYHOOD TO EASTERN COLLEGE 

Postmaster-General, in the victorious revolution 
of 1836, which ended in the foundation of the 
Lone Star Republic. Thomas William House 
lived under four flags in Texas in the course of 
his long life — the Mexican, the banner of the 
Texan Republic, the Stars and Bars of the Con- 
federacy, and the Stars and Stripes of the Union. 
In his way, he must have been as distinctive a 
character as his son. He prospered exceedingly, 
acquiring large holdings of sugar-cane and cotton 
lands, and many slaves, besides developing a flour- 
ishing business as a private banker. He is still 
remembered by old Texans as a man of strong 
will and great business capacity. 

Young House — "Ed" House to his boyhood 
friends — was born at a time when Texas was 
still, in the fullest sense of the word, a frontier 
State, although the actual frontier districts had 
been pushed westward of the seaboard counties. 
He grew up with a generation of men who had 
known "Davie" Crockett, James Bowie, Kit 
Carson, Mirabeau B. Lamar, Stephen Austin, 
Henry Smith, James W. Robinson, J. W. Fannin. 
The Alamo and San Jacinto were more than 
memories. Sam Houston himself was still alive 
■ — indeed, was elected Governor of Texas in 1859, 
the year after House was born, and strove with- 
out avail in 1861 to hold the State for the Union. 

When the Civil War ended in 1865 House was 
23 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

almost seven years old, and he was passing 
through the most observant period of youth dur- 
ing the tumultuous reconstruction days which 
followed, when Texas, like the other Southern 
States, was ruled by carpet-baggers and negroes, 
and for a short while tasted some of the miseries 
of a conquered people. He can remember when 
shooting frays were common occurrences in the 
streets of Houston; when the law of the pistol 
held sway all over the State, and a man who made 
enemies had to rely for safety on the quickness 
of his draw and the accuracy of his aim. Those 
were the days when Texas was still raw and 
crude, untamed and turbulent. The Comanches, 
Cheyennes, and Apaches ravaged the western 
counties; the bison roved in the Northwest, and 
the cowpuncher was in his glory. They were 
days which passed many years ago, and are re- 
flected now only in the gaudy reproductions of 
the cinema. 

"I think it is my memory of early times in 
Texas which keeps me from being as shocked 
as some people are at the dreadful slaughter of 
this war," he once remarked. "To a man who 
can remember when bad men killed for sport in 
open daylight in city streets and desperadoes, 
swarmed in bands and ruled whole tracts of 
country, the destruction of European lands is not 
so startling, after all." 

24 



WESTERN BOYHOOD TO EASTERN COLLEGE 

Young House grew up a Hardy, sturdy child, 
as was natural in that frontier environment. He 
learned to shoot and ride a broncho, as boys 
nowadays learn to skate or ride a bicycle. Slightly 
built and quiet-mannered as he is to-day, it is 
difficult to believe that he is a dead-shot with the 
six-shooter or rifle. This is not an exaggeration. 
He has all the celerity of the old frontier in 
drawing and aiming the pistol. There are few 
Texas rangers who can beat him at it. He was a 
close second in this respect to his friend and 
instructor, the late Capt. ''Bill" McDonald, one 
of the last of the gunmen of the "Shooting 
Times." 

''Strangely enough, I have never done well 
with the shotgun," Colonel House admits. "I 
think this is because I have never cared about 
shooting things, and killing birds with small shot 
always has been repugnant to me. I have hunted 
larger game with the rifle, but hunting is not a 
sport that appeals to me. I learned to shoot be- 
cause everybody in our country knew how to 
shoot. It was something worth knowing, too, and 
I have never regretted the time spent on it. There 
is always the chance it may be useful." 

While he was still very young, Colonel House 
suffered a fall from a swing which caused brain 
fever and left him rather delicate. That was 
before drainage theories had been developed to 

25 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

any extent, and the eastern portion of Texas was 
inclined to be malarial. A few years later, he 
sustained something like a heat-stroke, which 
weakened his resistance to climatic conditions to 
a point which made it imperative that he should 
be absent from the State for the greater part of 
the year. His father, of course, was a wealthy 
man, and it was decided that young House should 
be educated in the North, not only in considera- 
tion of his health, but because he showed a 
marked bookish tendency. 

Given his pick of educational institutions. 
House determined to go to the Hopkins Grammar 
School at New Haven and prepare for Yale. 
This is one of the most ancient preparatory 
schools in New England, and among the students 
House found boys from many well-known fam- 
ilies of the East and West, boys whose fathers 
were doing things in business and politics. He 
enjoyed himself to the full in the pleasant atmos- 
phere of the school and of New Haven, which 
had not then become a blustering factory city, 
and still slumbered peacefully under its towering 
elms. 

He was not a good scholar: he admits that 
himself, as do his schoolmates, quick though they 
are to pay tribute to his lovable qualities, his 
store of general knowledge, and his insatiable 
pursuit of everything which interested him. Ac- 

26 




I 



COLONEL HOUSE AT TWENTY 



WESTERN BOYHOOD TO EASTERN COLLEGE 

cording to some of those former school friends, 
Colonel House in his 'teens was already demon- 
strating his ability as a pacifier in smoothing out 
student rows. But he, himself, scouts the idea. 

"I was a quarrelsome boy, if the truth were 
known," he declares. ''Well, perhaps, I was not 
so quarrelsome when I got to college. But I can 
remember, when I was younger, I used to like to 
set boys at each other to see what they would do 
and then try to bring them around again. I have 
been called a great student, too. As a matter 
of fact, I didn't give a hang for my studies in 
school or college. I got through them as best I 
could. I wasn't interested in them. There 
were just two subjects that did interest me from 
my childhood — politics and history — and I read 
everything on those subjects that I could get my 
hands on. But I cared about nothing else." 

His old friends do not altogether bear him out 
in his first assertion, as has been said. 

"My recollection of Ed House as a college 
chum," said one man who makes his home now 
in New York city, "is that he always played the 
part of a quiet peacemaker in college rows, and 
established with us a high reputation for kindly 
diplomacy of a high order. He was Alpha Delta 
Phi, I remember, and a valued member of our 
chapter. Whenever there was a disturbance 
Ed would silently appear, and in a few minutes — 

27 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

you wouldn't know exactly how it happened — 
the trouble would be all over. He had an excep- 
tionally sweet disposition, and got on with every- 
body. As I recall, he was not the friend merely 
of a certain set of men, but of many fellows of a 
wide range of tastes and habits And he was 
everlastingly exploring some book. One of my 
earliest remembrances of him is that of a quiet 
youth reading a ponderous volume of de Tocque- 
ville's 'Democracy in America' as he walked 
along the street. That picture has stuck in my 
mind for forty years, I suppose. He liked espe- 
cially to start discussions on current topics in the 
news, political matters in this country or abroad, 
analyze what had been done, and then start out 
to develop a plan which would have worked 
better. 

** 'They ought not to have done that,' he would 
say. 'Now, this would be much better. Listen 
to me, now.' 

"And then he would launch into his own views, 
and he made us listen and debate them with him. 
He always liked to hear what other people 
thought." 

As matters worked out. House did not go to 
Yale. Several of the boys who were with him at 
the Hopkins School switched at the last moment 
to Cornell, which was just beginning to loom 
important on the educational horizon, and House 

28 



WESTERN BOYHOOD TO EASTERN COLLEGE 

switched with them. He entered college in 1877, 
with the class of 1881, but his father's death in 
1880 compelled him to leave after he had com- 
pleted less than three years of the course. He 
was not sorry to go, for he felt that he had gained 
everything that he desired from college, and he 
had the curiosity of youth to sample the world's 
portion for him. 

One aspect of his school and college life, how- 
ever, deserves more consideration. That was 
the friendships he made. Even at that early age 
House demonstrated his rare capacity for picking 
the right kind of men to know, which is one of 
the secrets of his amazing success. It was not 
that he was in any way snobbish. Personally he 
is, and was, the reverse of this. But he is inter- 
ested in men who count and in measures that 
matter, and some uncanny intuition in his char- 
acter enables him to identify the men who can 
work on his level. 

Among his young friends were several whose 
families held prominent positions in Washington 
society. One, in particular^ was a son of Sena- 
tor Oliver Morton, of Indiana, who had been 
War Governor of his State. Senator Morton 
was an unusually interesting man. A cripple 
from paralysis during the last decade of his life, 
he managed to maintain his place in the political 
arena and exert a potent influence in national 

29 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

affairs. House was especially favored in the 
friendship of such families as this one. Through 
them he gained an insight into the life of the 
national capital and the inner history of contem- 
porary politics which was invaluable in assisting 
the development of his favorite hobby. 

He had the entree during his vacations and 
holidays into the most exclusive circles of the 
capital during the Grant and Hayes Administra- 
tions, and was frequently at the White House 
with other young people. He knew members of 
both the Hayes and Grant families, and occupied 
what might be called a stage-box seat to witness 
the celebrated Hayes-Tilden contest. At an age 
when most boys were interested mainly in sport 
or the petty incidents of their own lives, he was 
turning an attentive gaze upon the momentous 
events of a crucial period in the nation's evolu- 
tion. 

When he returned to Texas, summoned to his 
father's bedside, he was obliged to put aside the 
pursuit of his hobby for a time. There was a 
large estate to be settled, and he had to make up 
his mind seriously on the question of his future. 
As the youngest son, he was guided more or less 
by his brothers, who were from twelve to fifteen 
years older than himself, the children who had 
come in between having died before this. In the 
final settlement of the family business^ three of 

30 



WESTERN BOYHOOD TO EASTERN COLLEGE 

the sons, Thomas WilHam, jr., John, and E. M., 
bought out the other heirs, Thomas WilHam re- 
ceiving the banking interests, John the sugar 
lands, and E. M. the cotton plantations. 

It may be interesting for the people who are 
given to referring to Colonel House as ''the Aus- 
tin banker" to know that he is not and never has 
been a banker, in the accepted sense of the word, 
since he disposed of his shares in his father's 
bank. Neither was he a ranchman. If he was 
anything of that sort, he was an agriculturist, but 
he is very frank to admit that he was no more of 
an agriculturist than he could help being. In 
conducting his own affairs he employed the same 
method he used in national politics — he secured 
the best man available to take care of the details 
under his general supervision. You see, that left 
him plenty of leisure to play with poUtics. 



31 



CHAPTER III 

TRUTH AND FICTION ABOUT HIS BUSINESS 
AFFAIRS 

AFTER the settlement of his father's estate, 
Colonel House moved from Houston to 
Austin, partly for the sake of his health and partly 
to be closer to the Public Land Office of the State, 
in order that he might have better facilities for 
developing his holdings. His father left him 
about $20,000 a year, and his income to-day is 
practically the same. He never craved wealth, as 
it is understood in the East. His principal con- 
cern was not to extend his property, but to con- 
serve it. The active pursuit of cotton culture 
did not attract him, and he spent very little time 
on his land, especially after his marriage to Miss 
Loulie Hunter, of Austin, on August 4, 1881. 

The statement will bear repetition that details 
have never interested him; he prefers to deal in 
the wider aspects of life, business, or politics. 

Of his financial affairs he says: 

"As a matter of fact, I have no more money 
to-day than my father left me. They say I am 
a banker. That is not true, and it never was. 

32 



ABOUT HIS BUSINESS AFFAIRS 

I got out of my father's bank as soon as I could. 
At this moment I have about $3,000 of stock in a 
bank in Austin and several thousands more in a 
bank in Houston. My bank stock holdings may 
aggregate $15,000 to $20,000. I doubt if they 
ever exceeded $7,000 after I disposed of the 
interests my father left me, until quite recently, 
when I sold my home in Austin and took in pay- 
ment for it $12,500 of bank stock. Formerly all 
my money was invested in Texas cotton lands, 
but several years ago, when I found my time was 
becoming more and more occupied with the work 
of the Administration, I sold off most of my 
property, and the major portion of my income 
now comes from the interest on the notes I took 
in payment for my land. 

"I know that men ask what I am getting out of 
my work. How foolish they are! They talk 
about my connection with Wall Street and the 
big banking houses. They seem to think I must 
get some sort of a shady rake-off for my services. 
It is as pitiful as it is despicable. Why, I can 
show you without fear the source of every penny 
of my income ! The only bonds I buy are those 
of public-service corporations over which munici- 
palities have control. The only Government 
bonds I own are a small block of Liberties, pur- 
chased for the same patriotic reason which ani- 
mated millions of other Americans. 

33 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

"If I wished to make money out of my position, 
I could do it easily, and without going to Wall 
Street. With my knowledge of what is happen- 
ing and what is going to happen, I am in a far 
better position than the powers of Wall Street, 
themselves, to take advantage of market condi- 
tions. But I will have nothing to do with that 
sort of thing. If I wished to make money dis- 
honestly, I could make plenty of it without Wall 
Street's assistance. It is difficult for some people 
to understand that I have enough money for my 
wants. I have never accepted any salary or re- 
tainer from any Government, except that when 
I have gone abroad for the President on official 
missions my expenses have been paid." 

So much for the vexed question of the secret 
sources of the mysterious Colonel House's mil- 
lions ! 

There has been a great deal of tommy-rot 
written about Colonel House and his personal 
business, and this is as good a place as any to 
point the absurdity of the conventional write-up 
to which he has been subjected. The offenders 
have been legion — offenders because if they had 
gone to him frankly for information he would 
have given it to them. His aversion to publicity, 
previously mentioned, is not so pronounced that 
he fails to recognize the right of the public to 
know the main facts about him. At first, per- 

34 



ABOUT HIS BUSINESS AFFAIRS 

haps, Colonel House did sidestep the publicity 
which was showered upon him. It was very novel 
and highly disagreeable. But he soon saw that 
his position was such as to require acceptance of 
the evil, and those who know him will testify that 
he stood to it like a man. In the meantime, how- 
ever, scores of nimble writers had begun to turn 
the wheels of the rumor factory, and legends, 
myths, fairy-tales, improvisations, corruptions of 
true anecdotes, and plain lies were showered 
forth by the column. Colonel House has not 
caught up with them yet. He gave up, discour- 
aged, several years ago. 

' It would be impossible to deal with all of these 
tootings of the journalistic trumpet, but we may 
select one ''horrible example" in the most recent 
which has come to notice, an article entitled 
"Colonel House— The Man of Mystery" in De- 
cember, 19 1 7. From this we glean the following 
quotations, cited because they are typical of the 
mass of misstatements or exaggerations about 
Colonel House: 

"He is a noiseless millionaire." 

"House is a mental equilibrium, a gyroscope, 
a sounding-board, and an ambassador, ex jure, 
of the Presidential mental slant. He knows 
what the President's thought emanations are and 
how to feed them upon what they seek." 

"No one has to 'see' Colonel House. No one 
35 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

can ^see' him, because upon approach he would 
dive into a hole and pull the hole in after him if 
possible. He detests and fears publicity." 

It is only fair to say that at the bottom of all 
of this preposterous farrago there is a gleam of 
pure metal : 

"He gets nothing out of it except the satisfac- 
tion of honestly believing that he is serving his 
country and his party." 

Even in this last quotation, however, there is 
a hint of a sneer, an inference that the man, at 
best, is a clever politician, working to promote 
party ends. People who know the real Colonel 
House will venture to differ with such an estimate 
of him. They consider him an astute politician, 
yes, the cleverest politician the country ever saw. 
But they do not stop with that. They believe 
that his greatest attribute is his statesmanship, 
his diplomacy in handling men and pushing 
measures. In these respects they consider him to 
rival the late John Hay. 

The other statements quoted may be dismissed 
with a few w^ords Colonel House obviously is 
not a millionaire. He is not a servile echo to the 
President's "thought emanations." He is thef 
President's principal counselor, probably the only 
man upon whose advice Woodrow Wilson leans 
with implicit trust, and any one who is acquainted 
with the upstanding character of Mr. Wilson, his 

36 



ABOUT HIS BUSINESS AFFAIRS 

stern self-confidence, will appreciate what this 
means. A writer in the New York Times two 
years ago — Charles Willis Thompson — in one of 
the few accurate summaries of Colonel House's 
character and work, in convincing phrases 
branded as false the estimates of House as the 
messenger boy of the White House. Mr. 
Thompson's words will bear repetition: 

"Of course, it is easy enough to turn a man into 
a mystery or a puzzle. All you have to do is to 
construct his character ideally from materials 
furnished by yourself, taking care that it shall be 
nothing like him. Then, when his actions are 
diametrically opposite to his character — that is, 
the character you have invented for him — these 
actions naturally become puzzling and the man 
becomes a mystery. It is then time for you to 
throw the blame on him, and ask why a man 
should be so confoundedly mysterious." 

Mr. Thompson was writing anent the sugges- 
tion that Colonel House's trip to Europe in De- 
cember, 1916, was for the purpose of adjusting 
certain alleged squabbles between the Ambassa- 
dors in London, Paris, Berlin, and Vienna, these 
gentlemen of years and dignity presumably hav- 
ing adopted the mental attitude of small boys who 
all wanted to bat at the same time in a game of 
*'one-old-cat." Mr. Thompson rem^arked on this 
subject: 

37 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

^'Seldom has a single effort of the imagination, 
tossed off in an idle moment without thought, 
created so much havoc as this story that Colonel 
House was going abroad to settle some personal 
differences between Ambassadors. He was to 
arrange that one Ambassador could get his 
clothes from another city, that another should 
stop bossing a third, that another's wife could 
go shopping whenever she wanted to without 
molestation, and generally to play the part of 
maiden aunt to all the naughty children who rep- 
resent this august Government in Europe. The 
State Department has been busy denying it ever 
since, and dispatches from abroad indicate that 
our Ambassadors are bewildered and infuriated. 
Yet its author invented it merely as an intel- 
lectual exercise, as a newspaper poet tries his 
hand at rondeaux and ballads to see what he 
can do. 

"No one would have believed it if the totally 
imaginary character of Colonel House had not 
been built up beforehand. Since the people who 
wrote about him did not know anything about 
him, he had to be invented, and the imagmary 
Colonel House, the Colonel House who never ex- 
isted, was one who might conceivably be sent 
abroad on nursery-maid errands like this. It is 
because of this that he is pictured, sometimes as 
a sort of private tutor sent hither and yon to 

38 



ABOUT HIS BUSINESS AFFAIRS 

teach naughty Ambassadors how to behave, 
sometimes as a Sherlock Holmes snooping 
around Europe to find a clew to peace, sometimes 
as a kind of spotter finding out if any of our 
Ambassadors have failed to ring up when we 
deposited a Lusitania or Ancona note in the box. 
The real Colonel House would not touch the first 
or third of these jobs with a pair of tongs, and 
knows altogether too much about the situation to 
waste time with the second. The real Colonel 
House is not an errand-boy, nor a private detec- 
tive, nor a governess ; he is a man who has made 
history, and molded great affairs. He is a 
statesman, a politician, a policy-maker, and a 
Warwick." 

There has been always a temptation to writers 
to compare Colonel House, as Mr. Thompson has 
done, with one of the famous rulers of kings of 
the past. He has been called another Talleyrand, 
a second Machiavelli. But there is nothing of 
the cunning medieval treachery of Machiavelli, 
the masterful ambition of Warwick, or the sly 
insidiousness of Talleyrand in his character. He 
is wholly modern in his outlook, one of the most 
progressive liberals in the world in these progres- 
sive times, set bitterly in principle against the old 
machinery of covered Government, an advocate 
of public diplomacy and direct legislation. Sim- 
ply because he prefers for personal reasons to 

39 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

work as much as possible without attracting at- 
tention to himself, people who do not know him 
jump to the conclusion that he is a believer in the 
old-world school of diplomacy. Nothing could 
be more erroneous. His interest from the start 
has been to strengthen the voters' grip on gov- 
ernmental machinery, and every piece of legisla- 
tion, every policy, with which he has been con- 
nected, has been distinctly progressive in trend. 

To go back over our track to the list of "hor- 
rible examples." To say that no one can *'see" 
Colonel House is absurd. The remark is only 
surpassed in absurdity by the statement that he 
fears publicity. He is one of the most frequently 
"seen" men in public life. Anybody who has a 
legitimate excuse — and a good many more who 
have not — can see him, at least once. People 
who really have something to say can come as 
often as they please. Colonel House can never 
see too much of this kind of person. One of the 
reasons for his phenomenal grasp of public senti- 
ment is his tremendously wide acquaintance — 
actually far wider than the President's, because it 
reaches through all strata of society and includes 
hundreds of men and women outside official cir- 
cles. Off-hand, one may venture the assertion 
that there are few men or women of prominence 
in any walk of life in America to-day with whom 
Mr. House has not conversed at some time or 

40 



ABOUT HIS BUSINESS AFFAIRS 

other. If the writer of the article mentioned 
above had undertaken the task of ''seeing" 
Colonel House he would have found it surpris- 
ingly easy. Colonel House never flees any 
reasonable curiosity, although he works on a 
schedule which requires the use of every waking 
hour. 

As for his fearing publicity — it is difficult to 
explain the source of this misunderstanding. 
What cause would he have for fearing publicity? 
He has nothing to conceal. His record is clean ; 
he would have been in the scrap-heap long before 
this if his enemies, the men who, for one reason 
or another, he has been compelled to disappoint 
or ofifend, had been able to discover anything to 
tarnish his shield. It is true that he does not 
like publicity. But he understands the art of 
securing and holding publicity, one of the most 
difficult arts of the politician, to a degree that 
Colonel Roosevelt cannot exceed. Upon this gift 
of his has hinged the success of more than one 
Democratic policy, the issue of several momen- 
tous campaigns. 



CHAPTER IV 

STEADFAST REFUSAL OF PUBLIC OFFICE 

ONE of the peculiarities of Colonel House 
which has stirred the ire of those who in- 
sist upon making a mystery out of him, is his 
steadfast refusal to accept public office. Repub- 
lican campaign spell-binders — and Republican 
Senators on the floor of Congress — proclaim that 
behind this notable perversion of human nature 
must lie some questionable hidden purpose. It 
is unnatural for any man to refuse high office 
when it is within his grasp, they declare. If he 
shrinks from it he must have something to con- 
ceal, or else he must find it more to his advantage 
to operate without the incubus of an oath to the 
people's interest. So they decide that Colonel 
House is a lobbyist, or a demagogue, or an agent 
of secret powers, and they are satisfied. 

Now there is as much of a mystery about 
House's refusal to accept office as there is about 
any other aspect of this many-sided man. He 
could have had any office in the gift of the people 
of Texas years ago, but he didn't want it. He 
could have any office in the gift of Woodrow 

42 



STEADFAST REFUSAL OF PUBLIC OFFICE 

Wilson to-day — could have had it any time these 
last six years — but he doesn't want it. Public 
office has no charms for him, but wholly aside 
from his instinctive distaste for it, he knows that 
his health would not permit attention to the ardu- 
ous routine duties of any office in Texas or in 
Washington. The injuries he suffered in his 
youth, which have already been described, under- 
mined his resistance to heat, and it is simply im- 
possible for him to pass the summer in the tepid 
climate below Mason and Dixon's Line. Even in 
the comparatively cool climate of the North he 
finds it difficult to undertake in summer as much' 
work as he is capable of during the balance of 
the year. 

"I never wanted office, anyway," he says, in 
describing his attitude toward the proposition. 
"But even if I did want it, I know that I should 
be signing my death-warrant to accept any office 
of worth, with its requirement of rigid hours and 
unremitting application. When I was a young 
man I used to think that I could do anything, ride 
and tramp in the sun like a negro farmhand. 
But I did it once too often, and I had something 
like a heatstroke. Since then I have not been 
able to stand the Texas summer climate. When 
I entered Texas politics this handicap stared me 
in the face, and I knew it would be foolish of me 
to consider accepting any State office, which 

43 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

would have required my year-round presence in 
Austin, 

"For the same reason I could not hold any 
Cabinet position which would demand my pres- 
ence in Washington during the summer. The 
climate of Washington is almost as hard on me as 
the Texas climate during the hot months. The 
kind of work I am doing is very different. For 
one thing, I always have the knowledge at the 
back of my head that if I wanted to drop it, I 
could quit to-morrow. I am not bound down. 
For another thing, I am not held to regular hours, 
and I can work when, where, and how I choose, 
in New York, for instance, instead of Washing- 
ton. I don't mean by this that I have ever seri- 
ously thought of dropping my work, but that 
after all, I have the comfortable feeling of being 
able to do so, if I ever felt the burden was too 
great." 

But even if his health permitted him to accept 
office, it is to be doubted if he would do so. He 
does not care for that sort of thing. It is much 
more to his taste to work as he is doing. He is 
what you might call a consulting expert in poli- 
tics, an adviser and assistant of office-holders. 
The only advantage he feels that he could gain 
by abandoning this role and taking office would 
be the winning of credit for measures for which 
he was responsible; but Colonel House's tempera- 

44 



STEADFAST REFUSAL OF PUBLIC OFFICE 

ment is so adjusted that he would far rather plan 
out measures and allow some other man to receive 
the credit for putting them in operation than 
occupy the limelight himself. Results, not re- 
wards, count with him. Applause means nothing 
to him. He is like his friend, Mr. Wilson, in his 
perfect readiness to ignore praise or blame if he 
thinks he is doing what is right and just. 

"I am working for what I conceive to be right," 
he summed it up, "and if I contribute in any 
measure to the success of public affairs, I am 
satisfied with the accomplishment of my object." 

Having set at rest the problem of why Colonel 
House does not seek the fierce light which beats 
upon the office-holder, we may turn to his first 
venture in practical politics. His interest in 
political matters, it will have been noted, began 
long before he was of voting age, and for the first 
ten years of his residence in Austin, after his 
marriage, his interest remained that of the ordi- 
narily active and intelligent citizen. He was 
meeting men, studying legislative problems, keep- 
ing his ear to the ground to observe the under- 
lying murmur of popular sentiment. 

Texas had just passed through the humiliating 
period of reconstruction and was but recently re- 
instated to a position of complete independence. 
It was an era of rapid changes. The railroads 
were reaching out for more territory as fast as 

4S 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

the surveyors could plan the rights of way and 
the road gangs lay the ties and spike the rails. 
The frontier was receding westward, not will- 
ingly, to be sure, but in a sullen mood of stubborn 
opposition and lawlessness. Lnmigrants were 
flocking to the raw lands of this greatest of land 
domains in the Union. The cattleman and the 
sheep-raiser were stopping now and then in their 
bickers to eye uneasily the growing ranks of the 
farmers who were overflowing from the eastern 
counties. Texas was gradually developing from 
a frontier State, with all the seething restlessness 
of overnight growth, into a settled community of 
definite aims and purposes. 

The period during which Colonel House ex- 
erted his influence upon the State's politics was 
the period of final evolution, and witnessed the 
establishment of the commonwealth on a basis 
of firm laws, which curbed the power of the cor- 
porations and made for popular control of the 
executive. Years before other States began to 
tackle the problem of restricting the mushroom 
growth of incorporated bodies, Texas had 
written on its statute books one of the most thor- 
ough railroad regulation acts which has ever 
been adopted in this country. It was in connec- 
tion with this particular piece of legislation that 
Colonel House laid the foundations of his polit- 
ical prestige and began his extraordinary career 

46 



STEADFAST REFUSAL OF PUBLIC OFFICE 

in State politics, which ended voluntarily only 
after he had elected four Governors in succession 
and at least one United States Senator. 

In 1892 James A. Hogg, famous throughout 
the State as ''the Great Commoner," had been 
Governor for two years, and was asking for re- 
nomination on an extremely radical platform, 
which called for the passage of an act creating a 
Railroad Commission, a law providing that no 
railroad should issue stocks or bonds upon its 
property in Texas, except with the consent of the 
Commission, after the valuation of its property 
by the Commission's engineers, and an act 
requiring the use of the Australian ballot in all 
towns of more than 10,000 population. Of 
course, in the ordinary course of events, nobody 
but a Democrat could be elected to any State 
office in Texas, and the only opposition to Hogg 
worth mentioning came from the conservative 
wing of his own party. George Clark was the 
candidate put forward by the conservatives, and 
he was strong enough to make matters very 
interesting for Governor Hogg. Clark did not 
think much of the Railroad Commission idea 
anyway, but he made the point that if there was 
to be such a body it should be elected by the peo- 
ple, and not appointed by the Chief Executive.. 

Colonel House did not know Governor Hogg 
very intimately at this time, but he had formed 

47 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

definite views on the issues of the campaign, and 
his sympathies were entirely with the radicals. 
The quiet, soft-voiced young cotton planter of 
Austin had attracted the attention of many of the 
leaders of the party by his political sagacity as 
revealed in minor matters, and when the cam- 
paign for the Democratic nomination began he 
was asked to manage Hogg's interests. A cam- 
paign committee was appointed, a chairman 
elected, and ostensibly this body handled the 
fight. It was the form adopted by House in all 
his later campaigns, national as well as State, 
except the first Culberson campaign. But 
actually behind the campaign managers who 
spoke on the stump and issued statements to the 
newspapers sat a young man — he was then not 
thirty-five — who laid out the strategy of the main 
operations, directed the concentration or dis- 
persal of forces, and suggested the catchwords 
and tactical dispositions. 

Plis plans succeeded with magical smoothness, 
as Colonel House's plans generally do. He gives 
to political conceptions a deftness, a sureness in 
execution, which is really beautiful to the trained 
observer of the political field. He almost never 
makes mistakes. When he does they are in- 
stantly rectified, frequently even turned to ad- 
vantage. There were probably less than fifty 
Democratic politicians in Texas in 1892 who 

48 



STEADFAST REFUSAL OF PUBLIC OFFICE 

appreciated the share he had taken in Hogg's 
victory; but the fifty who did know were men 
whose opinions counted, and while they respected 
House's wishes to the extent of keeping his name 
out of the newspapers, they sang his praises for- 
tissimo to Democratic leaders of other States. 
Thus was laid the basis for a reputation which 
ultimately enabled House to pick his own candi- 
date for the Presidency in 1912, and impose his 
will upon a rather unwilling Democracy. 

One of the candidates elected on the State 
ticket with Hogg in that campaign was a young 
man of about House's age, Charles A. Culberson, 
the new Attorney-General of Texas. He was a 
son of David Culberson, for many terms senior 
Democratic member of the Judiciary Committee 
of the House of Representatives, and Chairman 
of the Committee during Cleveland's Adminis- 
trations, and one of the best-known lawyers in 
Texas. The son was destined to be even more 
distinguished, thanks in no small degree to the 
friendship and counsel of Colonel House. 

The legislation demanded by Governor Hogg 
was speedily enacted by the Texas Legislature, 
and the responsibility for making it work then 
devolved upon Attorney-General Culberson's 
shoulders. The railroads were quick to realize 
the significance of the new measures, and, after 
waging a losing fight against them in the Legis- 

49 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

lature, took up the battle anew in the courts. 
Every influence of a well-equipped lobby, sup- 
plied with unlimited funds, was brought to bear 
against the effective operation of the laws. The 
railroads of the country combined to make their 
attack as strong as possible. The best legal 
talent was employed to exploit the railroads' con- 
struction of the basic statutes to prove the regu- 
latory powers conferred by the new laws illegal 
and unconstitutional. Step by step, Culberson 
fought on almost alone, through one court after 
another, until his final victory was won in the 
Supreme Court at Washington. 

Colonel House watched Culberson's develop- 
ment under great responsibilities with more than 
a little interest. He also watched with concern the 
growth of Populism and free-silver sentiment in 
Texas, and the swinging of the radical Demo- 
crats over to these dangerous ideas. He was a 
radical himself, but he looked ahead and saw the 
pit that free silver would dig for the party in 
1896. He decided to do what he could to check 
the influence of Populism in the State, and se- 
lected Culberson as the right man for the pur- 
pose. Despite Culberson's really sensational 
work as Attorney-General, he was not considered 
generally to be the man the party leaders would 
select for the Gubernatorial nomination. 

The ostensible leaders were divided in opinion 
50 



STEADFAST REFUSAL OF PUBLIC OFFICE 

on the claims to the nomination o£ the venerable 
Judge John H. Reagan, who had served the State 
in the United States Senate, and was the only 
surviving member of the Cabinet of Jefferson 
Davis, and Representative S. W. T. Lanham, 
who had been ten years in Congress, and was a 
former Confederate soldier. These men had 
substantial values as vote-getters, and were con- 
siderably senior to Culberson in political circles. 
Even people who looked upon Culberson as 
future Gubernatorial timber did not seriously 
think of him as a rival of two such old war- 
horses of the party. 

For the first and only time in his political 
career, Colonel House departed from his fixed de- 
termination not to accept any formal office and 
took the chairmanship of Culberson's Campaign 
Committee. It is indicative of the Colonel's 
character that he has never quite gotten over a 
feeling of ruefulness at his weakness in yielding 
to importunate friends upon this occasion. 

"For the life of me, I can't see why I did it," 
he said afterward. 

One hazards a guess that it was simply one of 
those innumerable little kindlinesses of which 
Colonel House has been guilty, and which bring 
out in strong relief the sweet humanness of his 
disposition. 

To give an idea of the amazement with which 
51 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

Culberson's candidacy was greeted, here is what 
a Texas politician afterward confided to a writer 
for Harper's Weekly: 

'1 couldn't tell you now just how it happened. 
None of us had much thought about Charley 
Culberson, but first thing you know he turned up 
in the convention with enough delegates to nomi- 
nate him twice over. Not that we hadn't a high 
opinion of Charley, for he was one of the best 
Attorney-Generals Texas ever had. But no one 
had any notion that he wanted to be Governor 
until he suddenly comes along as the Democratic 
candidate, which, of course, meant election. 
That's always the way with the Senator — no 
brass bands or loud shouting about what he's 
going to do. Just goes ahead and does it." 

A very fair report of what occurred, too, ex- 
cept that the last two sentences are as applicable 
to Colonel House as they are to Culberson. The 
present senior Senator from Texas would be 
the first man to admit this. 

It was in consequence of his services to Culber- 
son that Colonel House acquired his title. One of 
the new Governor's first acts was to commission 
House a colonel on his staflf. House at first de- 
clined, but when he saw he would hurt his 
friend's feelings, reluctantly accepted and under- 
took to order the uniform for his rank, as speci- 
fied in the regulations of the adjutant-general of 

52 



STEADFAST REFUSAL OF PUBLIC OFFICE 

the Texas militia. They tell a story in Austin 
that when the Colonel's trappings arrived from 
the tailor, he took one look at the heaps of gold 
lace, aiguilettes, epaulettes, braid, and burnished 
buttons, and then called in his negro coachman. 

*'Allen," he said, "take these — these clothes, 
and remove them." 

That was the end of the Colonel's active serv- 
ice as an officer on the Governor's staff. The 
uniform for many years adorned the figure of 
his coachman on meeting nights of a certain 
lodge patronized by the Sons of Ham. But it 
was not so easy for House to discard the title, 
which he disliked almost as much as he did the 
uniform. Give the South a legitimate chance to 
call a man colonel, and he is doomed to the title 
for life. However, Mr. — beg pardon. Colonel — 
House makes the best of a bad business. Colonel 
he was. Colonel he is, and Colonel he will be to 
the end, no matter what he does, says, or thinks. 



53 



CHAPTER V 

BEHIND THE SCENES IN HIS OWN STATE 

CULBERSON made as good a Governor as 
he had Attorney-GeneraJ. Shortly after 
he was inducted into office he gained a national 
reputation by prohibiting the holding of the 
Corbett-Fitzsimmons prize-fight on Texas soil. 
When the fight promoters, backed by all the 
gambling and professional sporting elements of 
the West and East, defied the Governor and told 
him there was no State law to prevent them from 
executing their purpose, Culberson grimly sum- 
moned the Legislature to a special session and 
compelled the passage of a law to serve his pur- 
pose. 

In pursuance of his policy of State financial 
retrenchment, he insisted upon the limitation of 
the fees collected by county and district officers. 
His biggest fight, however, was to prevent the 
consolidation of the railroads in the State under 
the domination of the Southern Pacific, then 
directed by the masterful brain of the late CoUis 
P. Pluntington. This fight rivaled Culberson's 
contest to maintain the constitutionality of the 

54 



BEHIND THE SCENES IN HIS OWN STATE 

railroad regulation acts, and it lasted almost as 
long. But with the help of Colonel House and the 
other progressive leaders in the State, he frus- 
trated Huntington's attempt to secure the neces- 
sary legislation, and saved Texas from the fate 
of California. 

It is the custom in Texas to renominate every 
Governor for a second two-year term — the first 
and only break in this tradition since reconstruc- 
tion days having occurred in the case of the late 
Governor Ferguson, who was impeached and re- 
moved from office — and there was no question 
about the Democratic nomination being offered 
to Culberson. But this was in 1896, when the 
wave of Populism was sweeping the West, and 
for the first time a Democratic candidate for 
Governor of Texas was confronted with an actual 
contest on election day, the Populist State Com- 
mittee having effected a fusion with the Republi- 
cans, the Republicans supporting the Populist 
State ticket in return for the Populist electoral 
votes. 

Most of the Populist strength was recruited 
from the ranks of the radical wing of the Demo- 
cratic party, and the contest was close and excit- 
ing. Colonel House steered the Culberson cam- 
paign from his seat behind the scenes. He was 
strongly opposed to the whole Populist pro- 
gram, and especially to free silver, but he was 

55 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

wise enough to see the strength of the hysteric 
frenzy which was disrupting the party, and he 
subscribed to a compromise endorsement of the 
free silver issue by the regular Democracy. He 
was under no illusions about this issue, and he 
was convinced it was the fatal dose of poison 
which would kill the party's chance of national 
success. But he was and is by conviction a 
party man, even though he does not advise regu- 
larity on the part of every voter. 

"I didn't think Bryan could win on the free 
silver issue," he describes his feelings. "But at 
the same time I did not think it was fair for me 
to refuse to play with Bryan's crowd, just be- 
cause they had got what they wanted, which hap- 
pened to be what I did not want them to get. I 
have always been a worker for the party, and 
perhaps as much for that reason as any other 
I have always been regular. I can't conceive 
myself voting anything but a Democratic ticket. 
But that does not alter my conviction that the 
salvation of the country is the great body of 
independent voters. Where would we be if 
every man rigidly voted either a Republican or a 
Democratic ticket? If we had no silent body 
ready to curb abuses of power, no matter what 
party was responsible for the evil? No, as I say, 
I am regular, because, taking part as I do in the 
direction of the party's affairs, it is only right for 

56 



BEHIND THE SCENES IN HIS OWN STATE 

me to abide by the party's decisions, its mistakes 
as well as its achievements. But the independ- 
ent voter has my admiration and respect. He 
is the highest type of good citizen." 

A contemporary account of that campaign re- 
marks : 

"Governor Culberson took the stump, sent a 
trusted lieutenant to Democratic Headquarters, 
and gave personal attention to the campaign." 

That was the contemporary way of saying that 
Colonel House was directing his third Guberna- 
torial campaign. The Colonel kept his trusty ear 
close to earth, sensed the movement and pace of 
the groundswell, and handled his forces accord- 
ingly. Culberson was reelected by nearly 60,000 
majority. 

During Culberson's second term the fight 
against the interests, the fight for government 
for the people, was carried forward with conspic- 
uous success. The shell-backs of the old regime, 
the local reactionaries, and predatory intermedi- 
aries between the corporations and the Legisla- 
ture were backed up against a stone wall. They 
died hard, but finally the breath was pretty wdl 
squeezed out of them. 

In the course of the reorganization of the 
party the question arose of a successor to Senator 
Roger Q. Mills, who had served continuously in 
Congress since 1873, ^.nd in the Senate since 

57 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

1892, and who had announced his retirement. 
Certain political leaders of the State chose as 
their candidate Judge Reagan, who, as has been 
said, was Postmaster-General in Jefferson 
Davis's Confederate Cabinet. 

Reagan was one of the strongest and ablest 
men in the State. During his career in the 
United States Senate — he had been Mills's prede- 
cessor in the upper chamber — he had gained a 
national reputation by his share in fathering the 
Interstate Commerce Commission law, and he 
had earned the affection and regard of the people 
of Texas by resigning his seat to accept from 
Governor Hogg the Chairmanship of the State's 
first Railroad Commission, in the erection of 
which he was deeply interested. Now that the 
Commission was established and in operation, it 
was suggested that he be given the opportunity 
to resume his Senatorial honors. 

But while Colonel House had much respect for 
Judge Reagan's ability and character, he thought 
that it was advisable in the circumstances to use 
new blood. He wished to see Texas represented 
in Congress by a Senator who would respond to 
the jaew. forces he knew to be working deep 
down underneath the surface of affairs, and he 
selected Culberson as the man who could be relied 
upon to work for progressive liberalism in Gov- 
ernment. 

58 



BEHIND THE SCENES IN HIS OWN STATE 

This was in 1898, at the end of Culberson's 
second term, and it is needless to say that the 
Governor was chosen and duly entered the Sen- 
ate in December. He has been one of the most 
successful legislators of the group championed 
by Colonel House, and has served with dignity 
and distinction. At this day he is chairman of 
the Judiciary Committee of the Upper House, as 
his father was Chairman of the same Committee 
in the House of Representatives. 

Culberson's election to the Senate is notable in 
many ways, but the outstanding incident, con- 
sidering the event in perspective, was the pres- 
ence of Colonel House in the galleries of the Hall 
of the Legislature in the State Capitol, the first 
and only time he ever entered the Legislative 
Chamber. The ordinary office holders and legis- 
lators never met him, were ignorant of his power. 
— with the result that he was not pestered for his 
assistance in all sorts of schemes and projects, 
nefarious and absurd. He carries out the same 
principle in his relation to the national Adminis- 
tration. It is probable that he has not visited the 
Capitol more than three times since Wilson came 
to Washington, and those times were the occa- 
sions of the President's addresses to Congress 
on international affairs. 

While Colonel House was helping Governor 
Culberson get elected to the Senate, he was also 

59 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

Steering the campaign of Culberson's successor in 
the Governorship, and a very interesting situation 
developed in this connection. In every one of 
House's Texas campaigns he found that he had to 
oppose the man he had last made Governor, who 
always had plans calling for a successor whom 
Colonel House could not approve. 

The retiring Governor would want to make use 
of the influences which had been mustered to 
elect him for the purpose of nominating a man 
chosen by and acceptable to himself. Then Colo- 
nel House would have to go to work and tear 
down the machine he had built up, erecting in its 
stead a brand-new campaign structure. The 
trouble was that there had grown up in Texas one 
of those peculiar political customs, which are 
phenomena of American public life, giving to the 
Attorney-General the unwritten right of succes- 
sion to the Governorship. House thought that 
this was a wrong idea, a fallacious theory crip- 
pling the initiative of the voters and capable of 
being turned to bad account by unscrupulous 
politicians, who might secure control of the nom- 
inating machinery. He set his face firmly against 
it, and in the end destroyed it. 

It is true that one of the candidates for the 
Democratic nomination for Governor this year 
happens to be the present Attorney-General, but 
if he is elected he will be the first Attorney-Gen- 

60 



BEHIND THE SCENES IN HIS OWN STATE 

eral to become Governor since Colonel House 
broke the succession, and there can be no harm 
in occasional instances of promoting a man who 
has done well as the State's law officer. The 
objection Colonel House had was that, under the 
custom existing when he entered State politics, 
every Governor of Texas must have been Attor- 
ney-General of Texas, and a man who had not 
been Attorney-General, no matter what his qual- 
ifications, could not be elected. Colonel House is 
just as strong in his belief that the right man 
ought to be nominated, even if he does happen to 
be the Attorney-General, as he is in his contention 
that it is not necessary for the right man to be or 
have been Attorney-General. 

In the State campaign of 1898, Governor Cul- 
berson and his friends backed Attorney-General 
Crane for the nomination. Both Culberson and 
his predecessor, Hogg, had served as Attorney- 
General, and Culberson was only carrying on the 
tradition. 

"Crane was an admirable man and had been 
a most efficient Attorney-General," said Colonel 
House in describing the incident. "I have no 
doubt he would have made a good Governor. 
But I considered that the principle at stake was 
bigger than any question of the man's individual 
fitness. I thought it was time to destroy the 
precedent which dictated his nomination." 

61 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

The man Colonel House picked as his candidate 
for the nomination — as usual without any un- 
necessary fuss and feathers — was Representative 
Joseph D. Sayers, a Confederate veteran, who 
had been fourteen years in Congress, and at that 
time was ranking minority member of the Ap- 
propriations Committee, of which he had been 
chairman during Cleveland's Administration. 
The Spanish-American War was then occupying 
the attention of the national legislators, and it 
was impossible for Sayers to leave Washington 
to participate in his own campaign. But Colonel 
House rallied his forces and secured L. L. Foster, 
who had been a member of the Railroad Com- 
mission under Governor Hogg, to act as chair- 
man of Sayers's campaign committee. It seemed 
like a forlorn hope, even to the most devoted 
supporters of Colonel House. 

That was a real battle. Only two members of 
the Culberson Administration followed Colonel 
House in the fight against Crane. Practically all 
the men who had supported him in previous cam- 
paigns were against him. He had to begin at 
the beginning and build up a brand-new organi- 
zation. Sayers never made a speech in his own 
behalf, never even entered the State before elec- 
tion. Every bit of campaigning was done for 
him. And despite the opposition of the strongest 
men in the party, the men who held the control 

62 



BEHIND THE SCENES IN HIS OWN STATE 

of the patronage and had the prestige of their 
offices behind them, he was nominated. 

How? Well, there is a certain point beyond 
which Colonel House will not reveal the inner 
secrets of his strategy. He says it was organiza- 
tion that turned the trick, organization and a 
candidate, who, after all, had a large personal 
following and was loved and respected. 

"Politics is largely a question of organization," 
Colonel House sums it up. "You've got to have 
a good, clean fellow to put before the voters. 
After that it is organization." 

The brand of organization that nominated Say- 
ers is still talked about with awe whenever Texas 
politicians foregather. In fact, that particular 
campaign is held up to young politicians as a 
model, an ideal of organization to be striven for, 
if not attained. It is illuminating to read in the 
New York Commercial of December 6, 1902, in a 
sketch of Governor Sayers : 

"The business elements of the State determined 
to bring about a change. They made up their 
minds that the State had been in control of the 
politicians long enough and that it was time that 
they should interest themselves in securing the 
election of a Governor who would give attention 
to the industrial and general business develop- 
ment of the State. Major Sayers was picked 
upon as the man who could bring this about." 

63 



CHAPTER VI 

WATCHING EVENTS AND BIDING HIS TIME 

AFTER the Sayers campaign, and the election \ 
of Governor Culberson to the Senate, Texas t 
politics palled on Colonel House. He felt that he 
had gotten out of it about all that he could. His 
main interest since youth had been primarily in 
national affairs, and even more than that in in- 
ternational relations, the curious cross-currents 
stirred by age-old ethnical repressions and ideals, 
the balance of power sought by conflicting na- 
tional groups, the effects of arbitrary territorial 
allotments in times past, and the subtle aggres- 
sive action of opposing trade interests. He had 
entered State politics, in the first place, because 
he conceived it to afford a good opportunity for 
trying out certain theories which he had been 
turning over in his brain, and secondly, because 
at the time he saw no other field in which he could 
exploit his talents. Now, he had obtained what 
he sought. He had tested himself in the labora- 
tory and learned that it was possible to achieve 
the ends he had in view. 

But it was not so easy for him to retire as per- 
64 



WATCHING EVENTS AND BIDING HIS TIME 

haps he imagined. He had won a remarkable 
place for himself in the political counsels of the 
State, a place such as no man had ever occupied 
in any commonwealth. And although he took 
less and less interest in the actual operations of 
government — partly, it is true, because, thanks 
to his past efforts, the Government ran smoothly 
and functioned in accordance with his ideas — it 
was some years before he could dissever himself 
from the active supervision of the party's prin- 
cipal campaigns. 

In 1900 Governor Sayers was nominated for a 
second term, with no opposition worth speaking 
of, and in 1902 Colonel House selected to succeed 
him Samuel W. T. Lanham, one of the State's 
Representatives in Congress, who had been a 
claimant for the nomination against Culberson in 
1S94. Lanham, it will be remembered, was a 
Confederate veteran, and by reason of his long 
service in Congress, a strong candidate. 

With House's support and guiding hand on 
the campaign, his nomination and election were 
easily assured. Such opponents as he had re- 
tired from the field before the convention met, 
and he was named by acclamation. In 1904 Gov- 
ernor Lanham was renominated, in accordance 
with the precedent previously alluded to, and 
Colonel House made up his mind definitely to 
quit active participation in State politics. 

65 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

The motive which actuated him in this resolve 
v^^as a feehng, which had been growing more and 
more pronounced for several years, that it was 
wrong for any one man to occupy any longer a 
position of domination over political issues in 
the State. He believed that it could not have 
a healthy effect, if prolonged. He had destroyed, 
it will be recalled, the custom of regarding the 
Attorney-General of Texas as the successor of 
the retiring Governor, because it had savored 
too strongly of a semi-dynastic principle and had 
made possible the continued control of the execu- 
tive office by any group of men who might saddle 
themselves upon the electorate. Now he decided 
to eliminate himself, lest he should create a prece- 
dent for unlimited direction of the Democratic 
party's political machinery. 

The disinterestedness which prompted this ac- 
tion is all the more striking because Colonel 
House's work in Texas had made him known to 
practically all the national leaders of the party. 
Contrary to the general supposition, current ever 
since his name became a household word by rea- 
son of his friendship with Woodrow Wilson, he 
was not an unknown quantity to Mr. Wilson or 
to the President's friends and advisers. Colonel 
House had a national reputation so long ago as 
1900, but it was a reputation known only to the 
men who make it their business to be conversant 

66 



WATCHING EVENTS AND BIDING HIS TIME 

with the inner happenings of the political world. 

He could have had a share in the management 
of Bryan's campaign in 1900 and of Alton B. 
Parker's campaign in 1904 — of course, on the 
usual understanding, stipulated for by him, that 
his work was to be done in confidence, the pub- 
licity and credit for whatever was accomplished 
being allotted to the actual chairman. But not 
even upon such terms could Colonel House be 
tempted to embark upon campaigns which he 
knew to be hopeless for the party. He supported 
and voted for both Bryan and Parker ; he acqui- 
esced in — if he did not approve — the sending by 
Texas of Free Silver delegations to the national 
conventions in 1896 and 1900, although he did 
not believe in the Free Silver heresy. But the 
personalities and aims of the two men did not 
appeal to him. In a word, he did not feel that 
he could work with them with the harmony and 
efficiency which were his standard for accom- 
plishing results. 

Mr. Bryan Colonel House knew well at this 
time. They first met in Houston, Texas, in 1897, 
when Bryan was paying a short visit to that city. 
Later, in the winter of 1898- 1899, the health of 
Mr. Bryan's daughter was very delicate and 
physicians recommended a sojourn in the South. 
By accident Mr. Bryan rented the house in Aus- 
tin next to Colonel House's. There was only a 

67 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

hedge-row between the two properties, and natu- 
rally the families became intimate. Colonel 
House had always cherished a deep admiration 
for the fine qualities, the free liberalism and pro- 
gressiveness, of Mr. Bryan's character. They 
were very close friends, for, fundamentally, they 
had much in common. As a rule the ends they 
strove for were the same, although their methods 
of approach frequently differed. 

But the bare fact is that Colonel House's fre- 
quent intercourse with the national leader of the 
Democratic party served to reinforce the con- 
viction previously formed that Mr. Bryan was 
not the long-awaited chieftain who would re- 
spond to the rising murmur of the times and 
lead the party to fresh victories. For this reason 
Colonel House kept out of the national campaigns 
of 1900 and 1908. In 1904 he abstained from 
taking part because he thought that Parker was 
the wrong man to be nominated, a man who did 
not reflect popular tendencies, who was as ex- 
clusively the representative of the conservative 
Eastern branch of the party as Bryan was of the 
Western radicals. One of Colonel House's traits 
is his ability to outwait almost any one in crea- 
tion. He can bide his time like an Indian, and he 
never moves until he is convinced that to move 
is the best policy. So he sat tight in 1900, 1904, 
and 1908. 

68 



WATCHING EVENTS AND BIDING HIS TIME 

One has a feeling that it must have been hard 
work, even for him. He had been growing in 
stature until he was become a national figure be- 
hind the scenes. The one thing that absorbed 
him most, as business, hobby, avocation, and 
pleasure, was politics, high politics, dealing with 
big issues, big men and big events. Yet for 
twelve years after he was ready to take the part 
he had cast himself for he was obliged to sit back 
and wait until the right man came along — a man 
whose qualifications should be only readiness to 
accept unselfish friendship and advice, for that 
was all Colonel House wanted to do. It seem^ 
strange, in a way, that a man who has no selfish 
ends to serve should have difficulty in finding 
another man who would be willing to accept of 
that service and not regard the offering with 
jealous eyes. But Colonel House spent twelve 
years in finding such a man. It is rather a com- 
mentary upon human nature — at least the kind 
of human nature which is warped and twisted by 
the passions and cramping ambitions of politics. 

He occupied himself in various ways during 
those years of waiting, and all of the time he was 
growing and learning, fitting himself for the role 
he was to play upon the stage of the world. It is 
safe to say that he had no real conception of the 
importance of the part that Fate had reserved for 
him, although he was looking ahead and studying 

69 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

the canker sores of mankind, watching them fes- 
ter and spread. He was an omnivorous reader of 
books that dealt with poHtics, social questions, 
economics, philosophy, national relations, and the 
moot questions of international interest. Years 
before Americans realized the importance of the 
underlying discontent of the Southern Slavs and 
the restlessness of the Czecho-Slavs under Aus- 
tria's rule, he had become a close student of the 
problem of submerged nationalities. 

Behind all his studies was the idea of working 
out such a distribution of the earth's surface as 
would make civilization safe from war. Colonel 
House had known the brutal savagery of the old 
frontier, and he appreciated far more than most 
of the men of his generation the torments of lust 
and crime and horrid violence which a world war 
would let loose upon the nations. He was always 
thinking of this question, when he and his family 
were at home in Austin during the winters and 
on their trips to the North or to Europe in the 
summers. He was of those Americans who had 
what was called "the going-abroad habit." He 
liked to travel, liked to examine strange countries 
and peoples, familiarize himself with their lives 
and interests. 

One derives amusement from the frequent as- 
sertions in Congress or on the stump that the 
President had picked out a *'raw, unlettered 

70 



WATCHING EVENTS AND BIDING HIS TIME 

Texas ranchman to represent him at the courts 
of Europe." There are few scholars of the East- 
ern States, few great international lawyers of 
the Eastern bar, who have as wide a grasp of 
world affairs as Colonel House — if for no other 
reason than because he has spent vastly more 
time in investigating this special field than almost 
any other man in the country. He was at home 
in every European capital, and had traveled ex- 
tensively over the Continent, before the Presi- 
dent sent him abroad the first time. More than 
that, in the course of his travels Colonel House 
had met many of the leaders of European thought 
and opinion, and he was by no means the stranger 
to foreign intellectuals that he has been repre- 
sented. 

The House home in Austin was the gathering 
place of the informed society of the Texas capi- 
tal. Colonel House's favorite relaxation is a lit- 
tle dinner party of congenial men. He is never 
so happy as when sitting by his own fireside chat- 
ting with a few friends, business men, politicians, 
or followers of the professions. So the House 
dinners were one of the attractions of Austin 
society in the years before his identification with 
the Administration at Washington obliged him 
to spend the whole year in the North. His per- 
sonal business required very little attention, and 
the short visits to his tiny office in a building near 

71 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

the State Capitol — the sign on the door was 
merely a visiting-card pasted on — left him plenty 
of leisure. 

When he dropped State politics he occupied 
himself in several ways during the winter months. 
He took great interest in the University of Texas, 
which had been established about the time he 
went to Cornell, and exerted much influence in 
its affairs. His brother-in-law, Sidney Edward 
Mezes, now president of the College of the City 
of New York, mho married, in 1896, Miss Anna 
O. Hunter, a sister of Mrs. House, was elected 
Dean of the University in 1902. One of the Gov- 
ernors of Texas offered to make Colonel House 
a Regent of the University, but he declined. It 
was typical of him that he should prefer to ren- 
der such assistance as he could under the cover 
of anonymity. 

Another undertaking which afforded him 
much fun and relaxation was the building of the 
Trinity & Brazos Valley Railway, a ninety-mile 
line through the cotton country near Austin. He 
was chairman of the executive committee and a 
director, and like all the other directors, knew 
nothing about railroad matters when he went into 
the project, which was financed by some Boston 
people. His connection with this road and his 
short service on the board of the Equitable Trust 
Company of New York constitute the sole rea- 

72 



WATCHING EVENTS AND BIDING HIS TIME 

sons for dubbing him a ''director and corporation 
magnate and a promoter of large business inter- 
ests." He i;psigned from the Equitable Trust 
Company because he found that he never had 
opportunity to attend any of the directors' meet- 
ings, and it was one of his theories that a director 
of a corporation is elected to direct. This is a 
theory which has not yet been adopted univer- 
sally. 

The Trinity & Brazos Valley v/a^ more of a 
recreation than a serious business proposition, 
but the promoters did not lose in the long run. 
The Tex^s railroads had earned a bad name with 
farmers and the general public by their attitude 
toward all claims made against them. The roads 
invariably refused to pay claims, and fought any 
effort to collect, with the idea that they could 
make it cost so much to sue that the claimant 
would lose his courage and drop out before all 
the legal resources of delay had been exhausted. 
Colonel House and his friends decided that the 
cardinal point of their policy should be fairness 
to the traveling public and land-owners along the 
right-of-way. They posted signs at all stations 
telling people who thought they had claims not to 
waste time with a lawyer, but to go straight to 
the railroad and have it settled. 

"We had a lot of fun with that little road," 
says Colonel House, "and it taught me a good 

7Z 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

deal about railroading. I'll never forget how we 
enjoyed all the questions that arose, the fun we 
had naming the stations and making up time- 
tables, and so forth. It was new to all of us. 
But we sold it at a substantial profit to B. F. 
Yoakum and Edwin Hawley, who later disposed 
of it to the Denver & Rio Grande, by whom it is 
still operated. We did it to prove that a railroad 
could be built and run and make money and still 
be fair to the people." 



74 



CHAPTER VII 

GAYNOR AS A PRESIDENTIAL POSSIBILITY 

THE decisive defeat of Mr. Bryan by Mr. 
Taft in the election of 1908 and the re- 
actionary trend of the Taft Administration con- 
vinced Colonel House that the opportunity he had 
been waiting twelve years for was at hand. He 
was not under any illusions about the difficulties 
to be surmounted in electing any Democrat to 
the Presidency; but he considered that the time 
had come when Bryan must concede the right of 
some other worthy man to the nomination, while 
the party's experience with Parker had shown 
that although a standard-bearer less radical than 
the Peerless Leader might be desirable, still, noth- 
ing could be gained by out-doing the Republicans 
in the extreme of conservatism. 

His judgment of the situation was that the 
right man to head the ticket in 191 2 must be, 
first of all, from the East, because, in order to 
win victory, the party must make substantial in- 
roads upon the densely populated industrial 
States, which had been giving uniform Re- 
publican majorities since the advent of Bryan 

75 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

and the free silver issue — now peacefully dead 
and lowly laid in a grave dug deep and sealed 
with a tombstone weighted by the intelligent con- 
demnation of Democrats, North and South, East 
and West. 

Secondly, Colonel House held that a Demo- 
cratic candidate who had any chance of winning 
the next election must be of proved progressive 
timber and established in advance in the minds 
of the voters as a liberal unidentified with Big 
Business or corporation activities. Preferably, 
he should not be a Congressman. It was essen- 
tial that he should be known in the South and 
West. These requirements ruled out most of the 
suggestions for the nomination whose names even 
so early as this were being aired in print by pro- 
fessional political forecasters. 

Thirdly — and here was the rub — Colonel 
House fully appreciated that no Democrat could 
stand a chance of getting the nomination in the 
National Convention unless he had the backing 
of Mr. Bryan. In other words, whoever was 
chosen as the party's nominee must be acceptable 
to Mr. Bryan, who, despite his three defeats and 
the regrettable memories of Populism, still ranked 
as the most powerful individual in the party, the 
idol of considerable sections of the Union, and a 
man who, where he could not force himself upon 
the delegates, at the least, could be assured of suf- 

76 



GAYNOR AS A PRESIDENTIAL POSSIBILITY 

ficient support to thwart the nomination of a can- 
didate he deemed unsatisfactory or below the 
standard he had set. 

It will readily be understood that this third 
requirement narrowed Colonel House's choice 
well-nigh to the vanishing- point. For Mr. 
Bryan's unfailing test of a man's fitness was th^ 
strength of that man's support in 1896, 1900, 
and 1908. More than one Eastern Democrat of 
national s<:a.ture, progressive, untainted by cor- 
porate connections, ftll by the wayside when put 
to the test of party regularity, as interpreted by 
Mr. Bryan. 

Colonel House was not discouraged, however, 
and with his usual calm aplomb surveyed th^ 
available stock of Eastern Democrats. Like 
many other acute political observers, his atten- 
tion was attracted early in 1910 by the personality 
of the late William J. Gaynor, who had been 
elected Mayor of New York in the preceding 
November. Mayor Gaynor had been a Justice of 
the State Supreme Court, sitting in Brooklyn, for 
many years, and had won a wide reputation as 
a jurist. His first notable exploit in public life 
as a young man was the smashing of the John Y. 
McKane gang, which had wielded immense power 
in Brooklyn, and he lent his support to later at- 
tacks upon machine corruption. He was nomi- 
nated by Tammany, but made his campaign for 

77 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

the mayoralty on the assertion that the nomina- 
tion had come to him unsought and that he was 
independent of Tammany control. He was the 
only member of the Tammany ticket to be elected. 

Mayor Gaynor brought to his office a most pic- 
turesque personality, an aggressive independence, 
a keen knowledge of governmental matters, and 
a disregard for precedents. He was in hot water 
from the start of his term, but he always handled 
himself with sang-froid, and for all the testiness 
of his disposition succeeded in winning the love 
and respect of cynical New Yorkers as have few 
other Mayors of the country's largest city. His 
sympathy with the poor and the oppressed, his 
opposition to police brutality, and his exceedingly 
human letters and public statements soon made 
him good newspaper copy in the South and West. 

Best of all, for Colonel House's purpose, Gay- 
nor was acceptable to Bryan. At the National 
Democratic Convention in Denver in 1908 Bryan 
had wanted him as running-mate on the Presi- 
dential ticket, but this plan was frustrated by 
certain delegates who presented newspaper clip- 
pings purporting to show that Gaynor had made 
attacks upon the Roman Catholic Church, and 
before the charge could be disproved Bryan was 
argued into an agreement to abandon Gaynor. 
When Gaynor began to assume possibilities as a 
Presidential candidate to Colonel House in 1910, 

78 



GAYNOR AS A PRESIDENTIAL POSSIBILITY 

the Colonel took pains to sound Bryan and learned 
that the Mayor of New York was still acceptable 
to the party's leader. 

But it is Colonel House's way to move cau- 
tiously. He would not lend his support and in- 
fluence to any man he did not know. So when 
he came North in the early summer of 1910 he 
went to the late James Creelman, then president 
of the Municipal Service Commission, who was 
the man he knew who also happened to be most 
intimate with Mayor Gaynor. At Colonel 
House's request Mr. Creelman arranged an ap- 
pointment with the Mayor and a private room 
was secured at the Lotos Club. Only the three 
men were present, and the whole evening was 
spent in discussion, Colonel House, as is his cus- 
tom, seeking out Gaynor's hobbies, sounding the 
capacities of his mind, leading him skillfully to 
talk about everything which interested him. 

Gaynor made an excellent impression. He was 
at his best. The brusqueness which often char- 
acterized his manner was entirely absent. He 
talked pleasantly and deferentially, and showed 
all the really wonderful qualities of his intellect. 

"He was a most remarkable man," said Colo- 
nel House in describing the interview. "I have 
rarely met his equal for depth of learning in 
political and governmental problems." 

Colonel House was much pleased with his pros- 
79 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

pective candidate, and he suggested to the Mayor 
that it would be advisable for him to enter the 
race for the Democratic nomination for the Gov- 
ernorship of New York in the election to be held 
in the approaching November. There was prac- 
tically no doubt of his ability to get the nomina- 
tion, and he would have made a much stronger 
candidate than John A. Dix, who ultimately was 
nominated by the Democrats and won. Colonel 
House pointed out to Mayor Gaynor that he could 
rely upon more substantial Democratic support 
in the Presidential contest of 1912, if he gave a 
demonstration as a vote-getter in a State election. 
Mayor Gaynor's reply to all such arguments 
Vvas that it was a bigger job to be Mayor of New 
York city than to be Governor of New York 
State, and that he did not wish to resign what he 
considered a first-class office for one of inferior 
importance. He was supported in this stand by 
Mr. Bryan. Colonel House was quite willing to 
admit that, on the merits of the case, the Mayor- 
alty of New York city was a bigger undertaking 
than the Governorship of New York State, but 
he also told the Mayor that this was not under- 
stood by people in other parts of the country, 
who refused to believe that the Mayor of any city 
could be more important than the Governor of 
his State. Colonel House argued further that 
so far Mr. Gaynor had figured but once in an 

80 



GAYNOR AS A PRESIDENTIAL POSSIBILITY 

important election, and that, while he was becom- 
ing a national figure, he would leap into much 
greater prominence if he allowed himself to be 
elected Governor of New York. It was next to 
impossible, Colonel House asserted, to jump a 
man from the Mayor's chair to the White House. 
Certainly, it had never been done in the past. 

But Gaynor demonstrated on this point all the 
mulish obstinacy which was one of his outstand- 
ing traits. He refused to yield his ground, and 
for the first time Colonel House began to doubt 
his value as Presidential timber. Gaynor might 
have been dropped then and there, if matters had 
not taken a new turn, with the shooting of the 
Mayor by John J. Gallagher, a discharged city 
employee, on August 9, 19 10, as he was standing 
on the deck of the liner Kaiser Wilhelm der 
Grosse, bidding good-by to a group of friends 
prior to his departure for a vacation in Europe. 
The bullet struck the Mayor in the throat, and 
for a while his life was despaired of. But the 
atrociousness of the assault, as well as the phleg- 
matic courage with which Gaynor withstood the 
ordeal of pain, instantly made him an object of 
national interest to an extraordinary degree. 

''He was shot into the Governorship," Colonel 
House once put it. 

Indeed, so important did Colonel House esti- 
mate the efifect of the attempted assassination 

81 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

upon Gaynor's availability that he renewed his 
attempts to persuade the Mayor to enter the 
Gubernatorial contest. But Gaynor still persisted 
in the view that he could not augment his political 
capital by going to Albany. 

Finding that it was no use to press this issue, 
Colonel House then cast about for another means 
to make Gaynor better known outside New York. 
As a preliminary step, he decided to introduce 
the Mayor to the voters of Texas, and the method 
he adopted was the same one by which he intro- 
duced to his home State another gentleman a year 
later — but that is also another story. 

It was learned that the idea of a trip to Texas 
was agreeable to Alayor Gaynor, and a few days 
later Colonel House, accompanied by Senator 
Culberson and Col. R. M. Johnstone, afterward 
Senator from Texas, called at the City Hall and 
formally suggested that the Mayor be invited to 
deliver an address at the annual State Fair, which 
is held in Dallas. It was likewise suggested by 
Colonel House that it might be a good thing to 
have the Texas Legislature, which would be in 
session, extend to the Mayor an invitation to ad- 
dress the two houses in joint assembly. 

The Mayor was very courteous to his visitors, 
and seemed most enthusiastic about their efforts 
in his behalf. He agreed to both suggestions, 
accepted the definite invitation to attend the State 

82 



GAYNOR AS A PRESIDENTIAL POSSIBILITY 

Fair, and expressed his pleasure at the prospect 
of addressing the State Legislature. He again 
made an excellent impression. 

How the sequel happened is a mystery. Noth- 
ing was heard from Gaynor for some days, and 
finally a newspaper editor in Texas — not a well- 
known man — sent the Mayor a telegram asking 
him if he was really coming. Gaynor wired back 
that it was the first he had heard of the matter — 
in fact, that he knew nothing about it. Only 
those who came in close contact with the eccentric 
mental processes of Gaynor's really brilliant mind 
can conceive how such an amazing act of dis- 
courtesy could be possible. And it is difficult 
for them to comprehend the quirk of his brain 
that fathered the snub which may well have cost 
him the Presidency. 

For that telegram to an obscure Texas news- 
paper editor finished Gaynor's chances, not only 
in Texas, but in national politics. Colonel House 
and his friends had first doubted Gaynor's fitness 
when he refused their advice to run for Gov- 
ernor. They regarded this as an error in politi- 
cal judgment. But they admitted that any man 
may make occasional errors in judgment, and 
they were willing to believe that a man of large 
soul could afiford to disdain conventional advan- 
tages. The second blunder, however, convinced 
Colonel House that, whatever might be said for 

83 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

Gaynor's intellectual greatness, he was a man of 
little, if any, political sense — and therefore hope- 
less as a Presidential possibility. 

The incident put Colonel House in a very un- 
comfortable position. He had been responsible 
for getting the State Legislature to pass the reso- 
lutions inviting Gaynor to address the members, 
and the legislators were naturally inclined to feel 
peevish at the way in which they had been treated. 
Colonel House had to admit that he had been 
mistaken in his man, and Gaynor's name was 
wiped off the slate of Presidential possibilities. 

That was probably the worst mistake that Colo- 
nel House ever made, and it served to convince 
him that his policy of putting prospective candi- 
dates over the jumps until they had demonstrated 
their paces was the only safe one. 

"Judging men you don't know is just like walk- 
ing through a strange country,'* he says. ''Every 
rolling swell in the land you see ahead of you 
looks more inviting than the hill you are standing 
on. But when you get to the next elevation, you 
find the view just the same — in fact, as like as 
not you will be disappointed because it is no bet- 
ter. I have found that if you allow yourself to 
become enthusiastic about a man you don't know, 
when you do come to know him he will seem dis- 
appointing. And that is your fault as much as 
his." 

84 



CHAPTER VIII 

RISE OF WILSON'S PRESIDENTIAL STAR 

JUST about the time Mayor Gaynor's name 
was erased from the slate of Presidential 
possibilities another and brighter star appeared 
on the Democratic political horizon. Woodrow 
Wilson was elected Governor of New Jersey — 
a solidly Republican State since the Free Silver 
issue had disrupted the Democratic party — in 
November, 1910, by a majority of 49,000 votes 
over Vivian M. Lewis, the Republican candidate. 
Wilson had been elected president of Princeton 
University in 1902, and in the following years 
had built up a reputation as one of the most in- 
fluential educators in the country. His policy at 
Princeton had been markedly liberal, so much so, 
indeed, that he was repeatedly brought into con- 
tact with the rockbound conservatism of this most 
conservative of American universities. He had 
also earned repute as an historian, his studies of 
American government particularly having been 
adjudged standard works in their field. He came 
to the Governorship with no previous practical 
experience as a politician, but with a fund of 

85 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

theoretical knowledge and an abundance of 
Scotch-Irish self-reliance. He made history from 
the first day he entered the State Capitol at 
Trenton. 

Probably few Gubernatorial elections ever at- 
tracted more national interest than Wilson's. It 
was a novel sight for the United States — a college 
president, a man of books, a student and theorist, 
entering the realm of the politician, where the 
lawyer and the business man had reigned so long. 
Predictions of "The Doctor's" failure were gen- 
eral in Republican newspapers, and, to say the 
truth, the bulk of the professional Democratic 
politicians regarded his advent in their midst with 
a sense of uneasiness, amounting in many cases 
to resentment. In his campaign he based his ap- 
peal for votes on promises of radical legislation 
to curb the powers of the political rings and cor- 
poration interests. He repudiated the machine 
politicians of the State, Democratic as well as 
Republican. He talked straight to the people. 

Before very many weeks had passed Colonel 
House was reading items in the daily news, even 
in far-away Texas, about the doings of this ex- 
traordinary man Wilson. Political observers in 
the North wrote to him, after their wont from 
time to time, and they, too, reported the stir 
which had been created by the independent atti- 
tude and progressive doctrines of this man of 

86 



RISE OF WILSON'S PRESIDENTIAL STAR 

theories. Colonel House became interested in 
the newcomer. After the Gaynor disappoint- 
ment he had cast his eye over the remaining 
Presidential timber that was available according 
to his three standards, and the prospect was not 
one to stimulate hope. When he sought hope he 
concentrated his gaze upon events in Washing- 
ton, where the Taft Administration was sitting 
tight on the lid to hold down the forces of prog- 
ress. 

Governor Wilson's first act to draw attention 
to himself was his insistence that the Democratic 
Legislature that had been elected along with him 
should carry out the popular will, as expressed 
in a referendum to the voters in the November 
campaign, under the Senatorial Preferential act, 
for the election of James E. Martine as United 
States Senator. The Legislature wished to dis- 
regard this popular behest and elect instead ex- 
Senator James Smith, one of the two Democratic 
bosses against whom the new Governor had set 
his face relentlessly. In the resulting contro- 
versy Governor Wilson won, and so established 
the precedent for the string of victories awaiting 
him in subsequent years. 

The importance of his stand on the question of 
the election of a Senator lay in the impetus it 
gave to the movement for an amendment to the 
Federal Constitution providing for the election 

87 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

of United States Senators by popular vote, a 
movement which was to gain increased headway 
after Wilson's election to the Presidency. His 
fight on this issue attracted notice in every part 
of the country, and especially in the Western 
States, where a tendency towards radical legis- 
lation to make easier the expression of the popu- 
lar will had been growing with rapid strides. 

Other legislation which served to stamp Gover- 
nor Wilson as a progressive in his sympathies in- 
cluded the famous "Seven Sisters" law to enforce 
the personal responsibility of individuals for un- 
lawful acts of corporations and forbidding inter- 
locking directorates; a law to punish corrupt 
practices at elections; a law making possible the 
adoption of government by commission by cities 
which chose to remodel their existing munici- 
palities; a Direct Primary law, affecting the elec- 
tion of all officeholders from Governor to con- 
stable, and a law for the establishment of jury 
commissions to take away from the sheriffs their 
control of the courts through the use of juries of 
their own drawing. 

Colonel House is the last person to claim for 
himself the honor of being "the first Wilson 
man." Who that wiseacre was is a question 
which in all probability will never be settled. 
Certainly, whoever laid claim to the honor would 
draw down upon himself a horde of indignant 



RISE OF WILSON'S PRESIDENTIAL STAR 

counterclaimants. But it is safe to say that the 
actual launching of the Wilson Presidential boom 
was done by a little group of Princeton alumni, 
the leader of whom was William F. McCombs, 
chairman of the Democratic National Committee 
in the 191 2 campaign. Col. George Harvey, edi- 
tor of Harper's Weekly, while not a member of 
this group, early raised the Wilson standard — 
a fact too firmly fixed by one of the few regret- 
table incidents of the campaign — as did Walter 
Hines Page, now Ambassador to Great Britain, 
then editor of the World's Work. 

There have been all sorts of stories purporting 
to tell how Colonel House became interested in 
Wilson. The plain, unvarnished fact is that 
Colonel House was attracted, first, by the far- 
sighted policies Wilson put forward at Prince- 
ton, and later, by the legislation, which, as Gov- 
ernor, he sponsored in New Jersey. To begin 
with. Colonel House's interest was the casual 
interest of any man who reads of good work 
well done. Evidently, he told himself, this Wood- 
row Wilson was a person of ideals. But as 
House read more and more about New Jersey's 
new Governor and examined closely the laws her 
Legislature was passing, he was amazed and 
delighted to discover that here was a man who 
was doing things after his own heart, whose 
ideas were of a piece with the ideas that he, him- 

89 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

self, had been cherishing. Here was an Eastern 
Democrat of forceful personality and liberal 
views, independent and fearless. The fact that 
Wilson had had no previous political career 
House counted as an advantage, for it narrowed 
by just so much the grounds for attacking him. 
It meant that the attacks upon him would have 
to be based upon his radical doctrines, and 
Colonel House was inclined to welcome such Re- 
publican tactics. 

Colonel House had been working for Wilson's 
boom a long time before the Governor of New 
Jersey heard of his silent ally. The first time 
House's name was mentioned to Wilson is be- 
lieved to have been on a Sunday in the late sum- 
mer of 191 1, when Mr. Page and Mr. Edward 
S. Martin of Life motored over to Princeton to 
discuss the situation with Mr. Wilson. They re- 
marked to him in the course of their conver- 
sation : 

"By the way. Governor, there is a man named 
House working for you down in Texas. You 
ought to meet him. He has ideas." 

This was substantially, if not literally, what 
was said. At any rate, Governor Wilson was 
interested and he wrote to Colonel House to tell 
him how much he appreciated the work the 
Colonel was doing and hoped that they might ar- 
range a meeting in the near future. 

90 



RISE OF WILSON'S PRESIDENTIAL STAR 

The friends of Governor Wilson were es- 
pecially anxious to have him supplement the 
reputation he was earning in the South and West 
through newspaper publicity by actual appear- 
ance in Democratic strongholds, and Colonel 
House suggested to them in September, 191 1, 
that it would be worth while for the Governor of 
New Jersey to go down to Texas and address 
the State Fair at Dallas on October 28. The 
arrangements were made by Thomas Watson 
Gregory, now Attorney-General, who was 
House's right-hand man in Texas, and who 
visited Governor Wilson at Trenton with the in- 
vitation of the officers of the fair. It will be 
remembered that this was the same try-out which 
was offered to Mayor Gaynor. Unlike the May- 
or, who had thrown away his chance the year 
before, however, Governor Wilson not only ac- 
cepted the invitation, but kept it. 

The Governor's address made an excellent im- 
pression, and was read throughout the country. 
It is amusing to note that in this speech, Mr. 
Wilson — who had used New Jersey as a labora- 
tory in which to test out the theories he had 
been formulating during years of study, exactly 
as Mr. House had used Texas for the same pur- 
pose — spoke of the States as "the political labora- 
tories of a free people." He declared that the 
rising spirit of the period was in favor of reforms 

91 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

and changes, "a just, well-considered, moderately 
executed readjustment of our present economic 
conditions." His speech, in fine, was a demand 
for progress by evolution, not by annihilation of 
existing machinery. Colonel House was more 
than ever satisfied that he had found the right 
man. 

When the Governor returned to Trenton from 
Dallas he sent Mr. McCombs to see Colonel 
House. Mr. McCombs brought with him on this 
visit William G. McAdoo, afterwards Secretary 
of the Treasury and Vice-Chairman of the Demo- 
cratic National Committee in the campaign of 
1912. It was the first time Colonel House had 
met either of these gentlemen. Mr. McCombs 
told Colonel House that Governor Wilson would 
like to come and consult personally with him on 
the management of the Wilson boom. Colonel 
House, who was stopping at the Hotel Gotham, 
in New York, on his way from New England 
back to Texas for the winter, replied that he 
should like very much to meet the Governor 
whenever it was convenient for him. 

Several days later — it must have been early in 
November, 191 1; the exact date is uncertain — 
Mr. McCoombs called up Colonel House at the 
Gotham to say that Governor Wilson was com- 
ing into town that afternoon and would like to 
make an appointment with him at four o'clock. 

9^ 



RISE OF WILSON'S PRESIDENTIAL STAR 

Colonel House replied that the hour would be 
satisfactory to him. Later Governor Wilson 
himself rang up Colonel House and said he would 
like to see him if it was convenient. Colonel 
House answered that he was waiting for him, 
and the Governor came over from the Hotel As- 
tor, where he was stopping. 

They met in Colonel House's room at the 
Gotham, and they were friends from the moment 
they shook hands. Governor Wilson's appoint- 
ments for the day gave him only an hour to spend 
with Colonel House, but they used every minute 
of it. 

"We talked and talked," said Colonel House, 
in describing the meeting. 'We knew each 
other for cjngenial souls at the very beginning. 
I don't remember just what we said, but I know 
we hit the high spots — we talked in generalities, 
you know. We exchanged our ideas about the 
democracies of the world, contrasted the 
European democracies with the United States, 
discussed where they differed, which was best in 
some respects and which in others." 

He smiled one of his rare smiles — all the more 
cordial for their rarity. 

**I remember we were very urbane," he went 
on. "Each gave the other every chance to have 
his say. He would say what he thought, and then 
wait and let me say what I thought. We agreed 

93 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

about everything. That was a wonderful talk. 
The hour flew away. It seemed no time at all 
when it was over. I remember we both remarked 
that. We were very sorry we could not stay 
together longer, for each of us had many things 
he wanted to talk about which there had not been 
time to discuss. Each of us started to ask the 
other when he would be free for another meeting, 
and laughing over our mutual enthusiasm, we ar- 
ranged an evening several days later when Gov- 
ernor Wilson should come and have dinner with 
me. 

"Our second meeting was even more delightful. 
We dined alone at the Gotham, and talked to- 
gether for hours. We talked about everything, 
I believe, and this time we could go into details 
and analyze our thoughts. It was remarkable. 
We found ourselves in agreement upon prac- 
tically every one of the issues of the day. I never 
met a man whose thought ran so identically with 
mine. 

"It was an evening several weeks later, when 
he had been paying me a similar visit, that I said 
to Mr. Wilson as he rose to go: 

" 'Governor, isn't it strange that two men who 
never knew each other before should think so 
much alike?' 

"He answered: 

94 



RISE OF WILSON'S PRESIDENTIAL STAR 

** 'My dear fellow, we have known each other 
all our lives/ 

**I cannot tell you how pleased I was with him. 
He seemed too good to be true. I could hardly 
believe it would be possible to elect him. You 
know, in politics you can almost never elect the 
best man — he has done something, said some- 
thing, or has something about him, which pre- 
vents his success. You have to take the next 
best man or perhaps the next to the next best 
man. But here was the best man available, the 
ideal man. And he seemed to have a good chance 
of success. He rarely made mistakes; he acted 
always with sense and judgment. You could rely 
upon his discretion to do what was best in any 
contingency. But we despaired of being able to 
nominate him because it seemed to be too good 
to be true; and after he was nominated, we were 
constantly worrying lest he should be defeated 
for the same reason. But Roosevelt stood by us, 
and he won/' — -^<*v 



95 



CHAPTER IX 

WILSON ON THE ROAD TO THE WHITE HOUSE 

IN championing Governor Wilson's presidential 
boom, Colonel House had not forgotten the 
last of his three requirements for a successful 
candidate. Governor Wilson was an Eastern 
Democrat and progressive, independent of any 
sinister control. But now the all-important 
question was what attitude toward this candidate 
would be assumed by Mr. Bryan? Shortly after 
Colonel House's first meeting with Governor 
Wilson, Mr. Bryan came to New York with Mrs. 
Bryan and stopped at the Holland House. Colo- 
nel House called him on the telephone one morn- 
ing, and Mr. Bryan asked him to come downtown 
at once. The Colonel found Mr. and Mrs. Bryan 
at breakfast and sat down with them. 

Of course, the conversation which followed 
was confidential, but it may be said that Colonel 
House presented Governor Wilson's case to Mr. 
Bryan as persuasively as he could — and while the 
Colonel is not an orator, he is an exceedingly 
good talker, man to man. He told Mr. Bryan 
in detail of Governor Wilson's work as head of 

96 



WILSON ON THE ROAD TO WHITE HOUSE 

Princeton University, of his tireless efforts there 
in the direction of liberalism, of his democratic 
policy, and the plucky fight he had made against 
the powerful conservative element in the Board 
of Trustees. Colonel House also sketched briefly 
Governor Wilson's progressive legislative ac- 
complishments at Trenton, and here he did not 
have to argue, for Mr. Bryan was fairly well 
informed on this phase of the Governor's career. 

Mr. Bryan listened very attentively to every- 
thing that Colonel House had to say; and while 
he was rather non-committal he did indicate 
that he had several objections to Governor Wil- 
son, all of which, however. Colonel House was 
able to explain away, except Mr. Bryan's suspi- 
cion of Col. George Harvey's enthusiastic 
advocacy of the Wilson candidacy in Harper's 
Weekly. To Mr. Bryan Harper's Weekly and 
Colonel Harvey meant Wall Street, J. P. Morgan 
& Co., and a link with the Money Trust. He did 
not like this connection, and he did not hesitate 
to say so. 

Now, as a matter of fact, Mr. Bryan was by 
no means the first Democratic leader to point the 
harmful effects upon Wilson's chances of the ex- 
treme measure of support he was receiving on 
the editorial page of Harper's Weekly. Accord- 
ing to a statement issued later by Col. Henry 

97 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

Watterson, in the course of the lamentable Wat- 
terson-Harvey-Wilson controversy, Colonel Wat- 
terson, himself, spoke to both Governor Wilson 
and Colonel Harvey about the feeling among 
radical Democrats, and suggested that the soft 
pedal be applied to the Harvey efforts in the fu- 
ture. This was back in October of 191 1, some 
weeks before Colonel House's talk with Mr. 
Bryan, 

Fortunately for Colonel House, he had prac- 
tically no connection with the three-cornered con- 
troversy which raged through the following 
January. He reported his conversation with Mr. 
Bryan to Governor Wilson at a meeting they had 
one night at dinner early in December. He also 
sent word through a friendly channel to Colonel 
Harvey. It was several days later that the 
famous encounter between Governor Wilson and 
Colonel Harvey took place at the Manhattan 
Club, in the course of which Harvey put the 
question direct to Governor Wilson whether the 
support of Harper's was doing him harm, and 
Mr. Wilson replied that some of his friends 
thought it was. 

"Is that so?" Harvey is reported to have re- 
plied. 

Then Colonel House went down to Texas, 
caught a fever, and was ill, most of the time in 
bed, for nearly two months. During those two 

98 



WILSON ON THE ROAD TO WHITE HOUSE 

months the break between Governor Wilson and 
Colonel Harvey occurred. Colonel House always 
regretted that it had to occur, but he felt at the 
same time that it operated materially to Governor 
Wilson's advantage. It was featured elaborately 
for weeks in the South and West, and the radical 
elements in the party were convinced by it that 
Wilson was not a man with Wall Street leanings. 
Another event of the two months during which 
Colonel House was sick in Texas was the publi- 
cation of the Joline letter, an incident noteworthy 
for the light it sheds on Mr. Bryan's character. 
For a week or more before the New Year rumors 
were circulating in Washington and New York 
of the existence of a letter written by Governor 
Wilson in which he had commented adversely 
upon Mr. Bryan's candidacy in a previous Presi- 
dential campaign. The rumors grew as they 
spread, and presently half-a-dozen versions, each 
more sensational than the last, were to be heard. 
Finally, some of them appeared in the news- 
papers, with the information that the letter was 
in the possession of Adrian H. Joline, a New 
York lawyer and a trustee of Princeton Univer- 
sity, When the story was referred to Governor 
Wilson, he stated that he had no objection to the 
publication of the letter, if it was printed in 
whole. Mr. Joline did so. 

99 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

The letter was written from Princeton on April 
29, 1907, and read as follows: 

"My dear Mr. Joline: 

"Thank you very much for sending me your 
address at Parsons, Kan., before the board of 
directors of the Missouri, Kansas & Texas Rail- 
way Company. I have read it with relish and 
entire agreement. Would that we could do some- 
thing, at once dignified and effective, to knock 
Mr. Bryan once for all into a cocked hat ! 

"Cordially and sincerely yours, 

"WooDROw Wilson." 

When the letter was published Mr. Bryan was 
returning from a visit to Kingston, Jamaica, by 
way of Key West and Florida. Some one at 
Wilson headquarters in New York telegraphed 
Colonel House to meet Mr. Bryan on his journey 
North and explain the letter to him. But Colonel 
House was too sick to go, and the mission was 
given to Josephus Daniels, the "newspaper 
friend" to whom Bryan referred in the only 
statement on the letter he ever made for publica- 
tion: 

"I have nothing whatever to say about that 
(the Wilson letter). I never heard of such a 
letter until I was informed of its existence by one 
of my newspaper friends. I am not discussing 
Presidential candidacies at this time." 

100 



WILSON ON THE ROAD TO WHITE HOUSE 

Mr. Bryan made this statement upon his ar- 
rival in Washington from the South to speak at 
the Jackson Day dinner on January 8. Governor 
Wilson also had been invited to speak at this din- 
ner, and it was feared by many of the Governor's 
supporters that Mr. Bryan might take the oppor- 
tunity to evince his displeasure at the letter, or 
even to denounce the Governor in his speech. 
But, instead, Mr. Bryan went out of his way to 
show that he did not cherish ill-feeling. He 
sought out Governor Wilson at the dinner, and 
not only spoke to him, but put his arm around his 
shoulders in a gesture of comradely affection. 

It is said that Mr. Bryan adopted this attitude 
because he w^as too genuinely great of soul to 
exploit the illicit use of a private letter. For 
another thing, he remembered that in years past 
he himself had had occasion to criticize Grover 
Cleveland and other Democratic chiefs with 
whom he had disagreed. Whatever his reasons 
— and no matter what they may have been, they 
only reflect credit upon his generosity and fair- 
ness — Mr. Bryan never permitted this incident to 
influence him in any way against Governor Wil- 
son's candidacy. He did not favor Wilson, 
outwardly at least, prior to the Convention at Bal- 
timore; but neither did he oppose him. Indeed, 
he said frankly that he would not take sides 
against either Wilson or Champ Clark, Speaker 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

of the House of Representatives, whose name was 
beginning to be put prominently before the voters. 

A few weeks before the Democratic Conven- 
tion was due to meet in Baltimore some of Gover- 
nor Wilson's friends urged that it might be de- 
sirable for him to make a second trip to Texas 
for a round of speeches. But Colonel House 
flatly negatived this proposition, while admitting 
freely the importance of winning the State's dele- 
gation. 

"You have already made your bow to Texas, 
Governor," said the Colonel. ''That is enough. 
HI thought it was necessary for you to make a 
second visit, I should be convinced that you could 
not win the nomination. Leave Texas to your 
friends down there." 

So Governor Wilson agreed that Texas was to 
be left to Colonel House to swing into the Wilson 
column of delegations, and the Colonel made 
good his promise. Barring his management of 
the Sayers campaign, perhaps no exploit of his 
career in domestic politics was more remarkable 
than that. Colonel House had taken no active 
share in State politics in some years, and the local 
machinery of the party was entirely in the hands 
of Senator Joseph W. Bailey and his friends, who 
were outspoken in favor of Governor Harmon of 
Ohio, the candidate for whom the conservative 
Democrats were shouting. The Democratic 

102 



WILSON ON THE ROAD TO WHITE HOUSE 

State Committee was made up practically entirely 
of Bailey men. 

Apparently no prospect could have been more 
hopeless. Bailey's clique were whole-heartedly 
antagonistic to Wilson. They were willing to go 
to any lengths to keep the nomination from him. 
He was precisely the sort of man they did not 
wish to see at the head of the party. But Colonel 
House was not discouraged. He went to work 
quietly, and at first got his friends interested. 
Who were they? Well, men like Albert Sidney 
Burleson, who had been elected Representative to 
succeed Governor Sayers and who is now Post- 
master-General, and Thomas W. Gregory, who 
had made a reputation as Special Assistant At- 
torney-General of the State in prosecuting the 
Waters-Pierce Oil Company and winning $i, 600,- 
000 damages, the first time the courts ever sus- 
tained a suit brought under the Sherman Anti- 
Trust law. 

Others were Cato Sells, Senator Culberson, 
Governor Campbell, M. M. Crane, W. F. Ram- 
sey, Cone Johnson, Thomas B. Love, T. A. Thom- 
son, Moshall Hicks, and Thomas Ball, all of them 
veterans of House's State campaigns in the past. 

They used the same tactics in rallying the State 
for Wilson. It is very difficult for Colonel House 
to describe how he accomplishes such things. 
Probably, it is largely a question of instinct. 

103 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

"How did we do It ?" he says. "We just picked 
the right people. That was all. We didn't use 
any brass bands. We went ahead quietly, secured 
control of the State Convention, and elected a 
solid Wilson delegation." 

And, mind you, this was in the face of a State 
Committee equally solidly opposed to any en- 
dorsement of Wilson! Furthermore, that Texas 
delegation went to the Baltimore Convention so 
rabid for Wilson that some Champ Clark men 
who were seated next to them said they were 
afraid to stir. Excepting Pennsylvania, no other 
delegation made such a strident, vociferous fight 
for Wilson through all the ups-and-downs of one 
of the most dramatic political conventions ever 
held in this country. 

There is a funny story to illustrate the surprise 
with which Wilson's opponents heard that Texas 
had drifted away from Harmon. One of the 
managers of the Ohio Governor was in New York 
in the early spring of 1912, and received the fol- 
lowing telegram from Texas : 

"Everything fine down here, but will you please 
find out what Col. E. M. House is doing? He is 
stopping at the Gotham." 

The manager in question was a young man, 
but he had been diligently on the job for several 

104 



J 



WILSON ON THE ROAD TO WHITE HOUSE 

years and he plumed himself on knowing by name 
every politician of State magnitude. 

''House?" he murmured to himself. "House? 
I've never heard that name. Yet he must amount 
to something." 

So on his way uptown to the Gotham he looked 
up a Southern friend who was also a political 
authority. 

"Know Colonel Ed? Why, of course, I know 
Colonel Ed !" exclaimed the authority. "A mighty 
fine man, sir. He's a power in Texas — been 
running things down there since 1892. A great 
friend of Bryan's." 

The young manager decided that it was dis- 
tinctly up to him to meet such a man, and he went 
direct to the Gotham. The desk-clerk recognized 
the name at once. 

"Oh, yes. Colonel House, of Austin, Texas. 
He is stopping here. Here he comes now." 

And as a writer in the New York Sun described 
it: 

"A slender, middle-aged man, with a gray, 
close-cropped mustache, well-dressed, calm-look- 
ing, was coming quietly in, with an accent on the 
'quiet.' He was not pussyfooting in or slinking 
in or gliding in, but while he walked firmly he 
walked quietly. He went up to the desk and 
asked the man presiding a question in a quiet 
tone. He did not hiss the question nor did he 

105 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

whisper it ; he asked it quietly, and when he got 
his answer he bowed courteously and walked 
quietly to the elevator, which, catching the infec- 
tion, shot quietly out of sight." 

Somewhat awed, the young manager wired 
back to Texas: 

"Your Colonel House is up here and I under- 
stand he is going to stay here. I think he is de- 
voting all his time to his personal business." 

The answer came back : 

"Never mind what you think ; you'd better find 
out what Colonel House is doing and what he is 
going to do." 

Thus confronted, the neophyte in high politics 
meekly secured a personal interview with Colonel 
House, experiencing no difficulty thereby, as is 
the customary experience of all persons who take 
their courage in their hands and essay to climb 
the wall of modesty which is the Colonel's only 
protection. Meekly, too, the young man asked 
his question, and quietly he received his answer. 
Colonel House was very sorry ; he admired Gov- 
ernor Harmon tremendously. But speaking for 
himself alone, he favored the nomination of Gov- 
ernor Wilson of New Jersey. 

1 06 



CHAPTER X 

HAPPENINGS AT THE BALTIMORE 
CONVENTION 

THE Duke of Wellington once summed up 
the Battle of Waterloo to William Creevey, 
the diarist, as "the nearest run thing you ever 
saw in your life." The phrase aptly fits Wood- 
row Wilson's struggle for the Presidential nomi- 
nation. American politics, Republican and 
Democratic, were in a state of turmoil in 1912. 
In both parties the same rift had been drawn 
between the reactionary conservatives, who 
dreaded the signs of progress, and the liberal ele- 
ment, who strove to gi^^e effect to the new ideas. 
The issues of the two internal contests, however, 
were very different. 

The rebellion of the so-called Progressive 
party, the Bull Moose, headed by Theodore 
Roosevelt, against the standpat control of the 
Republican Organization by the leaders of the 
Old Guard, split the parent party. The revolt 
in the Democratic ranks, on the other hand, while 
not so explosive in its development, was founded 
on more constructive principles, and under the 
leadership of Wilson acquired control of the 

107 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

party machinery and emancipated it from worn- 
out fetishes and crippHng attachments. 

There was a general feeling in Democratic 
circles, during the months immediately preceding 
the National Convention at Baltimore in June, 
that Wilson was the strongest of the several can- 
didates in the field, but so bitter was the fight 
made against him by the conservatives of the 
party that he must have been a man of omnis- 
cient power who predicted unqualifiedly a Wil- 
son victory in the Convention. The tactics of 
the opposition to Wilson were very skillful, espe- 
cially in the final stages of the contest. It is 
probable that if it had not been for the advance 
work in his interest, done secretly by Colonel 
House and other political friends, Mr. Wilson 
would have been squeezed out in the later rounds 
of the Convention battle. 

The greatest asset Governor Wilson possessed 
was the neutrality of Mr. Bryan. To begin with, 
this neutrality was nothing more than neutrality; 
it consisted solely in Mr. Bryan's keeping his 
hands off and refusing to take sides with one or 
the other candidate. In those days, when Mr. 
Bryan was asked for his opinion on Presidential 
candidates, he would echo certain editorials which 
had appeared in The Commoner. 

**Why, there is no dearth of Presidential tim- 
ber," he would say. ''Look at Folk; he's a good 

ig8 



HAPPENINGS AT BALTIMORE CONVENTION 

man. Look at Culberson, of Texas; he's a good 
man. There are plenty of them." 

Some shrewd observers at the time wondered 
if Mr. Bryan was singling out for mention men 
who, despite their personal qualifications, were 
second-raters in public estimation, with the idea 
of concerting a diversion of votes from the 
stronger candidates, so that at the last moment 
the band might blare "Hail to the Chief" and 
some leather-throated spell-binder could get up 
on his legs and propose "that honored and great 
American, that stalwart standard-bearer of 
Democracy, that favorite son of tens of millions 
of his fellow-citizens, William Jennings Bryan !" 
It is no more than just to Mr. Bryan to write it 
down emphatically that no action of his gave 
countenance to this theory, and in fact, the actual 
sequence of events was wholly to the contrary. 

For, as the booms of the several candidates 
progressed in the opening months of 1912, Mr. 
Bryan's sympathy began to be attracted more and 
more to Governor Wilson. The reasons for this 
are readily apparent. 

The Wilson boom gained great headway at 
the start, received fresh impetus through the 
Harvey and Watterson controversies, and in ab- 
sence of opposition from Bryan, rolled at full 
speed across the states where Bryan's support 
had been firmest in previous elections, snatching 

lOQ 



THE REAL COLONEL' HOUSE 

up delegations right and left. The chief oppo- 
nent of Governor Wilson up to this stage had 
been Governor Harmon, and he had proved abso- 
lutely ineffectual to stop the progressive move- 
ment in the party. In Texas, for instance, the 
Bailey group had tried to fight Colonel House's 
faction with Harmon and had failed pitifully. 
They might have made much trouble for the Wil- 
son supporters, though, had they picked Champ 
Clark, instead of the Ohio man. 

About this time the forces in the party which 
had been opposing Wilson became aware of the 
seriousness of their situation, and apparently 
decided to throw over Harmon. In his place they 
picked Representative Oscar Underwood of Ala- 
bama, who was satisfactory to the Hearst-Tam- 
many combine and the other reactionary elements. 
But Underwood did not work much better than 
Harmon as a magnet for delegations, and in des- 
peration some one among the opposition — it has 
been suggested that he was William F. Sheehan, 
the political brains of William Randolph Hearst 
— conceived the brilliant idea of using Champ 
Clark as a sort of stalking-horse to draw Bryan 
votes away from Wilson. 

The cheery Speaker of the House had always 
been considered a Bryan man ; Wilson — especially 
after the publication of the Joline letter — could 
not be regarded as a last-ditch Bryanite. It was 

no 



HAPPENINGS AT BALTIMORE CONVENTION 

figfured that if the Harmon and Underwood votes 
were switched to Clark, he would draw at least 
half the Bryan men in the Convention, and then 
— presto ! the Wilson debacle would begin. And 
in the hurly-burly Clark could be withdrawn and 
Underwood nominated and all would be well. 

Whether or not this is really what was planned 
is mainly a matter of conjecture, although the 
known facts seem to bear it out and lend con- 
sistency to the theory. But if such a plot was 
formulated the human forces underlying all po- 
litical conceptions made hash of it. Clark leaped 
into popular favor the instant he was brought 
forward. He had the conservatives behind him 
already, remember, and his own record and per- 
sonality won many radicals to him. There was 
no more easy acquisition of delegations for 
Wilson. As Colonel House once put it : 

"The honeymoon was over. We had hard work 
and plenty of it." 

But no less did the project of the anti- Wilson 
reactionaries suffer by Clark's astounding suc- 
cess. They were forced to give up all serious 
thought of using him as a stalking-horse, a cov- 
ering mantle under which to smuggle the nomina- 
tion to Underwood. The original plan of beating 
Wilson with Clark, and then nominating some 
one else, perforce was abandoned. The stalking- 
horse had run away with his backers. On the 

III 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

eve of the convention the issue was perfectly 
plain. It was either Wilson or Clark. 

Now, observe how the subtle tactics of the 
opposition worked in Wilson's favor. Bryan was 
as much aware as anybody else where Clark's 
bedrock support came from. He knew that the 
men behind Clark were the men, representing the 
interests, that he, Bryan, had always fought tooth 
and nail — in 1896, in 1900, in 1904, and in 1908. 
Inevitably, his sympathies began to turn toward 
Wilson. From neutrality he shifted to benevolent 
neutrality. And as the opposing forces ranged 
themselves more definitely at Baltimore he felt 
himself compelled at last to espouse Wilson's 
cause openly. Wilson's friends were his friends. 
He would not let himself be deceived by the hon- 
estly progressive support that was going to Clark. 
He knew that it was not these progressives who 
had first picked the Speaker for the nomination. 

Mr. Bryan's stand throughout the campaign 
of 1912 is one of the finest chapters in his life. 
It demonstrates his fundamental honesty and 
sincerity of purpose. There were several reasons 
why he should not have liked Woodrow Wilson. 
There were other reasons why he should have 
been jealous of any man of such vision and 
aggressiveness. But he never flinched or hesi- 
tated to judge the situation on the facts. He 
perceived clearly that Wilson stood for the kind 

112 



iEIAPPENINGS AT BALTIMORE CONVENTION 

of things that he stood for; that the men arrayed 
against Wilson were against those things. He 
backed Wilson with all his power, and to him 
Wilson owed his nomination as much as to any 
one man. 

Or put it this way: without Bryan, Wilson 
could not have been nominated, and without Colo- 
nel House he probably would not have obtained, 
first, Bryan's toleration and finally Bryan's sup- 
port. 

Colonel House, himself, had no share in the 
tempestuous events of the Baltimore Convention. 
On the day the convention opened, June 25, 19 12, 
he sailed from New York for a vacation in Eu- 
rope. The act was delightfully typical of the 
man. He had corralled every delegation that 
could be dragooned into declaring for Wilson; 
he had done everything that could be done; and 
he knew that the heat and hysteria of the con- 
vention would only undermine his health, which 
he desired to conserve in anticipation of the cam- 
paign in the fall. Placidly sitting on the deck of 
the steamship, he read of the long-drawn battle 
on the convention floor in brief wireless bulletins, 
and did not learn the result until a week after 
sailing, when the vessel touched at Queenstown. 
But he did not let the uncertainty worry him. He 
had done his best. The rest was on the knees of 
fate. 

"3 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

How well he builded was illustrated by the re- 
sult of the fight between the contending factions, 
a fight which may very well have been the de- 
ciding factor in the party's history. It will be 
remembered that the convention demonstrated a 
progressive tendency on the second day, when 
the radicals enforced the adoption of the report 
of the minority of the Rules Committee, smash- 
ing the unit rule, under which the reactionaries 
had hoped to retain their power and control the 
convention. But Wilson was still a long way 
from victory. He gained slowly on Clark up to 
the forty-first ballot on the night of July i, when 
he passed the 500 mark. But it was not until the 
forty-sixth ballot, in the opening hours of July 3, 
that he received the essential two-thirds, with 
990 votes, 264 more than were necessary. 

There never was one of those ballots when the 
chairman of the Texas delegation did not rise 
and shout in a voice that filled the hall from, wall 
to wall: 

"Texas casts her forty votes for Woodrow 
Wilson of New Jersey!" 

Those Texas votes might well be likened to 
the corner-stone of the Wilson candidacy, for 
around them gathered slowly more and more 
fragments of the solid South, men of the West, 
and in the end even the ninety votes of New 
York, held by Charles F. Murphy, of Tammany 

114 



J 



HAPPENINGS AT BALTIMORE CONVENTION 

Hall, in the hollow of his hand, and the disgrun- 
tled delegations of Alabama and Missouri. 

According to rumors industriously circulated 
at the time, Colonel House was the lavish spender 
who put up money to keep many weary delegates 
in Baltimore during the last three days of the 
convention. This was not true. Neither was the 
/Story true that he conferred concerning Wilson's 
affairs with Thomas Fortune Ryan. He has 
never met Mr. Ryan at any time. He had noth- 
ing whatever to do with the actual work of the 
convention. Having mixed the necessary dynam- 
ic human forces in the great political retort, 
he let them simmer and boil until they reached 
the combustion point. But he could not be sure, 
any more than the next man, what the resulting 
mixture would be. He wanted it to turn out a 
certain way; he mixed his elements to turn out 
that way. But no simple son of man on the foot- 
stool could have been certain in the circumstances. 
It is rather uncanny that those dissimilar inter- 
ests should have united as he had planned. That 
is, it is uncanny until you remember the previous 
occasions when his touch, light and unnoticed, 
had worked with the same unfailing sureness. 



"5 



CHAPTER XI 

GOOD JUDGMENT IN A TICKLISH CAMPAIGN 

EVEN the most ardent supporter of Wood- 
row Wilson will concede that as things 
happened in 19 12 the principal factor in his elec- 
tion was the candidacy of Theodore Roosevelt. 
Without Colonel Roosevelt's intercession, Mr. 
Wilson might very well have been elected against 
Mr. Taft or any other candidate put up by the 
Republican Old Guard. Colonel House is inclined 
to believe, too, that Mr. Wilson could have de- 
feated Mr. Roosevelt, himself, running on an 
unsplit Republican ticket, by the diligent use on 
the stump of the third term bogey and Colonel 
Roosevelt's pledge to abstain from accepting an- 
other nomination. But the plain fact is that 
neither of these contingencies occurred, and in 
the campaign as conducted the Roosevelt candi- 
dacy simply slit the Republican strength to rib- 
bons, electing Mr. Wilson by the greatest number 
of electoral votes cast for any Presidential can- 
didate since George Washington was first chosen 
without opposition. 

One of the strongest trumps in the hands of 
116 



GOOD JUDGMENT IN A TICKLISH CAMPAIGN 

the Democratic spellbinders was the famous 
Rooseveltian simile of the "two cups of coffee." 
The phrase will be a classic in American political 
annals. 

"If a man declines another cup of coffee, does 
that mean that he has no right to change his mind 
later ? Certainly not, sir ! Well, then, why can- 
not Colonel Roosevelt change his mind and accept 
a third term?" 

Looking back on it, one is tempted to wonder 
why anybody should have had a doubt of the 
campaign's result. But in the red-hot atmosphere 
of the hustings there was a disposition to forget 
the neutralizing effect of the Republican and Pro- 
gressive attacks upon each other and the un- 
broken array of the Democratic ranks. The Pro- 
gressive movement attained surprising propor- 
tions, driven by Colonel Roosevelt's dynamic per- 
sonality and a remarkable wave of politico-relig- 
ious hysteria. Who will ever forget the delegates 
to the second Chicago Convention dispersing to 
their self-appointed tasks to the tune of "On- 
ward, Christian Soldiers" ? It was difficult then 
to appraise the exact extent of the Progressive 
sweep. Many Democratic leaders were in a 
panicky mood. 

Colonel House returned from his vacation in 
Europe in August. There was no understanding 
between him and Mr. Wilson at this time — at 

117 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

least, none of a formal nature. But shortly after 
his return Mr. Wilson sent for him to discuss 
several political questions which were essential 
to the conduct of the campaign, and thereafter 
he became identified with every decision of im- 
portance. Mr. Wilson already had discovered 
the extraordinary powers of prevision and im- 
personal analysis which Colonel House possessed. 

"Colonel House," the President told newspa- 
per reporters before his inauguration, "can hold 
a subject away from him and examine it and 
analyze it, as if he had nothing to do with it, 
better than any man I ever knew." 

Before very long others of Mr. Wilson's ad- 
visers came to realize the dependability of this 
man's judgment. They would bring their prob- 
lems to him, and he would ascertain all the avail- 
able facts, and from these facts, in connection 
with the human influences behind them, he would 
work out the probable course of events. 

"His ability to foretell what a given line of 
action will bring about is almost uncanny," At- 
torney-General Gregory declared afterward. 

But of course the real reason for Mr. Wilson's 
trust in Colonel House was his appreciation of 
Colonel House's unselfish motives. And simi- 
larly, the most jealous and ambitious members 
of Mr. Wilson's political cabinet were assured 
that they did not need to be fearful of being dis- 

ii8 



GOOD JUDGMENT IN A TICKLISH CAMPAIGN 

placed by Colonel House, and so they came to 
him with all their fears and disappointments, 
their animosities, their dislikes, their complaints 
of the cabals they conceived were being framed 
against them. He stood apart from all the in- 
triguing and place-seeking, caught the tangled 
skein of truth and fiction in his hands and wove 
a texture substantial enough to support the work 
of the campaign. 

That was not a pleasant campaign. It was 
probably the most bothersome Colonel House 
ever took part in. There were two opposing ele- 
ments in the National Committee. Mr. Mc- 
Combs, the National Chairman, was worn out by 
his arduous labors and ill at one time for six 
weeks. The men who were running the cam- 
paign were new to their work, keen on their jobs, 
to be sure, all clean-cut, intelligent, wide-awake 
young Americans. But to many of them the po- 
litical game on such a scale was a novel proposi- 
tion, and they were apt to be nervous in crises 
and jumpy in the dark. Colonel House's job — 
or rather the most important one of several jobs 
— was to harmonize conflicting factions, to co- 
ordinate their efforts and smooth out traces of 
antagonism. 

He succeeded to an extraordinary degree, al- 
though he steadfastly lived up to his life-long 
^ rule not to take any official part in the campaign. 

119 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

When national headquarters were opened in the 
Fifth Avenue Building in New York, the cam- 
paign managers set aside an office for Colonel 
House and put his name on the door. As soon 
as he discovered it, he insisted that his name be 
removed and he refused to use the office. The 
very idea of having an office allocated to himself 
in a campaign headquarters was irritating to his 
ingrained modesty and inimical to his methods of 
work. 

He visited national headquarters during the 
campaign of 1912 much oftener than he did dur- 
ing the 1 91 6 campaign, but he never became a 
familiar figure. The wise ones at headquarters, 
however, learned to anticipate his visits when- 
ever there were rumblings of trouble underneath 
the routine of the campaign. When he came he 
never stayed long, and usually he had little to 
say; but after he had left peace would return and 
the work of electing Woodrow Wilson go on 
unhindered. 

A member of the committee in that campaign 
explained it this way: 

"Colonel House would come into an office and 
say a few words quietly, and after he had gone 
you would suddenly become seized by a good idea. 
You would suggest that idea to your friends or 
superiors and be congratulated for it; it would 
work first rate, beyond your wildest dreams. You 

120 



i 



GOOD JUDGMENT IN A TICKLISH CAMPAIGN 

might forget about it. But some time, as sure 
as shooting, in cogitating proudfully over it, you 
would come to an abrupt realization that that idea 
had been oozed into your brain by Colonel House 
in the course of conversation. 

''You did not know it at the time — because the 
Colonel did not want you to know it. He is never 
anxious to gain credit by his ideas ; anybody who 
can make 'em work is welcome to them. Well, 
sir, as a matter of fact, before the campaign was 
over some of us had come to the conclusion that 
Colonel House was about the biggest man in the 
works. He never held any position ; he wouldn't 
take one. He didn't seem to represent any per- 
son or persons. Nobody ever thought of declin- 
ing to listen to him. You were always anxious 
to talk to him; he had a quiet way of making you 
feel that it was a personal interest in your par- 
ticular welfare that prompted him. Besides, you 
knew that he had no ax to grind, that he was 
working for Wilson, and through Wilson for the 
country. And anyway, after you had listened to 
him once you knew he was worth listening to." 

While the campaign was on few people had any 
conception of the role Colonel House was play- 
ing, he moved so unostentatiously, he effaced 
himself so completely. His name appeared in 
the newspapers very rarely, and then merely as 
a visitor to the candidate. But his was the guid- 

121 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

ing hand that steered the party's destiny. In 
the planning of all the major strategy his voice 
was heard and heeded. 

It was he, for instance, who counseled Mr. 
Wilson to place emphasis upon the tariff issue 
in his speeches, because he felt that Mr. Wilson 
could make a better presentation of it than the 
other candidates, and with his trained scholar's 
mind and mastery of history, point out the fal- 
lacies of the high-protection theory. And it was 
at his suggestion that Dr. David Franklin Hous- 
ton, chancellor of Washington University at St. 
Louis, was invited to come East and assist Mr. 
Wilson in the preparation of tariff speeches with 
his monumental store of knowledge on all the 
political-economic aspects of the tariff system. 
Out of that chance meeting during the campaign 
was to spring an association lasting through fu- 
ture years and of great importance to the na- 
tion's interests. 

Colonel House also fully agreed with Mr. Wil- 
son in his determination to refrain from any 
personal attacks upon Mr. Taft. This was one 
of the shrewdest bits of strategy in the campaign. 
Its practical effect was to leave it to Mr. Taft to 
lay bare his own political weal^nesses. Mr. Wil- 
son took occasion to applaud Mr. Taft's honesty 
of purpose, his personal probity, his fine patriot- 
ism. Then he would turn and point to the ad- 

122 



GOOD JUDGMENT IN A TICKLISH CAMPAIGN 

visers who encircled the RepubHcan President 
and to the reactionary trend of the Administra- 
tion in the past four years. 

Against Colonel Roosevelt, on the other hand, 
Mr. Wilson swung his bludgeon with accuracy 
and force, laying bare all the contradictions of 
the third-termer's brilliantly erratic career, strip- 
ping the high-sounding Progressive platform of 
its verbiage and reducing it to the residuum of 
possible accomplishment, riddling the vagaries of 
its revolutionary social doctrines. In fine, Mr. 
Wilson put before the voters who teetered in their 
minds between Colonel Roosevelt and himself, 
the contrast of a real progressive with a false 
Progressive. 

But when Colonel Roosevelt was shot by a 
crazy man in Milwaukee on October 14, with 
prompt chivalry Mr. Wilson not only abstained 
from any further attacks upon an opponent who 
was no longer able to reply, but also cancelled 
all his future speaking engagements until Colonel 
Roosevelt had recovered sufficiently to make his 
appearance in Madison Square Garden for the 
wind-up of the campaign. 

It was Colonel House, by the way, who sent 
for Captain Bill McDonald, the Texas Ranger, 
to come East and act as bodyguard for Mr. Wil- 
son the day after Colonel Roosevelt was shot. 
Colonel House wired: 

123 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

"Come immediately. Important. Bring your 
artillery." 

Captain Bill wired back : 
"I'm comin'." 

Colonel House loves to tell about Captain Bill's 
arrival in New York a few days later. The old 
gun-fighter, who had known the Colonel ever 
since they were boys, had jumped to the conclu- 
sion that some people in the East must have been 
"pickin' " on his friend, and he arrived with blood 
in his eye. He had borrowed the carfare from 
a friend, and had not stopped to shave. 

"I can see him now," Colonel House described 
the incident, "and thinking of meeting him that 
evening reminds me of another time I met him 
with Albert Bigelow Paine, who wrote for him 
the story of his adventurous life. He wore his 
old yellow slicker and slouch hat. We took him 
to a little hotel near the Players Club, and I shall 
never forget the look that dawned on Paine's face 
when Captain Bill slipped off his slicker and coat 
and calmly unhitched his six-shooter and auto- 
matic from either hip. He carried those guns 
for ballast, you might say. He couldn't have 
walked straight without them. And he took them 
off just as you might take off your watch and 
key-ring." 

124 



GOOD JUDGMENT IN A TICKLISH CAMPAIGN 

There was a story circulated at the time of 
Captain Bill's arrival in New York that he had 
been arrested in the Waldorf-Astoria for carry- 
ing concealed weapons, and that Colonel House 
secured his release. Nothing like this ever hap- 
pened. Captain Bill did precisely what he was 
asked to do; he lived with Mr. Wilson, night and 
day, throughout the campaign, and he conducted 
himself like the simple frontier gentleman that 
he was. 

Disagreeable as were many incidents in the 
campaign of 1912, the problems to be solved were 
very simple. The most difficult task was to keep 
the peace in the Democratic ranks. Colonel 
House's unfailing advice to all the political man- 
agers, who came to him in fear and trembling at 
the uproar Roosevelt was creating, was to sit 
tight and not to make mistakes. Why was he so 
confident? Because he had studied dispassion- 
ately Colonel Roosevelt's effort and its effect upon 
the Republican party, and had then contrasted it 
with the Wilson feeling traceable in every part 
of the Union. He could not make himself see 
anything but a Wilson victory by such means. 

"Let Theodore Roosevelt elect us," was the 
way he summed up his strategy. 

How effectively this strategy worked you may 
see from an examination of the figures for the 
election of 191 2. Although Mr. Wilson received 

125 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

only 6,303,063 votes as compared with 4,168,564 
for Colonel Roosevelt and 3,439,529 for Mr. Taft 
— which were 2,134,499 more than Colonel 
Roosevelt and 1,305,030 less than the combined 
votes of the two other candidates — so complete 
was the split in the Republican party that the 
Democrats carried almost every Republican 
stronghold in the East and West and Mr. Wilson 
actually received 435 electoral votes against 88 
for Colonel Roosevelt and 8 for Mr. Taft. 



126 



CHAPTER XII 

FORMATION OF MR. WILSON'S CABINET 

THE first task of a President-elect is to form 
his Cabinet, and no prospective occupant 
of the White House ever confronted so many- 
knotty problems in this undertaking as did Wood- 
row Wilson. Mr. Wilson undoubtedly owed a 
considerable measure of his success with the vot- 
ers to his having disregarded the hide-bound tra- 
ditions established by Mr, Bryan. But he was 
thoroughly progressive, himself, in his beliefs 
and policies, and he could not establish connec- 
tions with the little ring of Democratic reaction- 
aries who had fought so hard to keep the nomina- 
tion from him. What he had to set himself to 
do in the circumstances was so to frame his Cabi- 
net as to unite in it representatives of all those 
elements of the party with which he could conge- 
nially work in accord. Colonel House had a 
greater share in this difficult work than any other 
of the President's advisers, but his influence has 
been distorted by rumor out of all resemblance 
to fact. 

It is another clew to his character that none of 

127 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

the old wives' tales circulated about his mythical 
potency has riled him so deeply as the oft-re- 
peated assertion that he ''selected" the Presi- 
dent's Cabinet. 

''They talk about my selection of men for the 
Cabinet," he exclaimed in one of his few bursts 
of feelings. "That is as silly as other things they 
say. Can you imagine Woodrow Wilson sub- 
mitting to the nomination by me or any one else 
of members of his Cabinet? It is preposterous! 
Those things took place just as they do in private 
life. We talked together — sometimes by our- 
selves; sometimes with others — about places to 
be filled and available men to fill them. Names 
would be mentioned, discussed, rejected, set aside 
for future consideration, dragged out again, com- 
pared with new ones. Our first test was fitness. 
My advice might be asked; I might be asked to 
suggest a name or names. I would do so, and the 
President would examine them in detail. Some 
he would dismiss after a short consideration; 
others he might adopt. You must remember that 
I had a very wide acquaintance with public men 
in this country, much wider than Mr, Wilson had 
at that time, for I had been in touch with political 
aflFairs for years before he left Princeton. 

"I remember that he was frequently attacked 
in the early days of the Administration for pick- 
ing unknown and untried men for the Cabinet. 

128 



FORMATION OF MR. WILSON'S CABINET 

As a matter of fact, I think that the trial fur- 
nished by the war, let alone the preceding four 
years of governmental progress and evolution, 
demonstrated the Cabinet to be an unusually 
competent body of men. Other Cabinets may 
have contained more individually brilliant men, 
but I doubt if many Cabinets have shown a higher 
level of efficiency and conscientious labor. Con- 
sider that the Democratic party had been out of 
office for sixteen years, and that we had prac- 
tically no trained men available. Our case was 
very different from the Republicans'. They had 
plenty of men who had held office and who were 
known quantities. But the generation of Demo- 
cratic office-holders who had been employed in 
Cleveland's last Administration had grown too 
old for active service, and the President had to 
go into the ranks and select men who had never 
held high executive office under the Federal Gov- 
ernment. 

"In the course of his search for the best men 
available, some of my friends were selected, be- 
cause, upon analysis, they seemed to be among 
the best. Every one of those men, with whom I 
was acquainted before the Administration came 
into power, has done splendidly." 

Colonel House has generally been given credit 
for putting three men in the Cabinet at the start 
of the Administration— Albert S. Burleson, 

129 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

Postmaster-General; Franklin K. Lane, Secre- 
tary of the Interior; and David F. Houston, Sec- 
retary of Agriculture. The truth is that Colonel 
House was acquainted with every member of the 
Cabinet before the Administration went into of- 
fice, except Lindley M. Garrison, President Wil- 
son's First Secretary of War. 

Mr. Garrison was chosen for this post at the 
last minute. The War portfolio had been offered 
to Representative A. Mitchel Palmer, of Penn- 
sylvania, now Official Custodian of Enemy Alien 
Property, but Mr. Palmer was a Quaker and did 
not feel at liberty to identify himself with mili- 
tary affairs. When he made known his decision 
there was very little time left in which to secure 
a man of the proper caliber for Secretary of War, 
and Joseph Tumulty, Secretary to the President, 
suggested the name of Mr. Garrison, then Chan- 
cellor of New Jersey. Mr. Garrison had the ad- 
vantage of being from the President's own State 
and could easily be looked up. Mr. Wilson sent 
for him, liked him very much, and offered him 
the place. 

There is a very interesting little story about the 
three friends of Colonel House named above. In 
the winter of 1902 — by an odd coincidence the 
same year in which Woodrow Wilson was elected 
president of Princeton University — Air. Lane, 
having just been defeated in the election for Gov- 

130 



FORMATION OF MR. WILSON'S CABINET 

crnor of California, started on a trip East by- 
way of Texas, planning to stop off at Austin to 
pay a visit to Mr. Mezes, brother-in-law of Colo- 
nel House, who had just been elected Dean of 
the University of Texas in succession to Dr. 
Houston, who had become president of the Agri- 
cultural and Mechanical College of Texas. Lane 
and Mezes had been students together at the Uni- 
versity of California, and after that Mezes had 
gone to Harvard, where he had met Houston, and 
he and Houston had come to Texas together as 
professors in the faculty of the new State Uni- 
versity. 

As was quite natural, during Lane's visit, Dean 
Mezes gave a dinner in honor of his guest, which 
was attended by Thomas W. Gregory, at that 
time a well-known lawyer and a regent of the 
University of Texas; Representative Burleson, 
Dr. Houston, Mr. House, R. L. Batts, now a ^ 
Judge of the United States Circuit Court, and 
C. K. Bell, who has since died. Rather an im-, 
pressive little party, was it not? There were 
present four future Cabinet members and the un- 
official adviser of the President. Except Mezes, 
none of these men had ever met Lane before. 
The others, of course, were old friends and allies 

I of Colonel House in his essays in State politics. 
Colonel House conceived an interest in Mr. 

j Lane at this meeting, which was intensified by 

131 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

Mr. Lane's work as a member of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission, to which he was ap- 
pointed by President Rooseveh in 1905 and on 
which body he served with distinction until his 
elevation to the Cabinet by President Wilson in 
March, 1913. It is noteworthy that Mr. Wilson 
had never met Secretary Lane until the day of 
the first meeting of the new Cabinet at the White 
House. It was necessary for Mr. Lane when he 
came to step up and introduce himself to the 
President. Mr. Wilson chose his Secretary of 
the Interior partly on the advice of Colonel 
House, but mainly on examination of Mr. Lane's 
work on the Interstate Commerce Commission. 
I Dr. Houston, it will be recalled. President Wil- 
son had met during the preceding campaign, in 
the course of the preparation of data for his 
sledge-hammer speeches on the tariff. Mr. Bur- 
leson, who had a long and distinguished record 
as a member of the lower house of Congress, had 
been one of the earliest supporters of Mr. Wilson 
in the pre-convention campaign, and the Presi- 
dent had had numerous opportunities of judging 
his capacity by personal intercourse in subsequent 
months. Of these two men, Dr. Houston was 
a scholar and economist, who brought an un- 
usual fund of special knowledge to his depart- 
ment, and Mr. Burleson demonstrated the ability 
in organization and executive control so essential 

132 



FORMATION OF MR. WILSON'S CABINET 

to the head of the largest Government business 
enterprise in the world. 

Although he did not become a member of the 
Cabinet at this time, it is convenient to mention 
here the circumstances which brought about the 
appointment of Mr. Gregory as Attorney-Gen- 
eral in August, 1914, to succeed James C. Mc- 
Reynolds, of Tennessee, upon Mr. McReynolds's 
promotion to the Supreme Court. Mr. Gregory, 
it will be recalled, made a name for himself by 
his prosecution, while Attorney-General of 
Texas, of the Waters-Pierce Oil Company. Like 
Burleson, he had been one of the steadiest sup- 
porters of Mr. Wilson's claims to the Presiden- 
tial nomination. It was Mr. Gregory, for in- 
stance, who arranged Mr. Wilson's visit to 
Texas in October, 191 1, to speak at the 
State Fair at Dallas, the occasion having served 
for Mr. Wilson's political bow to the Southwest. 
In 1913, Gregory was appointed a Special As- 
sistant Attorney-General to prosecute the Gov- 
ernment's reopened case against the New Haven 
Railroad, which had been started spasmodically 
in the Roosevelt Administration and dropped 
after Mr. Taft became President. Mr. Gregory 
handled this difficult job with conspicuous effi- 
ciency, and so became the logical successor to 
Attorney-General McReynolds. 

Of the other members of the Cabinet, Mr. Mc- 
133 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

Adoo won his appointment by his splendid work 
as vice-chairman of the National Committee in 
the campaign; he was one of the few members 
with whom the President had been acquainted 
prior to taking office. William B. Wilson, the 
Secretary of Labor, palpably was chosen purely 
for his ability to interpret the voice of labor and 
guard the interests of the workingman. Mr. 
Daniels, the Secretary of the Navy, was the 
"newspaper friend" of Mr. Bryan who was sent 
to explain the Joline letter. He was very active 
in Mr. Wilson's support and very popular in the 
South. William C. Redfield, Secretary of Com- 
merce, was from New York, and had made a 
reputation in tariff debates in the House of Rep- 
resentatives. 

But, of course, the great enigma of the Cabinet 
was Mr. Bryan, who, as Secretary of State, was 
the senior member, and sat at the President's 
right hand at meetings. Mr. Bryan was the first 
man picked for the Cabinet. There was no dis- 
cussion of who was to be Secretary of State. 
That portfolio was reserved for Mr. Bryan from 
the start. The President and Colonel House were 
in perfect accord in this matter. Mr. Bryan's 
inclusion in the Cabinet was a stroke of genius 
for which the President has never been sorry. 

As has been pointed out before, President Wil- 
son found himself in a peculiar position after his 

134 



FORIVIATION OF MR. WILSON'S CABINET 

election. Mr. Wilson's nomination had been due 
as much as anything else to Mr. Bryan's last- 
minute support. And despite Mr. Wilson's suc- 
cess at the polls, Mr. Bryan could still dispute 
with him the leadership of the Democratic party 
— if Mr. Bryan chose to do so. In plain words, 
Mr. Bryan could be a powerful friend to the Ad- 
ministration or a very dangerous opponent, all 
the more dangerous because he happened to be 
on the same side of the fence. The party, more- 
over, was still rent by feuds and dissensions; dis- 
cord was in the air. Every sign foreboded 
trouble. It was considered by the President and 
his friends that the correct policy was for them 
to placate Mr. Bryan by recognizing tacitly the 
value of his assistance. The wisdom of this 
policy was amply proved by the final issue of the 
Bryan episode. 

Without Bryan's aid in holding the party to- 
gether until the Administration had found its 
feet, the Administration almost certainly would 
have gone on the rocks. When he did break 
loose he did harm only to himself, because it was 
obvious that he had been treated with every con- 
sideration, and that he could not reproach the 
President for anything. The wisest thing Mr. 
Wilson did was to get Mr. Bryan into his Cab- 
inet. 

But it was by no means certain that Mr. Bryan 
135 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

would consent to enter a Cabinet of the composi- 
tion determined upon by the President. Of the 
ten members, only two — Burleson and Daniels — 
could be regarded as Bryan Democrats. Mr. 
Redfield, the Secretary of Commerce, had bolted 
Bryan tickets in the past and voted for Republi- 
can candidates; Mr. Lane had accepted appoint- 
ment under Roosevelt; Mr. McAdoo had been 
identified with the activities of a corporation and 
had never been conspicuous in any preceding 
campaign. Some of the President's advisers pre- 
dicted that at first sight of such a Cabinet Mr. 
Bryan would shy away from the Administration. 
It was for Colonel House, who knew Mr. Bryan 
better than any of the President's intimates, to 
prove the contrary. 

Quite a stir was caused among the politicians 
early in February, 1913, by the sudden announce- 
ment that Colonel House had gone South to visit 
Mr. Bryan at the Bryan winter home in Miami. 
It was stated in the newspapers — and never de- 
nied — that Colonel House had been dispatched as 
a bearer of belts to carry to Mr. Bryan the Presi- 
dent's profifer of the Secretaryship of State. But 
persons who knew Colonel House chuckled at 
the thought that he was become a messenger-boy 
for the President. 

The truth is that the Secretaryship of State 
had been offered to Mr. Bryan weeks prior to 

136 



FORMATION OF MR. WILSON'S CABINET 

this and had been accepted by him. Colonel 
House visited Mr. Bryan to tell him in detail of 
the President's Cabinet appointments and outline 
to him the situation, so that there might be no 
chance of any trouble with him on this score 
later on. Some people who knew of Colonel 
House's trip were not very sanguine of its suc- 
cess. But it went ofif as smoothly as could have 
been desired. Mr. Bryan did not then, nor did 
he later, have any criticism to make upon the 
personnel of the Cabinet. He acquiesced cheer- 
fully to the President's policies, and to a degree 
surprising to those who knew him best, effaced 
his masterful personality and quietly played sec- 
ond fiddle. 

He never made any promise or undertaking 
to Mr, Wilson. Indeed, the President was as 
much in the dark as anybody else as to what to 
expect from him. But by his attitude on the 
question of the Cabinet, and by his quiet support 
during the first two years of th^ Administration, 
he showed clearly his intent. By the time he had 
grown restless and found it no longer possible to 
curb his zest for independence of action his power 
for harm had waned. In the summer of 1913 he 
might have wrecked the Administration, and, in 
all probability, Mr. Wilson's future chances. 
Two years later, Mr. Wilson's power had grown 
so that the clash with Mr. Bryan was a mere 

T^Z7 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

episode, and actually strengthened the President's 
position by its illustration of Mr. Wilson's fixity 
of purpose. 

One of the few truthful rumors about Colonel 
House is that he was offered by the President a 
place in the Cabinet and that he declined it. The 
President did offer him any portfolio which he 
preferred, except the Secretaryship of State, 
which, as has already been stated, was reserved 
for Mr. Bryan. Colonel House's family were 
very anxious that he should enter the Cabinet, as 
were also those of his friends who were aware 
of the honor the President had conferred upon 
him. But for the reasons which had prevented 
him from seeing his way to accept office in the 
past, as well as because he honestly believed that ^ 
he could be more helpful in an independent ca-1j 
pacity, he refused. When Mr. Wilson pressed 
him further Colonel House answered that he was 
willing to do anything to help the Administra- 
tion, but that he felt sure he could be much more 
useful to the President, if he was not tied down 
by a department job of routine. The President, 
at first, was not disposed to accept Colonel 
House's view, but after a while he was apparently 
convinced, and he let the subject drop. Probably 
nobody is more grateful to-day that Colonel 
House is not "tied down" to the desk-work of 
some department than the President. 

138 



1 



CHAPTER XIII 

HIS PART IN NATIONAL CURRENCY REFORM 

IN the fall of 1912, Colonel House closed his 
home in Austin, and took an apartment in 
New York, so that he could be close at hand 
whenever Governor Wilson wished to consult 
iwith him. He chose New York, instead of Wash- 
ington, for a residence, because the climate 
agreed with him better, and he wished to keep 
out of the swirl of political intrigue in the na- 
tional capital. It was during these months fol- 
lowing the election that Governor Wilson con- 
tracted the habit of coming into New York from 
Trenton or Princeton to spend the night or week- 
end with his friend, and it was these visits of 
the President-elect which began to attract public 
notice to Colonel House. 

Practical politicians immediately concluded 
that here was a man to be conciliated, and they 
were quick to endeavor to place their talents at 
Colonel House's disposition. But for all who 
came he had a courteous greeting, and not much 
else. He listened to what they had to say, of 
course. He is an unusually good listener. But 

139 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

after they had talked their heads off he had only 
a courteous good-by to reward them with, and 
the practical politicians went away with a dis- 
tinct feeling of resentment. They told each other 
that "this fellow House" was plainly not going to 
share things; he was going to try *'to hog it all 
for himself." And clumsily, after their own 
fashion, they sought to start back-fires against 
him, which either flickered out in the kindling 
or else spurted flames at the conspirators. It 
took a long time for the professional politician 
to have -it seeped through his head that Colonel 
House was not in the game for the purposes 
w^hich animated him. 

It is an open secret that Colonel House's role 
in the Administration at first was that of political 
next-of-kin to Mr. Wilson, an all-around coun- 
selor and conciliator. His wits fairly itched to 
get at the international problems, which were the 
most interesting phase of governmental work to 
him, but he appreciated the need of settling the 
vital questions of domestic legislation before de- 
voting his attention elsewhere. Mr. Wilson soon 
discovered how valuable Colonel House could be 
as a harmonizer of conflicting wills, and how 
shrewd were his judgments of men and the prob- 
able outcome of policies. Many a time, in those 
days, the President-elect would disappear mys- 
teriously from the Capitol at Trenton and turn 

140 



HIS PART IN NATIONAL CURRENCY REFORM 

up again at the Pennsylvania Station in New 
York, bound for Colonel House's apartment in 
the East Thirties. On his return the newspaper 
men would demand what had taken him away, 
but the only answer they would receive would be 
that he had had "a bully talk with Colonel 
House" — subject and object not specified. 
. After Mr. Wilson's inauguration the principal 
legislative topic of discussion was the new Tariff 
bill. The impending currency reform legislation, 
perhaps because of its highly technical character, 
was not attracting so much notice. Tariff legis- 
lation had been agitated for years and was a 
subject which had contact with every kind of 
business. It was followed keenly by all classes 
of citizens and had intelligent appreciation to an 
extraordinary extent for a matter of such com- 
plexity. Also, there were many men in Congress 
who had studied the whole broad subject of tariff 
revision and reconstruction at great length. Its 
path through Congress was fairly smooth. 

The contemplated currency reform measure 
was a horse of another color. It was not under- 
stood by the mass of citizens, and it was greeted 
with an outburst of denunciation and destructive 
criticism by the people it was \o affect most — the 
bankers. The opposition tu it centred in the 
small group of tremendously powerful bankers 
in New York, Philadelphia, and Boston, who up 

141 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

to this time had successfully dominated the finan- 
cial operations of the country. They saw in it an 
assault upon their privileges, a curtailment of 
what they had looked upon as their rights, a com- 
plete reorganization of banking strength which 
they pretended must be fraught with bitter con- 
sequences for the entire economic structure of 
the nation. 

Now, the Currency Reform bill was the proj- 
ect of the Administration in which Colonel 
House took deepest interest. He was not a 
banker, you will remember. But for many years 
he had been studying financial conditions in the 
United States, and he had come to the conclu- 
sion long before this that there was something 
radically wrong with existing institutions. He 
had noted the liability of the country at intervals 
to blind, causeless panics, starting in sudden 
bursts of unreasoning fear, which swept all be- 
fore them. He had noted the absence of any con- 
crete financial machinery to be put into use to 
meet such emergencies. He had noted the un- 
balanced distribution of banking power and the 
tendency of the country as a whole to lean on the 
authority of the group of big bankers in the 
Eastern cities, with the inevitable result of plac- 
ing in the hands of these men practically unlim- 
ited power for good or ill. 

He had discussed the need for financial reor- 
142 



HIS PART IN NATIONAL CURRENCY REFORM' 

ganization with his friend, William Garrett 
Brown, who was then a regular editorial con- 
tributor to Harper's Weekly, prior even to his 
meeting with Mr. Wilson. It was not a new 
subject to him, and he was delighted to find that 
the President was thoroughly in accord with 
his theories for remodeling the existing struc- 
ture. It should be said here that Mr. Brown, 
who contributed a number of very valuable ideas 
to the symposium on financial reform which ulti- 
mately went into the Owen-Glass bill, did not 
live to witness the realization of his ideal of a 
permanent, unshakable financial organization, 
which should be as a pillar to support American 
trade and business. But on his death-bed he re- 
ceived from Colonel House the assurance that 
the bill would go through, and because he trusted 
Colonel House, he died happy and satisfied. 

When Congress met Colonel House went to 
Washington and held a conference with Repre- 
sentative Carter Glass, of Virginia, who was to 
have charge of the projected bill in the House; 
Senator Owen, of Oklahoma, its sponsor in the 
Senate, and Secretary McAdoo. These three 
men went at the problems presented by the bill 
in very dififerent ways, and each produced sug- 
gestions of great value. But none of them con- 
tributed more to it as finally enacted than did 
the President. Indeed, without the President's 

143 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE ■ 

keen brain and helping hand, the measure might 
well have failed, or at least, gone through in 
feebler form. Never was Mr. Wilson's genius 
for leadership more clearly demonstrated. Colo- 
nel House's part in the transaction was, as 
customary with him, that of bringing opposing 
views into line, preventing disagreements, and 
gathering and interpreting advice and criticisms 
from all classes of men and all parts of the 
country. 

*'The whole trouble was that most of those 
bankers who opposed the bill had not taken the 
trouble to study it," he said, in discussing the 
measure. "If they had done so they would soon 
have seen that the objections they claimed it pos- 
sessed were not susceptible of proof. The 
measure is easily understood by one who has the 
faculty of absorbing such matters and who is 
willing to devote a little time and study to it. 

"I corresponded with bankers and others 
throughout the country, and I am persuaded that 
the opposition to it was never so general or so 
pronounced as some persons would have had us 
believe. The backbone of the element which op- 
posed the measure was constituted of the small 
groups of powerful banking interests in Phila- 
delphia, New York, and Boston. At the same 
time, I know of one well-known banker of Bos- 
ton, a typical representative of the old-school, 

144 




A CORNER IN COLONEL HOUSE's STUDY 
WHERE HE INTERVIEWS HIS CALLERS 



•HIS PART IN NATIONAL CURRENCY REFORM 

conservative spirit in banking, who took a broad- 
minded, patriotic, public-spirited view of the bill. 
And there were others like him in Philadelphia 
and New York. 

*'It was not possible at the time to segregate 
the opponents and favorers of the measure, as 
some people tried to do, and assert that the 
bankers who did favor it were to be found in the 
smaller cities and the rural communities. Many 
bankers in the big cities, outside of the group I 
have mentioned, favored the bill. I remember a 
paper came out once with the assertion that 
2,000 bankers opposed the bill, and it made 
rather a sensation. But a great many more than 
2,000 bankers favored and supported the bill, 
and, what is more important still, the merchants 
and business men of the country, who were the 
most affected by it in the long run, were over- 
whelmingly in favor of it. The same was true 
of the farmers, although I do not think that they 
then realized so well as they do now that they 
would benefit more in proportion by the bill than 
the merchants and business men." 

Every banker of consequence in the country 
was asked for suggestions to improve the new 
law, but bankers as a class gave the legislators 
very little help. Everybody who had any share 
in putting the bill through was struck by the 
entire lack of professional breadth of vision 

145 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

demonstrated by many of the so-called "big" 
bankers. These men seemed to have made no 
study of the fmancial problem of the nation in 
its broader aspects. They were heads of enor- 
mously wealthy and successful banks; sure 
judges of what was ''safe paper" and what was 
not; widely acquainted and possessed of sources 
of "inside" information in Wall Street. But of 
the subtle forces which moved behind them and 
controlled the country's prosperity they appeared 
to have no adequate conception. 

Colonel House tells a story illustrative of the 
attitude of the conservative banking school 
toward the bill. He was invited to attend a din- 
ner given by a prominent banker to the heads of 
a certain group of banks, all of them institutions 
of ponderous proportions, mentioned in business 
circles with bated breath, the idea being that an 
attempt might be made to place the banks' side of 
the case before him. 

"A friend of mine went with me," said Colonel 
House. "On our way to the dinner he was very 
gloomy and had little to say. Afterward he con- 
fessed that he felt very sorry for me. Well, will 
you believe me, when I tell you that at the din- 
ner not one of the bankers present had a word 
to say on the subject of the bill? The entire 
conversation was conducted between myself and 
the only other person present who was not a 

146 



HIS PART IN NATIONAL CURRENCY REFORM 

banker. They let him do all the talking, and he 
was not a person of any special knowledge re- 
garding banking methods or problems. They 
were very courteous to me, but they seemed to 
know nothing about the bill, other than that 
they did not like it. 

"A few days later my host of the dinner called 
me up and told me that he and his friends, after' 
considering the matter, had decided that they 
would adopt a resolution condemning the bill 
and make it public for its effect upon Congress 
and public opinion. I told him that I hoped he 
would not pass it for the sake of himself and 
his friends. 'As a matter of fact,' I said, 'as we 
stand to-day, your passing this resolution will 
be of inestimable help to the men who want the 
bill adopted by Congress. Your resolution will 
be telegraphed all over the country, and the 
people in the West and South will look upon it 
as another f )roof that the banking interests of the 
East are the sole obstructors of this legislation. 
Your opposition is of more help to us than would 
be your assistance, but my friendly advice to you 
is to drop your resolution.' 

"He said nothing more, but I noticed that the 
resolution was not adopted and was never made 
public. Three years later — just a few months 
ago — this same banker invited me to his house 
to dinner again; many of the same group of 

H7 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

bankers were present. We talked about our pre- 
vious meeting, and he admitted freely that he 
had been all wrong in his estimate of the bill. 
His view had been that they had got along all 
right under the old financial structure, and they 
wanted to continue on the same basis. They 
were afraid of anything new, just because it was 
new. I asked him if he had not known that our 
old banking system was the most antiquated in 
the world, always liable to collapse. He con- 
ceded that this was so, but he said we had always 
managed to weather every storm notwithstand- 
ing, and he dreaded a change. This attitude of 
mind was the chief obstacle. 

The general public never heard of Colonel 
House's connection with the Federal Reserve 
Bank act, although from his study in New York 
he kept in constant communication with men and 
organizations in every State, who were for or 
against the measure, and he sifted and passed on 
the comments, critical and commendatory, the 
suggestions and ideas, which came to him, to the 
men in Washington who were shepherding the 
new legislation through Congress. The one 
thing the President and his advisers feared was 
a conflict between the House and the Senate. 
This would have meant the introduction of two 
separate and irreconcilable bills, with a conse- 
quent deadlock, and in the end, no law. But b] 

148 



HIS PART IN NATIONAL CURRENCY REFORM 

conciliation and treaty this danger was eradi- 
cated, and slowly, but surely, the dream of a 
modern, elastic, seaworthy financial structure, 
built to resist pressure and form a bulwark 
against panics and scares, was erected into a 
reality. 

The financial history of the United States, 
since the fall of 19 14, a period of singular trial 
and stress, is the vindication of the Federal Re- 
serve system. It stands out to-day as the most 
notable domestic accomplishment of the present 
Administration — by many competent judges be- 
ing esteemed, indeed, the most constructive piece 
of legislation ever placed upon the statute-books 
by Congress. 



149 



CHAPTER XIV 

FORESEEING THE WORLD WAR 

DESPITE preoccupation with domestic legis- 
lation during his first year in the White 
House, President Wilson found opportunity to 
cast his eye abroad and note the ominous signs 
in world politics. For none of his policies has he 
been so bitterly attacked as for his attitude to- 
ward Mexico, and his subsequent stand in rela- 
tion to the European War. At any time he could 
have silenced his critics ofif-hand by the simple 
revelation that so early as the fall of 1913, before 
anybody else in the world, outside of a handful 
of generals and politicians in Germany and Aus- 
tria-Hungary, and the late Lord Roberts, and a 
few other British thinkers — he and Colonel 
House, between them, had surveyed the Euro- 
pean situation, and perceived that the two oppos- 
ing groups of powers were drifting toward the 
war which had been dreaded for a generation. 

But Mr. Wilson never made public this fact, 
although upon it was largely based his Mexican 
policy of "watchful waiting." Neither has he 
ever disclosed that in May, 19 14, three months 



FORESEEING THE WORLD WAR 

before war actually broke out, he sent Colonel 
House to Europe to endeavor to convince the 
several Governments of Germany, France, and 
Great Britain of the danger of the existing situa- 
tion and awaken them to the need of taking steps 
to clarify the misunderstandings among them- 
selves for the sake, not only of their own peoples, 
but of the whole world. 

It is characteristic of the man's stern self-con- 
fidence that he never thought to explain his posi- 
tion or the reasons which had dictated his con- 
duct. He knew that he was right. Knowing 
that, he was willing to accept criticism, causeless 
attack, hostile denunciation — yes, even defeat in 
the election of 1916 — rather than stoop to ex- 
plain, and perhaps weaken his ability to gain the 
peace for the world which he hoped for up to 
the very morning that the United States was 
dragged into the war. Since this country en- 
tered the ranks of Germany's enemies, all neces- 
sity for silence upon the President's unique vision 
of Armageddon has ended — if, indeed, there was 
ever any real necessity, save in Mr. Wilson's 
close-mouthed austerity and pride, at once his 
greatest strength and weakness. 

Looking over in retrospect the events which 
excited the anxiety of the President, it does not 
seem so strange that he should have gauged cor- 
rectly the drift of international affairs. But we, 

151 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

who look back from the threshold of 1918 upon 
the turgid years beginning with 1912, have in our 
possession the keys to modern history, together 
with information on many secret matters then 
unknown to the President and his friend. Few 
Americans at that date had any interest in for- 
eign politics or anticipated that the intrigues and 
policies of European Governments eventually 
would draw us from our isolation into the whirl- 
pool of racial animosities across the Atlantic. M 
In 19 1 3 the writing was spread on the wall for 
the benefit of those who could decipher it, but 
there was no case of ''he who runs may read." 
Statesmen and legislators, generals and admirals, 
philosophers and journalists, saw the warning 
and passed it by. And even when it was read to 
them they laughed it aside. 

The President had a double-barreled interest in 
European peace. When he took over the Presi- 
dency from Mr. Taft, he inherited with it the 
problem of the IMexican revolution, which became 
more complicated with the passage of every 
month. In February, 1913, less than a month 
before his inauguration, there occurred in Mexico 
City the revolution headed by the younger Diaz 
and General Reyes, known as the "Decina Tra- 
gica" from the fearful ruin it wrought in the 
beautiful Mexican capital. The result was the 
overthrow of Aladero's new Government and the 

152 



FORESEEING THE WORLD WAR 

installation of Gen. Victoriano Huerta as dicta- 
tor. Huerta's first act was to countenance — if 
he did not order — the murder of Madero and 
Vice-President Pino Suarez by their guards. 

Mr. Taft had been scrupulous in the final 
months of his term to take no step which would 
embarrass his successor, going so far as to con- 
sult with Mr. Wilson on certain vital decisions. 
Mr. Taft's policy was substantially the policy 
which Mr. Wilson adhered to so long as it was 
humanly possible to do so. He kept his hands 
off Mexican internal affairs, and by strength- 
ening the guard of troops on our side of the bor- 
der, tried to minimize the chances of complica- 
tions from Mexican revolutionary and bandit ac- 
tivity close to the line. It was impossible, how- 
ever, for Mr. Wilson to recognize a government 
set up in defiance of the Mexican Constitution by 
such a blood-soaked monster as Huerta, and he 
did not hesitate to let this fact be known. 
1 Consider for a moment the troubles Mr. Wil- 
son confronted in the first year of his first term. 
At home he had an untried Cabinet, an unruly 
Congress, a tremendous legislative program — 
the most radical which had ever been proposed — 
and a disunited party. Abroad he could see the 
preliminary signs of the most horrible catastro- 
phe in the world's history. In Mexico, red an- 
: archy reigned unchecked, with every horror of 

153 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

rapine, arson, assassination, and theft. Ameri- 
cans were being- shot, tortured, and mistreated. 
A considerable section of public opinion in the 
United States was clamoring for intervention in 
Mexico. It was a situation to try any man, wdth 
all the chances against him if he lost his head — • 
and this new President had lived until he was 
past fifty in the secluded atmosphere of colleges 
and universities. 

It is significant that the English and French 
press were foremost in denouncing his Mexican 
policy during 1913, and up to August, 1914. 
Then they made an abrupt change of front, 
which will be referred to again. It is still more 
significant that the German Minister to Mexico, 
the notorious Admiral von Hintze, confidant of 
the Kaiser, chief spy of the German Admiralty, 
and go-between in the confidential relations of the 
Kaiser with Czar Nicholas, was the arch trouble- 
maker betw^een the United States and the Huerta 
Government. Was Germany then — almost a 
year before the heir to the Austro-Hungarian 
throne was assassinated in Sarajevo — plotting to 
keep the United States fully occupied in the West- 
ern Hemisphere? Some statesmen think so. 
There can be no question of her later intrigues' 
after the world war had begun. 

Mr. Wilson withstood the attacks upon him for 
his Mexican policy with his usual impassiveness. 

154 



FORESEEING THE WORLD WAR 

He was looking beyond Mexico, beyond the im- 
mediate future. He wanted, above all things, to 
keep the country out of hostilities with any 
Power, large or small. He hoped by peaceful 
means to be able to hold off and give the Mexi- 
cans a chance to adjust their difficulties in their 
own way. But most of all he wanted to keep his 
hands free to meet the greater dangers which he 
could dimly see beyond the horizon. He was not 
a seer. He had no gift of prophecy. And of 
course he did not foresee everything which should 
happen — the full extent of the bloody ruin that 
was to make of Europe a place of weeping and 
of the oceans the abode of tragedy. Neither he 
nor Colonel House then realized the weight of 
woe impending upon the world. 

Their fear was that the war, if it came, would 
affect the United States mainly by obliging us to 
meet an increased burden of armaments. Their 
hope was that we might be able to help the na- 
tions of Europe to a speedy peace, to be ready to 
assist in healing wounds, and to be a moral in- 
fluence to restrain the aggressors — if, indeed, it 
proved impossible to prevent hostilities. Let it 
be remembered by Americans with pride that Mr. 
Wilson did what no other ruler of the world did 
in 1914: he strove to prevent war before the war- 
dogs were loosed. If his efforts had been met 

155 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

with honesty and intelligence, he must have suc- 
ceeded. 

It would require a book to detail the causes of 
the world war, but the events which immediately 
forecast it were not numerous. The year 19 12 
was the most momentous in Europe since 181 5 
had witnessed the final crushing of the Napole- 
onic menace. In that year a Greek statesman, 
Eleutherios Venizelos, succeeded in conciliating 
the conflicting aims of the different Balkan states, 
and brought about an alliance against the crum- 
bling power of Turkey. The members of the 
Balkan Confederation were emboldened to this 
step by the recent seizure by Austria of the Turk- 
ish provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which 
had been occupied provisionally under the terms 
of the Treaty of Berlin, and also by the troubles 
which had beset the Turkish Government since 
the Young Turks had overthrown Abdul Hamid. 

By a swift campaign in the fall of 19 12 the 
Balkan allies crushed the Turkish army at Lule 
Burgas and Kumanovo, laid siege to the for- 
tresses of Adrianople, Scutari, and Janina, and 
occupied all of Turkey in Europe up to the Tcha- 
taldja lines guarding Constantinople itself, and 
the Gallipoli Peninsula. Europe shivered under 
the shock of these sudden accomplishments. The 
effects were several. In Germany, the military 
party viewed with professional appreciation the 

156 



FORESEEING THE WORLD WAR 

work done by the armies of the Balkan states, 
which were miniature models of the great con- 
script armaments of the larger Continental Pow- 
ers, and the demonstration of the possibilities of 
the essentially German theory of the offensive 
capacity of the nation in arms. They had visions 
of the far wider fields in which they could use the 
splendid engine of destruction they had created. 
In Russia, the exploits of the Southern Slavs 
were looked upon with parental pride, and from 
the practical point of view were considered to 
be of inestimable value as checking the stealthy 
progress of Austria southwards toward the 
^gean Sea. In fact, it was in Austria-Hungary 
that the events of the first Balkan War were re- 
garded most nervously. Austria experienced an 
instant reaction. She had millions of Slav sub- 
jects, whose racial feelings she did not wish to 
see aroused by the wave of Pan-Slav sentiment 
which followed the victories of the Balkan allies. 
Most of all, she resented the barring to her of 
the way she had plotted to Salonica. And she 
dreaded the erection of a hegemony of the South- 
ern Slavs below her Danube frontier, knowing 
that a permanent military confederacy, such as 
was talked of exultantly in the Balkan capitals, 
would be an enemy on her flank if she ever went 
to war with Russia. Austria mobilized in part, 
and stood sullenly by while the Balkan allies gar- 
I 157 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

nered the fruits of their conquests. She longed 
to strike, but the moment was not propitious. 

In union there is strength. In division there 
is empire. Austrian intrigue set to work to undo 
what had been accompHshed by the valor of the 
Southern Slavs. The whole story is not known. 
Perhaps it never will be known. But disputes 
broke out among the Allies. There were quarrels 
over territorial questions. The Bulgarians, who 
had suffered the heaviest fighting, claimed that 
they should receive a proportionate share of the 
spoils. Nominally, the Czar worked for peace. 
Actually, there is ground for the supposition, in 
view of the disclosures of the "Willy-Nicky pa- 
pers," that perhaps he lent himself to Teutonic 
intrigue. Certainly, with the vast prestige he ex- 
ercised over all the Slavs, it is difficult to believe 
that he could not have compelled arbitration of 
the differences between the Allies had he chosen 
to do so. 

The break came in June, 191 3, through Bul- 
garian aggression. The other Allies quickly 
united against her. Rumania joined in. Turkey 
seized the opportunity to win back Adrianople, 
and on August 10 the Treaty of Bucharest, one 
of the most miserable, unfair, time-serving docu- 
ments to the credit of the old secret diplomacy, 
was concluded by force of arms. It left in its 
track unburied hatreds, national dislikes, unsatis- 

158 



FORESEEING THE WORLD WAR 

fied ambitions, distortions of territory, all the 
seeds of future war. It accomplished nothing of 
what it set out to do. Within three years it was 
as valuable as the "scrap of paper" that protected 
Belgium. 

By it the second Balkan War was brought to 
an end, and Turkey in Europe divided up to suit 
the convenience of the great Powers. But the 
harm was done. Europe was in a state of high 
nervous tension. In the spring of 1913, Ger- 
many increased her army by 136,000 officers and 
men and made a proportionate increase in artil- 
lery and aircraft, the whole at the cost of $321,- 
000,000, to be raised by an increased income tax 
and by direct levies on the various states of the 
Empire. There was open talk that the sacrifices 
entailed by the raising of such a sum, in addition 
to the previous immense taxes, must be rewarded 
by steps which would make the long continuance 
of the load unnecessary. 

Throughout Germany there was a stiffening 
of the backs of military men, a loosening of the 
latent hysteria of their caste, which was demon- 
strated in the Zabern incident, when a young lieu- 
tenant of infantry slashed a cobbler with his 
sword for laughing at him. The Reichstag passed 
a vote of lack of confidence in Chancellor von 
<Bethmann-Hollweg, in consequence of his atti- 
tude in submitting to the military in this matter, 

159 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

and friends of Germany pointed to this demon- 
stration of the distaste of the people's representa- 
tives for the extreme militarists, as proof of Ger- 
many's love of peace and civilization. But the 
Reichstag's vote had no effect upon a Govern- 
ment which was not responsible to it. 

In France the news of the German army in- 
crease was heard with apprehension, and the 
Chamber voted to restore the three-year term of 
military service, which automatically increased 
somewhat the strength of the army. But the 
special budget of $i25,ocx),ooo for increasing! 
armaments and for manufacturing heavy artil- 
lery to meet the German increase failed of enact- 
ment. The same nervousness was noticeable to 
close observers in France, but there was no para- 
mount military party to enforce its will upon the 
Government. Two Ministries, those of Briand 
and Barthou, tried unsuccessfully to secure the 
adoption of the additional military budget. There 
were Strikes^ outbreaks of syndicalism, and a 
spread of Socialistic propaganda. Gaston Dou- 
mergue, a Socialist-Radical, ended the year as 
Premier and the additional budget was aban- 
doned. 

But it was in Austria that hysteria and ex- 
citement were supreme. The Second Balkan 
War had humiliated Bulgaria and destroyed for 
the time-being the possibility of a permanent 

i6o 



FORESEEING THE WORLD WAR 

Balkan Confederacy. But Servia's ambitions 
had been swollen enormously by her successes, 
and the increased territories and population won 
only served to strengthen the determination of 
the Servians to work for the unification with 
them of their blood-brothers who were subjects 
of Austria, Their desires were reciprocated, and 
the Government at Vienna saw with alarm the 
distillation of the spirit of rebellion among the 
restive Slavs of Bosnia, Herzegovina, Dalmatia, 
Croatia, Slavonia, and Hungary. 

In the East Great Britain, Russia, Germany, 
and France wrangled over commercial influences 
in Turkey, the partition of the Bagdad Railway, 
allotment of zones of influence in Persia. In all 
these negotiations Germany eyed the other na- 
tions askance, jealously convinced that they 
strove to block her from her long-sought ''place 
in the sun.'* The year 1913 ended with armies 
increasing, populations murmuring, and states- 
men dealing in expletives and denials. 



161 



CHAPTER XV 

THE PRESIDENT'S WARNING TO EUROPE 

INTERNATIONAL developments of the 
spring of 19 14 served to convince the Presi- 
dent of the accuracy of his forebodings. There 
was no lessening of the tension in Europe, al- 
though the peoples of the different countries as 
a whole were inclined to believe that the situation 
was less serious than it had been, in consequence 
of the great Powers having weathered safely 
the commotion of the two Balkan wars. But 
underneath the surface of affairs forces were 
stirring which plotted to drive the nations, 
whether they wished it or not, to a final trial of 
arms. In Mexico, too, matters were going from 
bad to worse, and two weeks before [Jolonel 
House sailed from New York on the Imperator, 
of the Hamburg-American Line, on his first trip 
to Europe for the President the United States 
was compelled to seize the port of Vera Cruz. 

This incident was not the immediate cause of 
Colonel House's trip, which had been planned 
many months before, but it added point to the 
urgent reasons which impelled the President to 

162 



THE PRESIDENT'S WARNING TO EUROPE 

make an efifort in private to avert the disaster 
overhanging the world. It is necessary here to 
rehearse the sequence of events leading up to 
this step, which was decisive in its effect upon 
Mexican politics. Mr. Wilson's refusal to recog- 
nize Huerta officially had rankled in the heart 
of the fierce old Indian warrior, and American 
relations with Mexico had become strained so 
early as May, 1913, when Huerta made a formal 
demand for recognition. Mr. Wilson was hon- 
estly determined to leave nothing undone to keep 
clear of intervention, and at different times he 
sent several emissaries, including John Lind, Dr. 
William Bayard Hale, and Paul Fuller, to con- 
sult with the several Mexican parties in an en- 
deavor to work out some means of adjusting their 
domestic differences and concluding the peace 
which Mexico sorely needed. 

But his efforts were fruitless, and as anarchy 
increased its sway, it became necessary to 
strengthen the American naval forces on the 
Mexican coast, until by the end of the winter of 
1913-14, a number of squadrons of the Atlantic 
fleet were distributed off Tampico and Vera Cruz. 
On April 10, 1914, occurred what was known as 
"the Tampico incident," when a detachment of 
Mexican soldiers of Huerta's army fired upon an 
American naval launch flying the American flag. 
Rear-Admiral Mayo, the senior American naval 

163 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

commander, promptly demanded of the local au- 
thorities the traditional apology for such a viola- 
tion of international courtesy, including a salute 
to the offended ensign. 

In making his demand Rear-Admiral Mayo 
acted correctly according to the methods of naval 
practice of the old days, when means of com- 
munication were slow and a responsible naval 
commander at a distance from his Government 
was supposed in certain exigencies to act upon 
his own initiative. But Mayo, like some other 
sailors, did not realize tliat the old days had 
passed. The wireless made such off-hand de- 
cisions as his unnecessary. In the circumstances 
the preferable procedure was for him to advise 
Washington of the insult, report the facts, and 
await instructions. With the best intentions, he 
acted as it would have been proper for him to 
have acted in the early nineties, and so made hay 
of the President's Mexican policy. 

Huerta's best chance of remaining in power 
was to convince the Mexicans that he was so 
strong that he was not even afraid of the United 
States, and Mayo's abrupt demand for an apology 
was too good an opportunity for him to miss. He 
quibbled and backed and filled, and at last flatly 
refused to satisfy the American demands. This 
was on Saturday morning, April i8, and the 
President was playing golf when the message was 

164 



THE PRESIDENT'S WARNING TO EUROPE 

brought to him, by Secretary of State Bryan and 
Mr. Tumulty. Mr. Wilson only finished the thir- 
teenth hole that morning. 

The last thing the President wished to do was 
to commit himself definitely to war with Mexico. 
To have done so would have been to tie him hand 
and foot, and to occupy all the country's energies 
at a time when it was most necessary to keep 
them free to deal with more important matters. 
But Huerta's defiance made it absolutely neces- 
sary for him to back up Mayo's demand. The 
country's prestige was at stake. Europe had 
been sneering at our tolerance of Mexican vio- 
lence and crime for several years, ignorant that 
in a few short months Great Britain and France 
would be prepared to beg us to put up with any- 
thing rather than undertake intervention in Mex- 
ico, and so rob civilization of the influence of our 
moral support. 

The President had no choice. He had to pun- 
ish Huerta; he had to show that, even if the 
JJnited States was long-suffering, there was a 
point beyond which it could not be provoked. He 
determined to order the navy to capture Vera 
Cruz, the principal Mexican port of entry, and 
establish a blockade of the Mexican coasts, hop- 
ing that by going so far he might undermine 
Huerta's power and compel his retirement — an 

« eventuality which, in itself, would be tantamount 

i 165 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

to an assertion of American prestige and a proof 
of the strength we could use if we chose. But he 
was firm in his purpose not to go any farther, if 
it could be helped. 

As might have been expected, we actually es- 
caped full intervention by a very narrow margin, 
but narrow as it was, that margin was wide 
enough for safety. Mr. Wilson's emergency pol- 
icy was completely successful. On April 21, the 
bluejackets and marines of the Atlantic fleet 
seized Vera Cruz and a strip of surrounding terri- 
tory; a few days later the Fifth Brigade of the 
regular army, under the late Major-Gen. Fred- 
erick Funston, relieved them; and the Americans 
settled down to a waiting policy, which spelled 
ruin to Huerta's political chances. There was 
no aggression against the Mexican people; they 
were assured that the Americans had come, not 
to seize their land, but to avenge Huerta's insults. 
The virus worked with remarkable rapidity. 
Huerta's prestige was undermined week by week. 
This man, the Mexican factions began to argue, 
had defied the Americans to prove his power, and 
the Americans had crippled him without even go- 
ing to war, simply by seizing his entry-port and 
impounding his port-dues. On July 15, 1914, 
Huerta gave up the unequal struggle in despair, 
and left Mexico on board the German cruiser 
Dresden, which had been provided for him by his 

166 



THE PRESIDENT'S WARNING TO EUROPE 

friend, Admiral von Hintze. Strange, is it not, 
how at every turn the Germans crop up in review- 
ing our troubles with Mexico? 

When Colonel House went abroad early in 
May the situation at Vera Cruz was still obscure, 
and nobody could be certain that we should not 
have to push our intervention and perhaps occupy 
Mexico City. [Ilis departure was not chronicled 
in the newspapers. The general pubHc were not 
aware that he had gone until May 27, when a 
brief cable from Berlin told of a dinner party 
given in his honor by Ambassador Gerard the 
night before, at which were present many notables 
of the German court, including Grand Admiral 
von Tirpitz and Herr von Jagow, the Foreign 
Minister. It was taken for granted in this coun- 
try and abroad that his presence in Europe was 
for the purpose of defending the President's Mex- 
ican policy to foreign governments which had 
been critical of the disadvantages it had imposed 
upon their own nationals^ 

It is true that he did make use of his oppor- 
tunities to explain the Administration's theories 
with regard to Mexico, but this was purely sub- 
ordinate to his main purpose : the direction of the 
gaze of foreign statesmen to the dangers breed- 
ing in their midst3 He prepared for his mission 
with the painstaking forethought which is one of 
his dominant traits. [§e knew, f or- iftst^ice, that 

167 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

if any one man could control the destinies of 
Europe, that man was Kaiser Wilhelm IL And 
he determined to make his great effort with the 
Kaiser; 

'As a preliminary, before he started he read 
everything worth while about the German ruler, 
and he talked with every person in this country 
who knew the Kaiser at all well — men like Ben- 
jamin Ide Wlieeler, the exchange professors who 
had served at German universities, and such 
American statesmen as had visited the German 
court. None of these men knew the reasons for 
Colonel House's interest in the Kaiser, but before 
he left New York he was familiar with Wilhelm 
II's personality, his tastes, fads, habits, hobbies, 
pet policies and beliefs, his personal aversions and 
preferences, the public men and rulers of other 
countries he liked or disliked! All this informa- 
tion Colonel House had indexed and filed in the 
wonderful card catalogue that is his min3? 

(In order that the German Government might 
have no grounds for suspicion that his ideas had 
been colored by statesmen in England or France, 
Colonel House was careful to take his passage on 
the Imperator, a German liner which went direct 
to Hamburg, and he traveled from Hamburg 
straight to Berlin. Ambassador Gerard had been 
apprised of his coming and had arranged in ad- 
vance a series of meetings, formal and informal, 

1 68 



THE PRESIDENT'S WARNING TO EUROPE 

with the various German leaders, which formed 
the foundation of Colonel House's thorough ac- 
quaintance with the psychology of the little group 
of men who control Germany. On June i he 
had his audience with the Kaiser at Potsdani^ an 
event of surpassing importance, but which was 
barely referred to in the only other newspaper 
account of Colonel House's first trip abroad, pub- 
lished on June 7, 

The interview with the Kaiser was confidential 
in character, and in this country, at any rate, its 
purport is known only to Colonel House and the 
President. Some day, perhaps. Colonel House's 
lips will be unsealed, and he will be able to tell 
the world of the answer he received from the 
man who, several years before, had sorrowfully 
told his royal sister, when they met for a pri- 
vate talk in Sweden, that he was no longer the 
ruler of Germany, that he would lose his throne 
if he attempted to thwart the military party. It 
is not the inclination of those who have knowl- 
edge of the inside history of the events leading 
up to the war to place the active responsibility 
for it upon the Kaiser* Colonel House, like-other 
observers, is disposed to believe that the Kaiser's 
role was negative. He did not wish the war, but 
he feared to take a positive stand against it, lest 
he be pushed out of the way by the arrogant 

169 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

clique of generals who flattered the vanity of the 
Crown Prince^\ 

IjColonel House found plenty of evidence in Ger- 
many of a state of mind to increase his uneasi- 
ness. The military leaders were crazy with ex- 
citement; they had been living under high tension 
since the trouble with France over Morocco, and 
the disturbed course of the past year had stimu- 
lated their hysteria. The generation of generals 
and marshals who had built up the great German 
military machine had been subalterns in the War 
of 1870-71, and they felt themselves growing old, 
without having had a chance to play with this 
marvelous toy, this stupendous engine of their 
own genius. It was theirs, they felt. They had 
forged it, tempered it, tested it in play. They 
hated the thought of dying the deaths of old men 
without the satisfaction of having tried it in 
battle, under their leadership 

Bizarre as it may seem, this was really the psy^ 
chology of the German military chieftains in the 
spring of 1914. They were hungry for war. 
Their nerves were on edge; they were jumpy. 
They talked about the ''insolence" of the Servians 
to their ally Austria, of the need to teach Russia 
a lesson to keep her hands off the Balkans, of 
the commercial tyranny of England, and the de- 
generacy of France. They said in so many 
words: "We have been on the edge of war now 

170 



THE PRESIDENT'S WARNING TO EUROPE 

for ten years. It has been one incident after 
another. It has been unhealthy and unsettHng. 
Well, we Germans are ready for war now. We 
shall never be in better shape for it. Let us end 
the uncertainty and have war." 

Colonel House heard this kind of talk, marked 
the hysteria in the air. His uneasiness grew to 
a certain anticipation of trouble, buf all his argu- 
ments and warnings to German statesmen and 
politicians were turned aside. They assured him 
he was mistaken.) Yes, there was some unrest. 
The international situation had gotten on people's 
nerves. The military men always had to have 
something to talk about. But war? It would 
never come unless some other nation saw fit to 
insult Germany and proVoke the Teutonic love of 
peace too far. 

^Early in June Colonel House left Berlin for 
Paris. Here he discovered a totally different 
atmosphere. France was wrapped up entirely in 
her own troubles — which were sufficient. In the 
first six months of 1914 the French democracy 
was completely absorbed in an extraordinary 
series of domestic upheavals. But the sensa- 
tion of the moment was the trial of Madame 
Caillaux, wife of the Radical Socialist leader, Jo- 
seph Caillaux — now charged with treason and 
conspiracy with the Germans against his own 
country — for the shooting of Gaston Calmette, 

171 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

editor of Pigaro, who had been attacking Cail- 
laux's personal and public career in his journal. 
The Caillaux trial was not an ordinary juridical 
procedure; it was an affair of parties, a national 
crisis. Nobody in France, apparently paid heed 
to what was going on beyond the borders. 

French politics were so entangled over the is- 
sue as to be almost unintelligible to an outsider. 
During the first two weeks of June there were 
three Ministries in the space of eleven days. The 
Doumergue Ministry resigned on June 3; Rene 
Viviani tried to form a new Cabinet, and failed ; 
Delcasse, who had been sacrificed to Germany a 
few short years before for his bold Moroccan 
policy, refused the task; Ribot, on June 10, did 
succeed iji forming a Ministry, which resigned 
three days later for want of a vote of confidence; 
and finally on June 14, Viviani was able to get 
together a Ministry strong enough to hold a ma- 
jority of the Chamber behind it. The influence 
of Caillaux was seen in these reiterating crises. 

To Colonel House, coming from the tense ner- 
vousness of Berlin's official circles, it seemed that 
France must be asleep; and in fact, upon talking 
with President Poincare and the more important 
party leaders and members of the Government, 
he learned that there was no disposition to antici- 
pate international trouble. The French refused 
to believe that peace was threatened. They had 

172 



I 



I 



, THE PRESIDENT'S WARNING TO EUROPE 

become used to the rattling of the German saber, 
and disregarded it with traditional Gallic insouci- 
ance. "^Their attitude was that it was something 
the Germans could not help doing, any more than 
they could resist putting up "Verboten" signs 
about their houses, and that it meant nothing at 
all .'France had no animosities against any other 
nation, they insisted. She had demonstrated this 
in her various minor troubles with Germany in 
the past decade. She had always been eager to 
meet the Germans more than half-way. No, now 
that the Balkans had been quieted again, there 
was a chance for the world to sit back and catch 
its breath/ 

Jlore than half-convinced by the sanity with 
which the French statesmen talked and acted, and 
their whole-hearted absorption in home affairs, 
Colonel House left Paris for London. This was 
about the middle of June. In London he encoun- 
tered an atmosphere similar to that which pre- 
vailed in Paris. The members of the British 
Government were blind to the dangers which had 
seemed so plain to the American's detached per- 
spective. They, like the French, were immersed 
in domestic politics. Rebellion and civil war im- 
pended in Ireland, where Ulster and the south 
armed against one another and the home Govern- 
ment. The army was racked by intrigue. The 

173 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

suffragettes were raising hob. Industrial unrest 
was flaming up in many sections. 

Colonel House was listened to with respect as 
the personal representative of the President, but 
British statesmen refused to take him seriouslj^ 
They told him that so long as men like Chancellor 
von Bethmann-Hollweg, Foreign Minister von 
Jagow, and Dr. Solf, the Colonial Minister, were 
in office in Berlin, it would be impossible for Ger- 
many to go to war. The present German Gov- 
ernment was eminently a peace Government, they 
insisted. Why, the mere continued presence in 
London of that stanch friend of England, Prince 
Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador, was a 
proof of peaceable intentions. Lichnowsky would 
never permit a break with England. Germany 
had no reason for war with England. The rela- 
tions of the two countries had never been better. 

All the members of the British Ministry were 
convinced that the world's peace was secure. It 
would be necessary for the Germans to have a 
change of Ministry before they could make war, 
the British statesmen asserted. And a change of 
ministry would be a warning, which could be 
heeded. They did not know, as the world knows 
now, that the real power in Germany was the 
military party, which could compel the Kaiser 
himself, to its will, and enforce the policy of any 
ministry for peace or war. They were ignorant. 

174 



THE PRESIDENT'S WARNING TO EUROPE 

as are most well-informed people to-day, that in 
Germany the interests of the Hohenzollerns are 
subordinated to the interests of the Army — which 
means the military clique in control; that if it 
came to a conflict between the dynasty and the 
military leaders the dynasty would have to give 

way. 

The British were persuaded of Germany's 
honesty of purpose, and so genuine was their 
attitude that for the time being they stifled 
Colonel House's suspicions. But ^n June 28 a 
Servian madman named Gavril Prinzip shot 
and killed the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir 
to the Austro-Hungarian throne, and his wife, 
the Countess Sophie Chotek, as they rode in state 
through Sarajevo in Bosnia. The German mili- 
tarists had ready to hand the excuse they had 
been looking fdry 



^75 



CHAPTER XVI 

AMERICA FACE TO FACE WITH WAR 

COLONEL HOUSE, himself, was amazed at 
the rapidity with which Europe was 
plunged into war. The assassination of 
the Archduke Franz Ferdinand was exactly the 
kind of spark in the tinder-box which he had 
warned the foreign governments to beware of, 
but the resulting explosion was far worse than 
he had anticipated. Indeed, what man had 
dreamed of such an international conflagration 
as swept Europe during the first three days of 
August, 19 14? Not even the German military 
leaders could have foreseen the extent of the re- 
action to their intrigues in Europe and beyond 
the feeas. Had they obtained a bare glimpse of 
the agonies to which their policy would lead their 
own country and tlie inevitable defeat it meant 
for Germany's commercial and financial ambi- 
tions, surely they would have hesitated and held 
their hands. 

I V/There was no indication in the summer and 
fall of 19 14 that the United States was in 
danger of being swept into the maelstrom of the 

176 



AMERICA FACE TO FACE WITH WAR 

war. The only effect of the catastrophe upon 
this country which was apprehended by the 
President and Colonel House, as -said -before, 
was the possibility of an increase in the stagger- 
ing load of armaments imposed upon the United 
States in common with other nations.x Like most 
well-informed observers, they looked to see an 
end to hostilities after a few months of swift 
fighting. IThe main exertion of the Administra- 
tion was devoted to limiting, so far as possible, 
the economic strain upon the United States and 
doing what it could to relieve suffering abroad^, 

Jn accordance with his desire to use every re- 
source permitted by international courtesy, Mr. 
Wilson on August 5, addressed an identic mes- 
sage to the Kaiser Wilhelm II, the Kaiser Franz 
Joseph, the Czar Nicholas, President Poincare 
and King George V, offering his services "as 
official head of one of the Powers signatory to 
the Hague Convention . . , to act in the 
interest of European peace, either now or at any 
other time that might be thought more suitable, 
as an occasion to serve you and all concerned in 
a way that would afford me lasting cause for 
gratitude and happiness^' 

So early did Woodrow Wilson give voice to 
the creed which has animated him in his conduct 
of the nation's international relations through- 
out the most painful years of the world's history. 

177 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

sJFor that statement, contained in his first mes- 
sage to the rulers of Europe, in its succinct 
phrase comprised the root and sinew of the 
poHcy which has inspired his every later acO It 
is at the basis of the policy he pursues to-day, 
although, thanks to the lawless aggression of the 
German Government, he speaks now with far 
greater authority than would have been the case 
had he met with success in 1914. 

Although the Administration did not foresee 
the future developments which were to draw us 
into collision with German ambitions, it was 
manifest that ordinary prudence required us, in 
such unsettled times, to steer clear of trouble in 
Mexico. Huerta's resignation of power on 
July 15 and departure from the country had sat- 
isfied the original purpose for which we seized 
•Vera Cruz, and while Mexico's internal condi- 
tions were far from satisfactory, it was decided 
to withdraw the expeditionary force at Vera 
Cru2 as rapidly as possible. General Funston 
embarked his troops and turned the town over to 
the local authorities on September 15. The in- 
stant result w^as an extension of the spirit of 
anarchy, and a division of the revolutionary 
forces which had been fighting Huerta into two 
opposing parties, headed respectively by Villa 
and Carranza. 
His Mexican policy was Mr. Wilson's hete 
178 



AMERICA FACE TO FACE WITH WAR 

noir from that day forth. He was accused ol 
vacillation, uncertainty, cowardice, and even 
duplicity. He was hammered for it relentlessly 
by enemies of widely opposite views. It came 
near wrecking his Presidential candidacy in the 
1916 campaign. But he knew that the United 
States was the one firm anchor of civilization 
in 1914, the one great Power of the West that 
had escaped the clutch of war, the one disinter- 
ested voice to speak to the rest of mankind with 
the language of common brotherhood and hu- 
manity. And once we were involved in war — 
especially a war, no matter how just our motives 
might be, with a neighboring and weaker nation 
— our influence for peace and justice must be 
immeasurably diminished. 

It is Mr. Wilson's great virtue that his self- 
confidence, founded upon belief in the righteous- 
ness of his views, remains with him under any 
storm of criticism. But his patience and his 
confidence were sorely tried in those black years 
which stretch behind us. It required all his 
strength of will to meet the storm and not to 
shrink before the hail of shafts barbed with 
malice and partisanship. 

^e first hint of future trouble in American 
relations with Germany came in an interview 
with Grand Admiral von Tirpitz, then Minister 
of Marine at Berlin, published in the London 

179 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

Daily Mail of December 22, 19 14, in which he 
advocated the inauguration of submarine attacks 
upon British commerce as an offset to the stran- 
gUng effect of the British blockade of Germany. 
Von Tirpitz admitted frankly the impotency of 
the German navy against the British fleet, the 
futility of Zeppelin raids, and the trifling Allied 
shipping losses from surface raiders* But the 
submarine, he contended, could change all this, 
and by its use Germany would be able to neutral- 
ize Great Britain's command of the seasT; 

This interview was only a paragraph in length 
and excited comparatively little attention. 
There was no extensive comment upon it, and 
the day after it was printed the man in the street 
had forgotten it. But official information from 
Germany convinced the Administration that von 
Tirpitz was not making idle threats. To gauge 
the situation correctly, it is necessary to analyze 
the German state of mind at this stage of the 
war. After the battle of the Marne and the re- 
treat of the German armies to the Aisne and the 
subsequent failure of the Germans to break 
down the opposition of the French and British 
troops to their advance upon the Channel ports, 
it became apparent to the President and Colonel 
House — as it did to practically every unpreju- 
diced person who had facilities for knowing jjie 
inside facts — that Germany had shot her bolt.-^ 

180 



AMERICA FACE TO FACE WITH WAR 

(What was much more important, the German 
military leaders came to the same realization at 
the same time, and they were frightened into a 
momentary meekness}. There was still enough 
common-sense in milftary circles to perceive the 
enormous expense of a prolongation of war on 
such a gigantic scale. Sfhey felt that they had 
failed, and they were willing to grasp any oppor- 
tunity of escape from the situation in which they 
found themselves. Plainly speaking, they were 
in a condition bordering on panic. The plans 
of campaign they had been maturing for a gen- 
eration had failed. They totalled up the man- 
power, the productive capacity, and natural re- 
sources of the Entente Allies, and admitted to 
themselves, with sinking hearts, that if their 
enemies hung together there could be but one 
issue to the conflict. In their hopelessness they 
were willing to make peace on terms which 
would have surprised the Entente-.' 

CBut, of course, the leaders of the Entente 
had been making the same calculations as the 
German Great General Staff, and they were 
highly satisfied with the figures which they 
worked out. It was obvious, they decided, that 
in a year or so, when their maximum power 
began to tell, they could crush Germany and 
Austria, and in that event, of course, be able to 
exact whatever terms they chose. Peace was 

i8i 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

very far from the thoughts of the statesmen in 
London and Paris, and it was not very long be- 
fore the Germans discovered, through the medi- 
um of their diplomats in neutral countries, that 
their overtures would meet with ignominious 
refusal. This knowledge inspired in Germany 
a desperation which was prompted by the belief 
that the Empire — and especially the military 
party — was menaced by such national humilia- 
tion as was visited on France in 1871. Ani- 
mated by this belief, the military leaders suc- 
ceeded in working, not only themselves, but all 
classes of the population up to a white heat of 
fanatic resolution, and extremists like Tirpitz 
and Hindenburg were listened to, with increasing 
respecty 

3^he intelligence which reached him concern- 
ing conditions in the belligerent countries in the 
winter of 1914-1915 determined the President 
to dispatch Colonel House on a second mission 
to Europe, for the purpose of feeling out the 
general situation and plumbing the minds of the 
leaders on both sides. Incidental to this, Colonel 
House was supposed to investigate the possibili- 
ties of reaching some arrangement whereby the 
use of the submarine might be restricted, or per- 
haps even the entire system of maritime warfare 
and reprisals might be readjusted between the 
belligerent's.; But Mr. Wilson had no reason to 

182 



AMERICA FACE TO FACE WITH WAR 

anticipate the sudden announcement of the Ger- 
man submarine zone, which was the opening 
move in von Tirpitz's campaign. 

Colonel House sailed from New York on Janu- 
ary 30, 191 5, on board the Lusitania.*^ It was on 
this trip that the big Cunarder flew the American 
flag in passing through the waters adjacent to 
the British Isles — although Colonel House did 
not know it at the time — which was one of the 
excuses given by the German Government for 
sinking her several months afterward. While 
no public explanation of the incident was made, 
it has always been supposed that Captain Dow, 
of the Lusitania, took this unusual step for the 
protection of Colonel House. Passengers who 
were aboard on the voyage in question testified 
to the skipper's unusual nervousness, induced by 
the fact that submarines already were active off 
the mouth of the Mersey, and decided that he 
resorted to American colors in the belief that it 
was a justifiable device to shield the person of 
the American envoy. 

tfhe newspapers had it that Colonel House 
was going abroad to assist Herbert Hoover in 
coordinating the work of Belgian relief, and, as 
this was a most convenient means of cloaking the 
real purpose of his visit, the story was allowed 
to stand — indeed, tacitly encouraged But the 
news of his arrival in London on February 6 

183 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

started a report in this country that he had been 
sent by the President to make an effort to bring 
the combatants to terms. It was necessary for 
the President to make an official denial of this 
story on February 9. The President and 
Colonel House knew far better than did the gen- 
eral public the psychology of the hostile nations. 
The Allies, after their experience with German 
methods, were in no mood to consider peace 
at that moment. The Germans were flog- 
ging themselves to battle fury in the con- 
viction that they must conquer or be wrecked as 
a great Pgwer, 

While Colonel House was at sea von Tirpitz 
and his friends induced the civil government in 
Berlin to acquiesce in their program for a 
submarine offensive to cripple British economic 
efficiency. In the first week of February Ger- 
many issued an official proclamation declaring 
the waters surrounding the British Isles, within 
certain specified degrees of latitude and longi- 
tude, to be a war zone, through which neutral 
shipping could venture only at their own peril 
after February 18. Abuse of neutral flags by 
British merchantmen, acting under orders of the 
British Government, was assigned as the reason 
for the sweeping nature of the measure. Un- 
officially, American newspaper correspondents 
were assured that the order was not a blockade 

184 



I 



AMERICA FACE TO FACE WITH WAR 

and that no hostile action against neutral ships 
was contemplated. 

(ip London the news was received with mingled 
resentment and amusement, but British officials 
were no more inclined to take it seriously, now 
that it was a reality, than they had been when it 
was still a matter of debate in Germany. They 
viewed it as an indication of the extremities to 
which Germany was driven, but they discounted 
or failed to take into account the reserve power 
which German resourcefulness could muster and 
the weak links in the chain they and their Allies 
were welding around the Central Powers.3 

p?his was the situation when Colonel House 
arrived in London; and in the course of two or 
three weeks, in conversations with the leading 
British statesmen of all parties, he did what he 
could to convince them of the dangers inherent 
in it and the advisability of meeting Germany 
part way. But all through the first two years 
of the war Britain was convinced of the invul- 
nerability of her isolation and the paralyzing 
power of her fleeo. 

^hey scouted the possibility of grave losses to 
their merchant marine from submarine warfare, 
and they refused to believe that Germany would 
run the risk of offending friendly nations by 
depredations upon neutral shipping. They had 
no proper understanding of the desperate char- 

185 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

acter of the power arrayed against them. Eng- 
lishmen did not realize that the dominant mili- 
tary party in Germany, having brought on a war 
more inclusive and terrible than they had ex- 
pected, were fighting with their backs to the wall, 
in the knowledge that their only hope of perpetu- 
ating their control of German affairs was to win 
what would pass for a victory, and that this 
military party would stop at nothing to achieve 
victoryr^^ It was only a few days later that the 
German use of poison gas at Ypres shocked a 
world which had fancied itself inured to barbar- 
ity in war. But even then the statesmen in 
London smilingly refused to believe that the 
German submarine was to be the most deadly 
engine they would have to face. 



i86 



CHAPTER XVII 

"THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS" 

^ -T7^ ROM London Colonel House went to Pans, 
-i- where he "conferred with President Poincare 
and the principal French Ministers. He found 
Paris much more alive to the serious aspect of 
affairs than London, but the French Govern- 
ment's views on the new submarine warfare 
were colored by London's optimistic attitude and 
the magic prestige of the British navy. The 
absence of any marked disposition toward peace 
did not surprise him. He had expected that. 
The French were still braced by the memory of 
their triumph at the Marne; the difficulties of 
trench warfare were not yet appreciated; and 
the Allies had suffered none of the galling re- 
verses which were to sap their resources and 
striking power, and steel the nerve of the German 
people to withstand the hardships of a nation 
besieged. If peace or any amelioration of the 
submarine war at sea were to be obtained, it was 
manifest that the opening wedge must be driven 
at Berlins 
lOn March 19, Colonel House arrived in tl.e 

, 187 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

German capital) after a short stay in Switzerland^ 
:He was the guest of Ambassador Gerard, and 
he met a second time the statesmen he had tried 
to persuade in the previous May to move to pre- 
vent the bursting of the war-cloud-f-among 
others, the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 
Zimmermann, who was to make the ridiculous 
attempt to ally Mexico and Japan with Germany 
against the United States, in January, 1917, and 
who was then one of the strongest men in Ger- 
many by reason of his alliance with the extrem- 
ists of the military party and the advocates of 
ruthlessness at the Admiralty, headed by von 
Tirpitz. With these men and others,^ Colonel 
House undertook to argue the advantages of 
moderation, and the harm that must ensue if yet 
more nations should be arrayed with Germany's 
enemies,! 

-They gave him fair words, but no satisfaction, 
until he extended, as- a fisherman casts his bait, 
a certain phrase of five words: ''The Freedom of 
the Seas." So far as can be determined, Colonel 
House was the first to use this much-debated 
phrase, at least in its connection with the prob- 
lems raised by the present war. No previous 
mention of it has been found.) It met with 
prompt response. 

"Ah," said the German statesmen, ''you mean 
188 



"THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS" 

the general recognition of the Declaration of 
London?" 

But Colonel House meant much more than 
this. - He meant a literal, unlimited freedom of 
the seas, which would imply the safety of mer- 
chantmen in enemy ports on the declaration of 
war; the safety not only of food cargoes, but 
cargoes of actual contraband; the uninterrupted 
progress of the world's ocean-borne commerce in 
the midst of the most widely dispersed war. It 
was, in effect, an extension to the ut.nost limits 
of the American doctrine of the exemption from 
capture of private property. Accepted by the 
belligerent nations, it would have the immediate 
result of confining the war to a struggle between 
fleets and armies and exempting from harm non- 
combatants and neutral nations, while the 
economic structure of civilization would survive 
almost unimpaired. Inevitably, such a policy 
would operate to restrict the waging of war on a 
national scale. 

''But for what would navies be used, then?" 
demanded the Germans. 

*'For defense against invasion," returned 
Colonel House. 

A vista opened before the eyes of the leaders 
at Berlin which they had abandoned hope of see- 
ing. Perhaps they were purely selfish and 
cynical in their acceptance of this doctrine of 

189 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

idealism; perhaps they thought only of the nulli- 
fication of the preponderating naval power of 
Great Britain, and the abolition of the blockade 
which was cutting off Germany from her sources 
of raw material. But Colonel House saw much 
further than they did. He saw that interna- 
tional recognition of a real freedom of the seas 
would react quite as much to the advantage of 
Germany's enemies as to her own, in that it 
would free the British Isles of all fear of eco- 
nomic fan ne and leave the British merchant 
marine free to pour foodstuffs, munitions, and 
supplies into France. And even beyond that, he 
saw that the acceptance by all the nations of the 
freedom of the seas would be an important step 
— the most important step next to the setting up 
of a League of Nations — toward the abolition of 
war. 

At any rate, the immediate effect of his sug- 
gestion of the doctrine in Berlin was to obtain 
the prompt and enthusiastic assent of Germany. 

"I believe you have thrown the first thread 
across the chasm which bars us from peace," said 
one of the greatest men in Germany. 

paving achieved his purpose in Berlin, Colonel 
House returned to London to take up the far 
more arduous task of arguing the British leaders 
into an appreciation of the advantages which 
would accrue to them from accepting the new 

190 




THE APARTMENT AT NO. 115 EAST 53RD STREET, NEW 
YORK CITY, "the AMERICAN, NO. 10 DOWNING STREET," 
WHERE COLONEL HOUSE RESIDES 



"THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS" 

idea)) Imagine his vexation, when, (tipon his ar- 
rival in London, he encountered reports in the 
English newspapers of boastful speeches in favor 
of ''the freedom of the seas," as he had outlined 
it, which had been delivered in the United States 
by Ambassador von Bernstorff and Dr. Bern- 
hard Dernburg, the former German Colonial 
Secretary and chief propagandist in America. 
The first act of the German Government after 
Colonel House outlined his doctrine had been to 
cable instructions to their agents in the United 
States to bolster it by a vigorous campaign of 
propaganda;)— a typical piece of German diplo- 
matic stupidity. 

Of course, the minute Colonel House men- 
tioned ''the freedom of the seas" in London, 
British statesmen smiled knowingly and said: 
. "Oh, yes, that is the newest thing in Berlin. 
Some more deviltry they are up to." 

(Colonel House had the utmost difficulty in 
breaking down the wall of natural suspicion 
which met him at every turn when he undertook 
to preach his doctrine. But he collected his 
proofs and showed conclusively that while he had 
suggested the idea in Berlin on such-and-such a 
day, the speeches had been delivered in America 
on subsequent dates. Even so, "the freedom of 
' the seas" was a phrase from which the English- 
1 man shied instinctively./ 

191 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

"What do you mean by it?" they would say. 
"The freedom of the seas? Is not that what 
England has always fought for, since the days of 
the Armada ? Is not that what the British navy 
is maintained for? Or do you mean that we 
should surrender our coaling stations and ports 
and colonies, which are open to all the nations of 
the world, as well as to our own shipping?" 

Very slowly, however, Colonel House made his 
point and drove it home, and Englishmen of Hb- 
eral views began to endorse it. 

"The freedom of the seas, as you outline it, 
would be of 60 per cent, advantage to the United 
States, 100 per cent, advantage to Germany, and 
120 per cent, advantage to the British Empire," 
pronounced one English statesman. 

In fact, -despite all the opposition which his 
suggestions encountered, and the hampering 
clutch of German stupidity. Colonel House's ef- 
forts soon bore fruit, as was evidenced by the 
speech delivered by Sir Edward Grey — no) 
Lord Grey — Minister for Foreign Affairs, n 
the House of Commons, in which the remarkabl( 
concession was made by this spokesman of the 
British Ministry that "the freedom of the seas" 
was considered a debatable question. 

Here, then, was in process of construction 
basis for negotiation, which might have suj 
ported substantial work for peace. But in the 

192 



"THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS" 

moment of fruition Colonel House's plans wer«j 
destroyed by the news that the Lusitania had 
been sunk on May 7, 19 15, by a German sub- 
marine off the coast of Ireland, with a loss of 
1,200 non-combatants, including more than 100 
Americans. By that deed Germany placed her- 
self outside the pale of civilization, and ruined 
the promising chances of escape from the British 
blockade which Colonel House had offered her. 
There was nothing for him to do but return 
home. I 

The sinking of the Lusitania was precisely the 
contingency Colonel House had foreseen in 
Germany's reckless disregard of international 
law at sea. The dangers inseparable from sub- 
marine warfare had been drawn to the attention 
of the German Government by the United States 
in a note of February 10, immediately upon 
receipt of the proclamation of the war zone 
around the British Isles. In this preliminary 
note. Secretary Bryan had warned the German 
Government that "if the commanders of German 
vessels of war should act upon the presumption 
that the flag of the United States was not being 
used in good faith and should destroy on the high 
seas an American vessel or the lives of Amerioan 
citizens, it would be difficult for the Government 
of the United States to view the act in any other 
light than as an indefensible violation of neutral 

193 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

rights. If such a deplorable situation should 
arise the Imperial German Government can read- 
ily appreciate that the Government of the United 
States would be constrained to hold the Imperial 
Government of Germany to a strict accounta- 
bility for such acts of their naval authorities, and 
to take any steps it might be necessary to safe- 
guard American lives and property and to secure 
to American citizens the full employment of their 
acknowledged rights on the high seas." 

At the same time, and under the same date, 
Secretary Bryan sent a note to the British Gov- 
ernment requesting that care be used to avoid 
the systematic display of the American flag by 
British merchantmen in the war zone. 

This was to keep the slate clean, to allow Ger- 
many no chance to claim that any step had been 
left untaken to prevent a breach between her and 
the United States. She was warned repeatedly 
in notes from the Department of State; she was 
warned at every opportunity by Ambassador 
Gerard. 

Colonel House's fears for the future were in- 
tensified by the unsatisfactory issue of the 
Lusitania controversy and the disinclination of 
Germany to make full admission of its lawless 
conduct. To aggravate the situation, on August 
19, several days before the German Government 
finally agreed to make reparation for the Lusi- 

194 



"THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS" 

tania outrage, the breach between the two coun- 
tries was widened by the torpedoing, under 
similar circumstances, of the White Star linef 
Arabic, with the loss of a number of innocent 
lives. 

But the spontaneous outburst of indignation in 
the United States, which followed the news of 
the sinking of the Arabic, had a salutary effect 
in Berlin. At that time Germany was not yet 
prepared to dare the anger of the whole civilized 
world, and moreover, Gottlieb von Jagow, the 
Foreign Secretary, was a consistent and fearless 
foe of the doctrine of frightfulness preached by 
Grand Admiral von Tirpitz and his supporters 
at the Admiralty and in the Great General Staff. 
Berlin allowed it to become known that orders 
had been issued to submarine commanders, mod- 
ifying their previous instructions, and that they 
were ordered to spare passenger liners when 
there was any question of inability to save all 
the company. 

But the official note of the German Govern- 
ment, in reply to the representations of our Gov- 
ernment regarding the destruction of the Arabic, 
was no more conciliatory in tone than had been 
the specious expressions of regret for the Lusi- 
tania tragedy. With cool impudence, the excuse 
was offered that the submarine had torpedoed the 
Arabic because the German commander thought 

195 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

that the liner intended to ram him — a falsehood 
which was demonstrated beyond contention l5y 
numerous affidavits of survivors. 

It speedily became plain to the German Gov- 
ernment, however, that the United States meant 
business, and von Jagow was able to muster 
enough backing to resist the pressure of the mili- 
tarists and the Tirpitz group. On October 5 
Count von Bernstorff, German Ambassador at 
Washington, addressed a letter to the Secretary 
of State announcing that his Government had 
instructed him to "disavow" the sinking of the 
Arabic and offer reparation. 



196 



CHAPTER XVIII 

PROBLEMS RAISED BY THE SUBMARINE 

THE perplexities of the Administration's 
position during the first year of the war 
are strikingly illustrated by the following quota- 
tion from an article in the London Spectator: 

"President Wilson has made the fatal mistake 
of letting himself be governed by words, or 
rather by a word, rather than by actualities. 
President Wilson at the very beginning of the 
war determined he would maintain 'a strict neu- 
trality.' Unfortunately, he failed to think out 
accurately and clearly what was the true mean- 
ing of neutrality. He let the word run away 
with him. It is an awful thing, a wicked thing, 
a thing contrary to the usages of civilized 
nations, to harry a country as Belgium has been 
harried, to shoot hostages by the hundreds as 
they have been shot in Belgium, and to give up 
whole cities to military execution because a few 
men not in uniform lost their heads and fired at 
the soldiers who were invading their country. 
But mum's the word, for to condemn these things 
as they ought to be condemned would be in effect 

197 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

hostile to Germany, if she did them, and would 
show that we were not strictly neutral. 

"President Wilson will go down to history as 
a man on whom fate has been specially hard. 
But for this war the world would probably have 
regarded him as one of America's greatest and 
most high-minded statesmen. As it is, the ver- 
dict of the world will be like that of Tacitus on 
the Roman Emperor. Every one would have 
deemed Wilson capable of nobly filling his high 
office had not he been tried in the fire of a great 
crisis. Political luck never struck a man harder 
than it struck him." 

It would be interesting to compare this ex- 
pression of opinion with any mention of the 
President in the columns of the Spectator in the 
past year. 

The truth is, of course, that no matter what 
Mr. Wilson's feelings were with regard to Ger- 
man lawlessness in the early part of the war, the 
state of public opinion in the United States 
positively precluded all idea of our intervention. 
There was a very active pro-German party, as 
well as a pro-Ally party, but the great mass of 
the population, untrained in the intricacies of 
international politics, took little practical inter- 
est in the elements of right and wrong in the 
European struggle. Mr. Wilson and his ad- 
visers sensed this condition, and they knew that 

198 



PROBLEMS RAISED BY THE SUBMARINE 

it would be the height of recklessness to allow 
the country to be forced into a war for which 
there was no popular demand. The duty of the 
Administration, as Colonel House saw it, was to 
preserve the Republic from foreign entangle- 
ments, if possible; to steer clear of war, if peace 
could be maintained with honor, and to stand 
firmly for international justice in so far as it was 
compatible with our traditional policies. 

Colonel House always hoped for the best be- 
cause, when the war began, nobody imagined 
either that it would involve so many nations or 
that Germany would run amuck. And each 
fresh act of oppression or lawlessness was met 
in the spirit of cool impartiality, based on the 
feeling that so extraordinary a struggle had bred 
unnatural instincts and antagonisms in men's 
breasts, and that therefore it was necessary to 
make allowance for the unusual stirring of 
human passions. It was only gradually that 
hope of preserving peace was abandoned, and to 
the very end the policy was followed of giving 
Germany one chance more. 

Private information reaching the Administra- 
tion from Berlin in the fall of 191 5, and the con- 
tinued operations, even though restricted, of the 
German submarines, provided fresh cause for 
foreboding in Washington. A situation was 
forming which gave promise of becoming im- 

199 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

possible for neutral nations. Toward the end of 
December the President determined to send 
Colonel House abroad again, and he sailed from 
New York on December 28 on board the Hol- 
land-America liner Rotterdam, having with him 
as fellow-passenger Capt. Karl Boy-Ed, German 
naval attache at Washington, who had been re- 
called at the request of the United States in 
consequence of his unneutral activities. 

In Washington the same crop of rumors her- 
alded Colonel House's departure as had attended 
his previous trip in the spring. It was asserted 
at once that he was going to canvass and report 
'on the prospects of peace, and when this was 
denied by the President, Secretary Lansing, and 
Colonel House himself, a new rumor gained cir- 
culation to the effect that our Ambassadors in 
the several European capitals were squabbling, 
and Colonel House was being dispatched abroad 
"to spank them all soundly and put them to bed." 
It will be obs; rved that he was still regarded by 
the rumor-mnigers of the capital as a glorified 
messenger- ■.(.; or bearer of the bow-string for 
the PresidciiL. 

Nobody - " ' much heed to Colonel House's 
own stater. f his purposes: 

**I am go...,^ to Europe at the request of the 
President and Secretary of State. My task will 
be to take information to some of our Ambassa- 

200 



PROBLEMS RAISED BY THE SUBMARINE 

dors in order that they may have a more intimate 
knowledge of this Government's attitude regard- 
ing certain phases of pending international ques- 
tions and in order to obtain from them their 
personal point of view." 

This was quite correct, but, of course, the most 
important object he had in view was an adjust- 
ment of the submarine problem which would 
allow the United States and other neutrals to 
preserve their dignity and lawful freedom of 
movement on the seas. Any sign of a disposition 
for peace Colonel House would have jumped at, 
but the President did not need to give him im- 
plicit instructions on this point, for Mr. Wilson 
knew that his friend saw eye to eye with him 
where peace was concerned. The problem in 
launching discussions of peace was to move with- 
out embarrassing either of the belligerents, and 
the opportunity for such a move had not pre- 
sented itself. 

On this trip, for the first time, Colonel House 
was formally accredited as a diplomatic agent of 
the United States Government, this step having 
been taken in consequence of an agitation, engi- 
neered by certain enemies of the Administration, 
who had dug up a musty statute known as the 
Logan Law, enacted in the infant days of the Re- 
public, to prohibit the conducting of negotiations 
with foreign Governments by a person who was 

201 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

not officially accredited to act for the United 
States. Several of the foreign diplomats in 
Washington had been much exercised over this 
matter, and it v^as thought best to observe the 
requirements of the law, even if there was some 
doubt of its application in the case at issue. But 
Colonel House was not paid for his services by 
the State Department, as was alleged at the 
time. 

He visited again London, Paris and Berlin. 
In Europe the true object of his mission was no 
more known than at home in America. There 
was much speculation in all foreign countries, 
and the universal conclusion was that he was on 
a peace mission. 

In London he found the Cabinet in process of 
solution, and things so unsettled that it was im- 
possible to talk definitely or with persons who 
possessed the authority to act and decide policies. 
But British statesmen individually were still 
skeptical of the danger of the submarine war- 
fare, although somewhat more inclined to the 
idea of compromise, after the months of hard 
fighting just past. When he suggested the pos- 
sibility of relaxing the food blockade of Ger- 
many, in return for a mitigation of submarine 
activities, their attitude was distinctly cordial. 
The gist of the general discussion of terms which 
Colonel House conducted was that the British 

202 



PROBLEMS RAISED BY THE SUBMARINE 

would agree to pass food cargoes for neutral 
countries adjoining Germany. 

Much encouraged by this tentative concession, 
Colonel House journeyed on to Berlin and in- 
quired what Germany would offer in return. 
But the German Government was disposed to call 
for a high bid. As a preliminary to any relaxa- 
tion of the submarine campaign, beyond their 
pledge to spare passenger liners, they demanded 
that the British should pass supplies of raw 
materials likewise consigned to neutral countries. 
Inasmuch as it would have been impossible for 
the Allies to agree to this, without nullifying the 
military effect of their blockade, the prospective 
compromise came to nothing. Colonel House 
did not even bother to give the details of the Ger- 
man reply to his friends in London and Paris. 
He knew it would be useless. 

The Germans were more confident than ever. 
They had just smashed the Servian army and 
occupied practically all of Servia, while by bring- 
ing Bulgaria into alliance with them, they had 
opened up that "corridor" through middle 
Europe which linked them to Turkey and the 
Near East. The Allies were equally assured. 
The Servian debacle was the first of their great 
mistakes, and they were busily concentrating an 
army at Salonica, with which they expected to re- 
conquer the occupied territory and drive across 

203 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

the Danube in collaboration with a Russian 
offensive from the East into Hungary. Peace 
was farther away from Europe at that time than 
it had ever been. Before the disastrous Servian 
campaig-n, Germany was inclined to talk small. 
Now Germany felt herself distinctly top-dog. 

Colonel House did what he could. He tried 
to convince both sets of belligerents of the advan- 
tage to each of them in keeping the United States 
out of the war. And, on the other hand, the 
British and French were equally anxious to con- 
vince him that we should not become involved in 
hostilities with Mexico. People and newspapers, 
who, a year and a half previously, had been rant- 
ing at Mr. Wilson and the Administration for 
their slackness, now bore away on the opposite 
tack. Colonel House was begged to beware of 
the German intrigues in Mexico, designed to oc- 
cupy our attention and cause the deflection to our 
own uses of the stores of ammunitions, arms, and 
war supplies flowing across the Atlantic. 

In reply he assured the British and French 
diplomats that we had no intention to tie our- 
selves to a war with Mexico if it could be 
avoided, and he took advantage of their argu- 
ments to point out to them how equally it was to 
their interests to do what they could to keep us 
from being dragged into the European war. In 
that case, he said, just as surely as if we were 

204 



PROBLEMS RAISED BY THE SUBMARINE 

committed to a Mexican campaign, the French 
and British armies would lose the supplies they 
were drawing from us — supplies which were of 
paramount importance to them because they had 
not yet been able fully to organize their own 
manufacturing resources. 

He also reassured them when they expressed 
fear of the possible results of the elaborate sys- 
tem of German propaganda which was built up 
in the United States during the first two years of 
the war. Instead of fearing this propaganda, 
Colonel House told them, they should view its 
activities with satisfaction. The worst possible 
thing they could do, he declared, was to attempt 
to meet it by a campaign of their own. In that 
case, the Germans would have something definite 
to which they might hitch their onslaughts. As 
it was, the strongest impression was made upon 
the American people by the dignified silence of 
the Allied Governments, and hundreds of Ameri- 
can leaders of thought and opinion were ready 
to refute voluntarily every German charge and 
boast. The Germans were wrecking their hold 
on America's good opinion, and they could be 
relied upon to ruin themselves in this wise quick- 
est by their own unaided efforts. 

When he went to Germany Colonel House 
labored to convince the statesmen at Berlin of 
the harm they were suffering from the policy of 

205 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

frightfulness practiced by their army and navy 
commanders. He told them that Germany was 
merely making commercial enemies by her on- 
slaughts upon neutral shipping, by her ruthless- 
ness, and by her disregard of international law. 
He told them that their air raids upon London 
and other English towns were a crowning piece 
of foolishness, that the only material result had 
been to add 1,000,000 men to the ranks of 
Britain's volunteer armies. He said that one 
objection the British Government had to the raids 
was the limited sphere of operation of the Ger- 
man airmen. The raids were confined to the 
eastern counties, where every able-bodied man 
had enlisted, and recruiting officers were confi- 
dent that if some raiders would only visit other 
parts of England equally satisfactory results 
could be obtained there. 

To the credit of the civilian heads of Germany, 
Colonel House's arguments had effect and they 
pledged their endeavor to dissuade the military 
chiefs from such methods of warfare. But the 
military commanders would not yield. They 
brushed aside the arguments presented to them 
and went cheerfully ahead with their frightful- 
ness and their faith in the persuasiveness to peace 
of unchecked atrocities. 

Colonel House returned to the United States 
early in March, 1916. His trip had not been so 

206 



PROBLEMS RAISED BY THE SUBMARINE 

successful as he had hoped, but it had been pro- 
ductive of much of value. It had placed him — 
and through him, the President — in intimate 
touch with the feeling prevailing in the different 
capitals of the countries at war. It had enabled 
him to convince the statesmen in Berlin that the 
Administration at Washington was in earnest in 
its intent to uphold the existing structure of 
international law, and that while American 
patience might be long-drawn out, there must 
come a time when it would yield to action, if it 
was pushed too far. It had brought the various 
American embassies in closer touch with the 
home Government and allowed an exchange of 
ideas impossible through the medium of the 
cable. 

Coming, then, upon the heels of Colonel 
House's visit to Berlin, the torpedoing on March 
24, 1916, of the steamer Sussex in the English 
Channel, with Americans on board, was nothing 
less than an open defiance to public opinion in 
the United States. And so Mr. Wilson inter- 
preted it. On April 19, he addressed the two 
Houses of Congress, reading to them in a special 
message, the text of a note which he had just 
addressed to Germany, the terms of it practically 
amounting to an ultimatum. Germany tried to 
evade responsibility for the act, claimed at first 
that the Sussex must have been sunk by a mine ; 

207 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

next that no German submarine could have sunk 
the Sussex; and finally, that it was true a Ger- 
man submarine had sunk a vessel in the vicinity I 
in which the Sussex was attacked, but that it was| 
not the same craft. 

These evasions were swept sternly aside by the 
President, and Germany was compelled to admit, 
not only that a German submarine had attacked j 
the Sussex, but also the number of the submarine 
and the identity of her commander. Germany 
was obliged to disavow the act, to promise to pun- 
ish the officer in command, and to agree to mod- 
ify still further her attacks upon shipping, 
although, in making this promise, she implied 
that it was conditional to some degree upon the 
utilization of the good efforts of the United; 
States to induce the British Government to accept] 
peace. 

Thanks in part to Colonel House's visit taj 
Berlin, and to the sterling w^ork of Ambassador' 
Gerard, the more level-headed German states- 1 
men, who realized the mistake of estranging the 
United States, were able to defeat the advocates! 
of ruthlessness on the Sussex issue, and actually 
there seemed to be more chance than ever in the 
spring of 1916 that we might be successful in 
compelling Germany to recognize our rights andj 
so avoid participation in the war. 



208 



CHAPTER XIX 

PRESIDENT WILSON'S SECOND CAMPAIGN 

PRESIDENT WILSON entered the cam- 
paign of 1916 with the chances distinctly, 
against him. The man in office who runs for re- 
election is always at a disadvantage as compared 
with his opponent His record is fixed and 
known ; his inevitable mistakes are glaringly ap- 
parent; if his opponent is a man of political 
sagacity, he is forced upon the defensive from the 
day of his nomination. This was the situation in 
which Mr. Wilson found himself. No President 
since Abraham Lincoln had been confronted by 
so many varied and perplexing problems. Time 
and again in his first term he had been compelled 
to choose between two courses of action, with 
the knowledge that no matter which way he 
directed his steps he would encounter bitter de- 
nunciation. The many pieces of constructive 
legislation to his credit were ignored by his polit- 
ical enemies for the sake of making capital out 
of policies regarding which there were essentially 
different points of view. 

His lofty idealism, his steadfast repudiation of 
209 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

the sordid forces of misrule, his unyielding re- 
sistance to reactionaries, his devotion to justice 
in every cause, his unfailing arraignment of 
wrong-doing, his determined pressure for social 
reform, his subordination of personal interest to 
the national welfare — all these were rejected 
and cast aside. And it is only fair to say that in 
the prevailing unsettled state of the public's 
mind, a clever campaign against him must have 
promised every chance of success. 

The return of Theodore Roosevelt and the con- 
servative wing of the Progressives of 1912 
enabled the Republican party to present a solid 
front; business men generally in the East were 
against Mr. Wilson, despite the huge profits they 
had been making for two years ; his fearless atti- 
tude toward Germany had offended a substantial 
element of German-American voters, while his 
refusal to allow the country to be drawn into the 
war, without a mandate from the people, had 
drawn down upon him the abuse of a vociferous 
pro-Ally group, headed by Colonel Roosevelt. 
Finally, his Mexican policy, always a source of 
trouble, had been brought to the fore again by 
the necessity of adopting sterner measures in the 
spring and early summer of 1916. 

Of Mr. Wilson's renomination there was never 
the slightest doubt. The only man who could 
ever have contested the nomination with him was 

210 



PRESIDENT WILSON'S SECOND CAMPAIGN 

Mr. Bryan, and Mr. Bryan, whether knowingly 
or unknowingly, threw away his chances by his 
attitude toward the Lusitania controversy with 
Germany. Mr. Wilson was far and away the 
strongest man in his party. In fact, no Presi- 
dent in recent times had ever been leader of his 
party to the same degree. Democracy was 
solidly behind him. The question his campaign 
committee faced was the necessity of attracting 
enough Progressive and independent votes and 
the ballots of newly enfranchised women to offset 
the old Republican majority which had triumphed 
in 1896, in 1900, in 1904, and in 1908. 

The President was especially fortunate in the 
choice of his National Chairman, Vance McCor- 
mick, of Pennsylvania, an old Yale football 
player, a choice which had the thorough approval 
of Colonel House. There was considerable 
opposition to Mr. McCormick's selection among 
Democratic leaders, because he came from a 
Republican State. But the President and Colonel 
House held that this was actually an advantage. 
It meant that he would not be handicapped by the 
factional fights which always laid a burden on 
the shoulders of any National Chairman who 
could control the vote of his State. Moreover, 
Mr. McCormick was a Progressive, who had en- 
joyed the support and endorsement of Colonel 
Roosevelt as candidate for Governor in 1912, and 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

he would therefore be an ideal man for attracting 
the Progressive votes, which the Democrats 
needed rather badly. 

He had an exceedingly good personality, was 
an excellent organizer, and possessed the best of 
health, which permitted him to work night and 
day — no mean advantage for the chairman of a 
national political committee. Shortly after he 
was appointed he came over to New York and 
spent the day with Colonel House, who had never 
met him before. They talked and dined to- 
gether, went to the theater, and talke some 
more, and Colonel House took his measure. 

''McCormick is a splendid fellow," was his 
verdict. *'He grows on you. The more you see 
of him, the better you like him. He is lovable in 
disposition, cheery, hard-working, friendly to 
everybody, with a peculiar facility for making 
men get along together and ironing out difficul- 
ties. He was the best man we could have picked 
for the place, and he more than justified the 
President's selection of him." 

Fundamentally, the Democrats had a strong 
appeal to make to the voters in 191 6. "Peace, 
Prosperity, and Preparedness !" was their slogan. 
In a time when all the other great nations of the 
world had been involved in war. Air. Wilson had 
managed honorably to steer clear of hostilities, 
and had even succeeded in winning a diplomatic 

212 



PRESIDENT WILSON'S SECOND CAMPAIGN 

victory over Germany on the Sussex issue. In 
Mexico the President had upheld American pres- 
tige by his occupation of Vera Cruz, by his dis- 
patch of Pershing's column into Sonora in pur- 
suit of Villa in March, 1916, and by his mobiliza- 
tion of the National Guard along the border in 
the following June, after Carranza troops had 
ambushed a patrol of Pershing's men at Carrizal. 
Yet despite these measures he had averted war, 
making it perfectly clear to the responsible 
authorities in Mexico that he would give them 
every opportunity to solve their difficulties in 
their own way. 

But there was considerable discontent with 
both his German and Mexican policies. Fortu- 
nately for Mr. Wilson, Mr. Charles E. Hughes, 
the Republican Presidential candidate, elected to 
observe a cautiously non-committal attitude on 
these questions, aiming to avoid antagonizing the 
German- Americans who were assailing the Pres- 
ident for being pro-British, or the people who 
followed Colonel Roosevelt's lead and denounced 
him for having failed to intervene in the world 
war, either when the Germans violated the neu- 
trality of Belgium or when the Lusitania was 
sunk; and similarly, endeavoring to please all 
shades of opinion regarding Mexico. 

The President was quick to seize the oppor- 
tunity of taking the offensive, and it was he and 

213 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

his supporters who held this strategic advantage 
throughout the balance of the campaign. He 
took his stand squarely on the issue of peace. 
He challenged the Republicans again and again: 
Would they, had they been in power in August, 
1914, or in May, 1915, have intervened in the 
war in Europe? Would they, had they been in 
power in the summer of 1914, have marched 
from Vera Cruz to Mexico City, or in March, 
1916, would they have used Villa's border raids 
as an excuse for embarking upon hostilities with 
Carranza and all Mexico? This was an issue 
Mr. Wilson could safely go to the voters upon, 
for he knew that the vast majority of Americans 
had not wanted war, either with Germany or 
Mexico. 

He never allowed a hint to escape of the pro- 
found secret reasons which had governed his 
foreign policy. It must be apparent to any one 
who has read these pages that he could have 
silenced his most unreasonable critics by a brief 
statement of the conclusions he and Colonel 
House had reached so far back as the fall of 
1913. But for him to have explained at that 
time might have hampered his influence abroad 
in behalf of peace, and he considered it was 
incumbent upon him, above all things, to preserve 
every resource he had to obtain peace when the 
right moment came. In the summer and early 

214 



PRESIDENT WILSON'S SECOND CAMPAIGN 

fall of 1916 the President and Colonel House 
supposed that Germany intended to live up to the 
obligations solemnly assumed by her with regard 
to her conduct of sea warfare. They were con- 
fident that the United States was as safe as a 
nation could be in such disturbed times, and they 
were happy in the thought that this left them free 
to work for the end of the war in Europe. 
j In the field of domestic affairs, Mr. Wilson had 
nothing to apologize for. He could point to the 
most remarkable program of progressive, lib- 
eral legislation, enacted and in operation, which 
had ever been secured by one Administration in 
three years. The Federal Reserve act, the Rural 
Credits act, the Underwood Tariff law, the final 
achievement of an Income Tax law, a definite 
programme for naval and military preparedness, 
establishment of the Federal Trade Commis- 
sion, direct election of Senators, the Industrial 
Employees Arbitration act, the Child Labor and 
Eight-Hour laws, Philippine independence, and 
half-a-dozen other important measures, had set a 
record, not to speak of the universal speeding up 
of the Federal departments and the higher moral 
tone of Government. It was a record to be 
proud of. Had Mr. Wilson been defeated in 
19 16, he would still have been remembered in 
history as a President who threw aside conven- 

215 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

tion and placed monumental laws upon the 
statute books. 

So much for the issues. The weaknesses of 
Mr. Wilson's candidacy were as apparent to 
Colonel House and the President's other advisers 
as was the strength of the Republicans. Never 
before — not even in the palmiest days of Mark 
Hanna's leadership — were campaign funds sub- 
scribed to as they were by the leaders of "Big 
Business" who backed Mr. Hughes. Colonel 
House realized from the opening of the campaign 
that it would be impossible to rival the enemy in 
this respect. To make any attempt to meet themj 
on their own footing would be ridiculous, disas- 
trous. But it is one of Colonel House's political 
axioms that too much money in a campaign is 
liable to be a greater handicap than an asset. 

"Too much money is an evil," he says. "It] 
reacts upon its spenders. The best cause can be 
ruined by it. Look at what happened to the 
Fusion municipal campaign in New York city in 
1917, Too much money wrecked the chances of ^ 
a good ticket. It is always best in a campaign 
to keep your expenses down to strictly legitimate ; 
purposes — office work, typing, paper, the tele- 
phone and telegraph, and printing. Circulariz- 
ing is a feature which can easily be overdone. 
It never pays with city people. They throw i 
away the literature sent to them; they have too! 

216 



PRESIDENT WILSON'S SECOND CAMPAIGN 

much to do, too many interests, to give the time 
to reading it. But in a campaign in rural dis- 
tricts, good printed matter frequently is valuable, 
as country people have fewer resources for 
amusement." 

Colonel House's basic idea of the campaign 
was to try to organize 16,000,000 voters for 
Wilson, precisely as you would go about organiz- 
ing a precinct for the election of a justice of the 
peace. In other words, he advised the political 
managers to use the lowest possible unit of or- 
ganization, and to employ meticulous care in 
reaching every voter. Many Democratic leaders 
doubted that it could be done, but Colonel House 
insisted that if his scheme would elect a justice 
of the peace, it would elect a President, and in 
the end he convinced them. The chief difficulty 
was lack of money, but in this respect, they did 
the best they could in the circumstances. The 
more money the managers had in certain States 
or districts, why, the more units they organized. 
If they could not organize by precinct, they or- 
ganized by assembly districts or counties. 

The winning factor in Colonel House's strat- 
egy, however, was his dispersal of the Demo- 
cratic funds and energy. He saw early in the 
campaign that the Republicans were going to 
make their big efforts in the densely populated 
States of the Northeastern section of the coun- 

217 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

try, relying for success in the West upon the 
normal Republican majorities returned in the 
past. For example, the Republican managers 
simply squandered money in New York, which 
they regarded in 1916 as more than ever the 
pivotal State of the Union, with its forty-five 
electoral votes. The allotment of funds in New 
York was said to have been as high as $5,000 an 
election district. In Pennsylvania, Indiana, Illi- 
nois, Ohio, Iowa, Michigan, Wisconsin, and in 
New England the same conditions prevailed. 

Colonel House counselled the Democratic man- 
agers to go quietly out into the West and without 
drawing too much attention to their exertions, 
make every effort to win over the States which 
had shown radical tendencies in recent elections, 
especially the woman suffrage States. The Re- 
publicans mostly ignored these States. Colonel fl 
House, with his ear close to the ground, had per- 
ceived the direction in which they were drifting. 
In a few States where the Republicans were 
working hard, such as Ohio, Kansas, and Cali- 
fornia, the Democrats let themselves out to meet 
their opponents, with results surprisingly satis- 
factory. It was a daring plan. It meant that 
Air. Wilson's victory could not be won by a very 
wide margin, and that a slip-up in a vital State 
would mean a defeat. As it happened, the elec- 
tion turned entirely on California, whose thirteen 

218 



i 



PRESIDENT WILSON'S SECOND CAMPAIGN 

electoral votes were won by little more than 3,000 
majority, largely due to the rallying of the 
iwomen and Progressives to Mr. Wilson. 
j It was one of the tensest elections in the coun- 
Itry's history. The New York evening papers of 
Election Day — all but the Evening Post — con- 
ceded the election of Hughes, for the impressive 
majorities he rolled up in the East and Middle 
West, it was taken for granted, would be dupli- 
cated in the Prairie, Rocky Mountain, and Pacific 
Coast States. The New York Sun, the next 
Imorning, November 8, announced that Hughes 
had "swept the West," and already was assured 
of more than 291 electoral votes, a safe margin 
over the 266 necessary to elect. Even the New 
I York World, stanch supporter of Wilson, that 
morning conceded Hughes's election, stating that 
he had carried twenty-three States, with 284 
electoral votes. 

A few hours later the outlook was materially 
changed, as the close returns of the Far West 
began to come over the wires in detail. There, 
it was seen, in State after State, which the 
Republican managers had confidently looked 
upon as safe, Wilson was running neck-and-neck 
with Hughes or leading him — and always the 
Wilson votes kept increasing while the Hughes 
votes decreased. 

On the morning of November 10, Mr. Wilson's 
219 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

election was assured beyond cavil by his victory 
in California. He received ^'jy electoral votes, 
the odd one coming from West Virginia, where 
there was a split, seven votes going to Hughes 
and one to Wilson. He received a total of 
9,129,269 votes, against 8,547,328 for Hughes, 
or a majority of 581,941. From being a minor- 
ity President he became a majority President, 
and even more impressively so geographically 
speaking. The Republican party was revealed 
as pent up in narrow stretches of country along 
the northern third of the Atlantic seaboard and 
in the Middle West around the Great Lakes. 
Ohio intervened between the two Republican 
blocks of States, isolating one from the other. 
Even in rockbound New England, New Hamp- 
shire had gone Democratic. Everywhere else, 
North, Soutl% and West, Wilson had won. Only 
Oregon on the Pacific Coast and South Dakota in 
the Prairie group had remained Republican. It 
was impressive — or depressing — as you happen 
to look at it. 

Through all the hurly-burly of the days imme- 
diately preceding election and following it, 
Colonel House preserved his calm and his curi- 
ously detached vision. He refused to grow 
excited; he refused to despair; he refused to 
worry. The morning after Election Day, wheni 
the President's prospects still seemed black, he 

220 



PRESIDENT WILSON'S SECOND CAMPAIGN 

was cheerful and confident. He had made his 
calculations, and he believed in them, until they 
were definitely proved wrong. All night he had 
rested with a telephone at his bedside, answering 
calls from all over the country, soothing dis- 
tracted State chairmen, advising on the issuing 
of statements. But he did not show it, except 
for the lines of fatigue in his face. His eyes 
were clear, his manner unhurried. 

"Wait until we hear more from the West," he 
advised. "Even here in the East, the first big 
majorities for Hughes are falling." 

His confidence was justified. The West went 
Democratic, and Mr. Wilson won by the same 
tactics which elect a justice of the peace. 

'*It was a great personal triumph for the Presi- 
dent," said Colonel House long afterward. "But 
it was more than that. It was a political revolu- 
tion, a realignment of national sentiment. It 
was the most encouraging sign in American 
politics." 



221 



CHAPTER XX 

LAST EFFORTS FOR PEACE 

IN October, 191 6, a few weeks before Election 
Day, Ambassador Gerard returned from 
Germany for a brief visit, and the confidential 
report he brought with him was not reassuring. 
The restrictions on submarine warfare, imposed 
by Germany's acceptance of Mr. Wilson's ultima- 
tum after the Sussex affair, were growing irk- 
some to the naval and military chiefs, and they 
were pressing the civil Government — notably 
Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg and Foreign 
IMinister von Jagow — to repudiate the undertak- 
ing/} Hindenburg, now supreme commander of 
the German armies, had come to Berlin in sym- 
pathy with the Chancellor's policy of moderation 
at sea and conciliation of the United States, but 
gradually, he was won away from the Chan- 
cellor's side and finally became a partisan of von 
Tirpitz and the other advocates of ruthlessness. 
The achievements of the German high com- 
mand in the ''pincers" campaign of von Falken- 
hayn and von Mackensen against Rumania, in 
the fall of 1916, which transferred the Entente's 

222 



LAST EFFORTS FOR PEACE 

newest ally from the credit to the debit column, 
enhanced the prestige of those commanders to 
such a degree that when they gave their support 
to von Tirpitz and his friends the Chancellor and 
von Jagow were unable to resist them. The 
Chancellor abandoned his convictions and his 
pledged word for the sake of remaining in office 
and retaining the shadow of power the military 
clique had left to the head of the civil govern- 
ment. But von Jagow, to his honor be it said, 
refused to countenance an action, the wisdom of 
which and the honesty alike he decried, and he 
resigned his portfolio on November 22. He is 
one of the few German officials in the present war 
who have seemed to possess the courage of their 
convictions and the will to resist the domination 
of the military party. As a result, he has passed 
out of official life, and he is occupied to-day — or 
was, at last accounts — in inconspicuous work for 
the Red Cross. 

Of course, all these occurrences were not 
known to the Administration in Washington at 
the time, but enough information reached the 
President to make them uneasy. It was plain 
that the war was approaching a crisis, and that 
unless peace could be obtained within the next 
few weeks, the struggle must enter upon a phase 
more desperate than any in the preceding two 
years — with consequences highly dangerous to 

223 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

the United States. 'Both the President and 
Colonel House were convinced that the ultimate 
effect of a resumption of unrestricted submarine 
warfare by Germany would be the inclusion of 
the United States in the struggle. It would be 
impossible for a great nation to support the arro- 
gation of supreme authority over life and death 
and property rights on the high seas to which the 
German Admiralty pretended^ 
i It was true that violations of international law 
had been committed by the Entente Allies at vari- 
ous times and places in the course of the war; 
but these infractions were as minor civil offences 
in comparison with Germany's outrages against 
the criminal law of mankind. And in every 
case, the Entente Allies had been prompt to show 
reason and a sense of obligation when their trans- 
gressions were brought to their attention. There 
could be no question on whose side we should 
enter the war, if we did enter it. "But the last 
wish of Mr. Wilson was to enter it at all. He 
had just been reelected on the score of his efforts 
to keep the Republic at peace, and if it was possi- 
ble to continue at peace, on terms compatible with 
the national honor, he was determined to do so. 
The obvious policy for him to adopt in the 
circumstances was to call for a statement of 
possible terms of peace by all the belligerents; 
but he waited as long as he deemed it safe before 

224 



LAST EFFORTS FOR PEACE 

doing so, largely because, in the meantime, our 
diplomatic representatives in Berlin had received 
renewed assurances of Germany's intention to 
live up to her promise of conducting submarine 
operations according to the rules of cruiser war- 
fare. In the meantime, too, on the very eve of 
the President's promulgation of his peace appeal 
to the world, the Teutonic Allies, themselves, 
launched through the medium of the neutral Gov- 
ernments of the United States, Spain, and Switz- 
erland, a suggestion to the Entente Allies for a 
conference of belligerents to discuss terms of 
peace. Germany had been moved to this step by 
her successes in Rumania, which, in two months, 
had changed her military position from one of 
grave danger to that of a substantial victor in the 
year's fighting, precisely as her campaign in 
Servia in the preceding fall had remedied the 
effects of her failures in France and Belgium and 
the setbacks of Austria at the hands of the 
Russians.** 

iGermany's move for peace was, in a way, a last 
effort on the part of her civil government to avert 
the resumption of ruthlessness at sea; but this 
fact was not known outside of the inner circles 
in Berlin. It did not, however, indicate a real 
desire for peace on equitable terms, as the event 
showed. > Germany still considered herself the 
victor, and she was disposed to insist upon her 

225 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

right to dictate the final settlement. Never, per- 
haps, was the overmastering power of the mili- 
tary clique revealed more clearly than in the 
sequence of events which turned to account the 
situation at the close of 1916, to press for a 
"German peace," or a carnival of savagery such 
as the world had not known since the Thirty 
Years War. "Mr. Wilson and his advisers nat- 
urally took the German bid for peace at its face 
value, as an indication of willingness frankly to 
state fair and practicable terms from which the 
basis for a conclusive settlement could be worked 

OUt;,J 

"yVe hoped for peace until it became apparent 
that the military party in Germany wanted only 
such a peace as was unsatisfactory, not only to 
the Entente nations, but to the majority of neu- 
trals," Colonel House puts it. "The President 
was scrupulous to do nothing which could be in- 
terpreted by either side as indicating an intention 
to abandon neutrality> 

"Within the limits of this policy, however, the 
Administration prepared plans for substantial 
increases in the Army and Navy, and these plans 
were explained and advocated by the President 
in a series of speeches delivered on a special 'pre- 
paredness' tour. He did not wish to arouse sus- 
picions of our intentions among any of the 
belligerents. It was particularly important that 

226 



LAST EFFORTS FOR PEACE 

Germany should be convinced of our disinterest- 
edness. He was determined to give Germany 
every chance, and not to allow her any excuse for 
suspecting our motives. His patience was almost 
unbelievable." 

The final moves in the game which were to end 
in the alignment of the United States with the 
nations against Germany — the moves which may 
be said to have signed the death-warrant of the 
German military clique — were rapid and easy to 
trace. iDn December 12, the Teutonic Allies ad- 
dressed the note, previously alluded to, to the 
members of the Entente, suggesting a conference 
of representatives of all belligerents on neutral 
soil. No terms were stated. On December 19, 
David Lloyd George, who had just succeeded 
Herbert Asquith as Premier of Great Britain, in 
the House of Commons declared that any peace 
terms must include complete restitution, full 
reparation and guarantees for the future from 
Germany and her Allies^ \ 

On December 20, there was published the text 
of a note Mr. Wilson had caused to be dis- 
patched to all the warring nations, calling upon 
them to state their terms. This note, which was 
written several days before Lloyd George's speech 
and had been formulated prior even to the pub- 
lication of Germany's note mentioned above, was 
signed by Mr. Lansing, the Secretary of State, 

227 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

and asserted that "the President is not proposing 
peace ; he is not even offering mediation. He is 
merely proposing that soundings be taken, in or- 
der that we may learn, the neutral nations with 
the belligerent, how near the haven of peace may 
be for which all mankind longs with an intense 
and increasing longing:^' 

This note was sent by the President in order 
that, when the time of wrath came, there might 
be no question of the United States having used 
every means at its disposal to prevent war. Pa- 
tiently, with infinite kindliness and humility, the 
President extended again and again the means 
by which Germany might lift herself up out of 
the mire of slaughter in which she was sunken. 
His enemies denounced his meekness, dubbed it 
cowardice, but upon his conduct depended the 
lives of hundreds of thousands, perhaps of mil- 
lions, of his countrymen. 

"On his shoulders rested — and it still rests — 
the world's hope of peace," said Colonel House 
in narrating this episode of history. "It was a 
responsibility the weight of which the ordinary 
mind cannot grasp. It was crushing, depressing. 
But he carried it without whimpering, and his 
resolution to do what was right has been recog- 
nized by many of those who once criticised him 
for inaction. The country was not ready for 
war, and did not want war. The President was 

228 



LAST EFFORTS FOR PEACE 

determined to obey the will of the people, and to 
any fair-minded man it was manifest that the 
American people did not want war, if it could be 
prevented. Mr. Wilson handled affairs so skill- 
fully that when the break with Germany did come 
the realization of German dishonesty was like a 
slap in the face to Americans. The country was 
solid for war behind Mr. Wilson because the 
facts, comprehensible to the simplest mind, 
showed that the President had done everything 
humanly possible to keep peace." 

On December 26, Germany replied in courteous 
but hollow terms to the President's note, reiterat- 
ing the suggestion contained in the note of the 
Teutonic Allies for a conference of belligerents, 
but ignoring the request for terms. On Decem- 
ber 30, the Entente Allies replied to the German 
note of December 12, denouncing it as "not an 
offer of peace, but a war maneuver" and echoing 
Lloyd George's demand for assurances of repara- 
tion for wrongs committed and guarantees 
against repetition of like offences in the future, 
as a preliminary to peace. 

The New Year dawned with peace trembling in 
the balance, with the probabilities strongly 
against it. Some time in December, at a secret 
council held in Berlin, the military and naval au- 
thorities had enforced upon the German Govern- 
ment their plan for a resumption of unchecked 

229 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

submarine warfare in February, providing Ger- 
many's enemies did not previously agree to a 
peace satisfactory to the military clique — that is, 
a peace which would enable the military clique 
to pose before the German people as their sav- 
iours and the victors in the war. Rumors of this 
determination were circulated in Germany and 
reached neutral and enemy countries, but all in- 
quiries by our Embassy in Berlin were answered 
by assurances that no such intention was held. 
Let it be stated emphatically, in this connection, 
that the German replies to our inquiries were not 
evasions ; they were plain lies. When Mr. Gerard 
afterward taxed Dr. Zimmermann, the new 
Foreign Minister, with those lies, Zimmermann, 
wholly unabashed, replied that it had been deemed 
best not to reveal the truth "in order to avoid 
controversy and preserve good relations between 
the two countries." 

On January lo, 1917, the Entente Allies replied 
to the President's note of December 20, giving 
their terms as restoration by Germany and her 
accomplices of all territories overrun not only in 
this present war, but in the past, with indemni- 
ties for damages and outrages, and the expulsion 
of the Ottoman Turks from Europe. It was ap- 
parent now to the President and to Colonel House 
that the gap between the belli,c:erents was as wide 
as ever, and that only an heroic attempt, ignoring 

2Z0 



LAST EFFORTS FOR PEACE 

diplomatic precedent and tradition, could stop 
the war and insure peace for the United States. 
Mr. Wilson did not dodge the issue. He appeared 
before the Senate on January 22, and read his 
famous address in which he pleaded for the sake 
of a suffering world, for a democratic peace, and 
for a fair readjustment of international re- 
lations which should have for its cardinal prin- 
ciples the establishment of true freedom of the 
seas, limitation of armaments, and the adoption 
of a worldwide Monroe Doctrine, providing for 
abstention by every nation from interference in 
the affairs of other nations. As the future arbi- 
ter of the world and the controlling factor in the 
reestablished fabric of civilization, Mr. Wilson 
envisioned a League of Peace, a federation of na- 
tions, working for all. 

Knowing, as we now know, the state of mind 
existing then among the rulers of Germany, the 
result of the President's last effort was a fore- 
gone conclusion. A peace such as he sketched 
would have meant failure for the military clique 
and the disillusionment of the German people. 
"Peace without victory" was farthest from their 
intentions. Already they had gauged the de- 
termination of the Entente to continue the war, 
and to counteract the possible opposition of the 
United States, Zimmermann on January 19, had 
initiated his preposterous attempt to form an al- 

231 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

liance against the United States with Mexico am 
Japan, while the plans for the resumption oj 
submarine raids were rapidly approaching com^ 
pletion. 

It is interesting to speculate on the degree to' 
which Count von Bernstorff, the German Am- 
bassador at Washington, was acquainted with 
the secret policies of the Government in Berlin. 
Outwardly, at least, Bernstorff was always the 
friend of the United States, always a worker 
for international peace. After the President's 
note of December 20 was made public he de- 
clared: *'Now we shall have a conference." It is 
beyond question that he applied pressure to good 
purpose in Berlin to avert the crises caused by the 
Lusitania, Arabic, and Sussex incidents. But 
it seems impossible that in January, 191 7, he 
could have been ignorant of the plans for action 
which Zimmermann had made in conjunction 
with the Admiralty and the Great General Staff. 
And surely, he must have had cognizance of Zim- 
mermann's atrocious intrigues in Mexico and the 
proposition, absurd though it was, to form an al- 
liance against a nation with which Germany was 
at peace. Un judged though he must be, until 
he has had an opportunity to speak for himself, 
without restraint. Count von Bernstorff has many 
questions to answer before he can win back the 
trust of Americans. A typical German aristo- 

232 



LAST EFFORTS FOR PEACE 

crat, cynical in his entire outlook upon life, an 
atheist, a self-confessed believer in nothing, who 
lives for the present and without any but purely 
selfish ties, he is a character foreign in environ- 
ment and culture to American views and corre- 
spondingly difficult to analyze. 

The situation with which the United States was 
confronted by the failure of the President's peace 
policy was realized abroad before it penetrated 
the minds of people at home. On January 24, the 
Associated Press correspondent in London was 
reporting that "parliamentary circles considered 
Wilson's Senate speech a last move for peace and 
if it failed that he would be obliged to side finally 
with one of the belligerent groups." Mr. Wilson, 
himself, and his advisers understood this, and 
every precautionary step was taken that was per- 
mitted by the President's insistence upon observ- 
ance of strict neutrality, to make ready for a 
break with Germany, if it came. 

The first consideration in the minds of the Ad- 
ministration was to withdraw Pershing's column 
from. Mexico. Luckily, the purpose for which 
Pershing had been sent into Mexico, the breaking 
up of Villa's power to raid American towns on 
the border, had been accomplished, and the prep- 
arations for withdrawal had been begun in De- 
cember. The National Guard troops mobilized 
on the Border in June, 191 6, likewise had been 

233 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

sent home before this time, the countn- being the 
gainer by the training and experience acquired 
by officers and men in the course of their service 
in the neld. 

In the afternoon of January- 30, Colonel House 
received a telephone call from Washington, an- 
nouncing the receipt of an answer from Germany 
to the President's note urging a league of peace, 
and v.*iLh it a note on submarine warfare. Colonel 
House asked how matters looked, and was told 
that the submarine note was "rather bad." In 
that note, without any previous warning, Ger- 
many announced to the L'nited States that she 
was going to begin immediately, on Februar)- i, 
unrestricted submarine warfare in the zone 
around the British Isles, and undertook to specify 
the route which a restricted number of American 
ships might take through this zone. 

The next day Colonel House was summoned 
to Washington to consult with the President It 
was plain to both of them that the break they 
had worked so hard to prevent was now ine\*it- 
able. Yet still the President intended to do ever>-- 
thing he could to stop short of war. On Februar)* 
4, he addressed Congress, announcing the sever- 
ance of diplomatic relations with Germany, and 
stating his hope that Germany would pause be- 
fore it was too late. On Februarj^ 5, the rear- 
guard of Pershing's column marched back across 

234 



LAST EFFORTS FOR PEACE 

the border. On February 26, the steamship La- 
conia, with Americans on board, was sunk, and 
on the next day the President addressed Con- 
gress, suggesting the proclamation of armed neu- 
trality, as a final effort to apply pressure to the 
German Government to show that the United 
States was in earnest and would protect its rights 
against lawless attacks at sea. But all prelim- 
inary measures failed, and on April 6, 19 17, in 
response to an address delivered by the President 
on April 2, the Congress of the United States 
declared solemnly that a state of war existed 
between the people of the United States and the 
Imperial Government of Germany. 

The President did everything it was humanly 
possible to do to prevent the definite break He 
w^as willing to negotiate up to the last minute, 
had Germany shown any disposition to be reason- 
able. He left no stone unturned At the very 
moment when he was awaiting Germany's 
answer to his second peace note, he had talked 
the Entente Allies into agreeing to accept reason- 
able terms. The world was never so near peace 
as it v.as in the last week of Januar\-, 191 7. 

Germany knew this, too. The rulers at Berlin 
v/ere aware that the United States was able to 
bring pressure to bear upon the Entente Gov- 
ernments to accept a just peace. But Germany 
would not then, nor would she at any other time, 

-235 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

offer or agree to accept terms which would be 
satisfactory to the United States, much less her 
opponents. Instead of taking the hand of peace 
Mr. Wilson held out to her, she drew the sword. 
The German military party did not want peace. 
They took care that there should not be peace. 



Ii 



>36 



i 



CHAPTER XXI 

HIS SHARE IN THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR 

COLONEL HOUSE'S share in the general 
conduct of the war since the United States 
joined the Entente AlHes has been more important 
than most people might suppose. His knowledge 
of conditions abroad and his acquaintance with 
the psychology and characters of the leading 
statesmen of Britain, France, and Germany are 
of inestimable advantage to the President, but 
equally so is his talent for smoothing over diffi- 
culties and taking the kinks out of Government 
work. Colonel House has a positive genius for 
persuading men of opposite temperaments to 
work in harmony, and he can always be depended 
upon to evolve some formula for solving the most 
difficult problem. That is why, although he is 
pre-occupied mainly with the Administration's 
international negotiations, he is frequently called 
upon to advise in regard to troubles or plans in 
Washington. 

Indeed, in war matters, as in political or legis- 
lative matters. Colonel House plays the part of 
buffer for the President. He aims to take off Mr. 

^11 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

Wilson's shoulders as much as possible of the 
burden of interviews and details. By meeting 
and talking to the bulk of people who crave the 
President's attention, he is able to sift from the 
chaff the small quantity of really worthwhile 
ideas ; and in the same way, he reads and assimi- 
lates masses of data and reports, passing on to 
Mr. Wilson the facts which are essential. The 
result is a considerable saving of time for the 
harassed President, with proportionate increase 
in the efficiency which Air. Wilson is able to bring 
to bear upon the major problems for which he can 
conserve himself. 

Familiar as he was with the experiences of the 
German, British, and French Governments in the 
war, Colonel House was able to take a candid and 
unprejudiced view of all the nostrums, cure-alls, 
win-the-war-quick remedies and "can-the-Kaiser" 
schemes which were brought forward by scores 
of well-meaning persons and organizations. 
From the very start he knew that there were just 
two ways in which the war could be won : by out- 
matching Germany's astonishing achievements in 
coordination of national effort and by attacking 
Germany and Austria from within. He thor- 
oughly agreed with Mr. Wilson that American 
political institutions would not lend themselves to 
such departures from national custom as the erec- 
tion of a coalition Cabinet. He knew, far better 

238 



HIS SHARE IN THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR 

than did the advocates of this idea, the precise 
degree to which it had accelerated war work 
abroad; but he was also aware of the constitu- 
tional and political — not to speak of the human — 
obstacles in the way of its successful operation in 
Washington. He held, with the President, that 
the extraordinary amount of responsibility en- 
trusted, under the Constitution, to the President 
made it incumbent upon the Chief Executive to 
have the support of men of his own party. 

From all historic precedent, the United States 
looks to one man to lead the country's forces in 
the war. That man is Woodrow Wilson. To 
him will go the credit for victory or the obloquy 
of defeat. Moreover, it was the feeling of the 
President and his adviser that the exigencies of 
the international situation left no time for the 
trial of new ideas. The creation of a coalition 
Cabinet might, conceivably, meet with a certain 
measure of success. On the other hand, there 
were many reasons for supposing that it might 
encounter disaster. Consider the result, had a 
coalition Cabinet sat during the debates upon 
army supply matters, coal, transportation, and 
shipbuilding, during the past winter. It is diffi- 
cult to believe that the divisions and bickerings in 
Congress would not have been reflected at the 
Cabinet meetings. In that case, what would have 
become of coordination — that much-vaunted 

239 



THE REAL COLOXEL HOUSE 

word which has come to p'.agne u?, to spur u? on 
to new iiights of effort? The wheels of govern- 
ment must have been blocked, the intricate ma- 
chinery of combat dislocated beyond repair. 

Xo: a coalition Cabinet was re^eaed by Colonel 
House's evenly balanced mind The idea had ad- 
vantages, but they were ad\*antages which spring 
from placing to the g^eries. The announcement 
of such a step would be hailed by all sections of 
the countn- as a mark of disinterestedness, a 
proof of non-partisanship. But what would such 
tributes avail if die war-engine was slowed up? 
For better or for worse, the voters of the United 
States had elected a Democratic President, after 
four vears of trial of him and his Cabinet. It 
was for this same President and this same Cab- 
inet to steer the country through the mazes of 
war. They were used to working together : they 
were famihar with their staffs and the routine of 
their departments. Also, the President had cer- 
tain aims and ideals which he could not entrust to 
any but lieutenants of his own way of th ink i n g. 
Successful administration depends to a great de- 
gree upon complete unity in policy- — which re- 
quires unit>- in thoughL The President was 
convinced that in a situation so fraught with 
delicate questions and with the great objeas he 
had set himself to attain, it was more than ever 

240 



HIS SIL\IIE IN THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR 

necessar)- for him to have the sup^^ort cf meri 
who saw with him eye to tyc. 

The President's position was aptly set forth by 
Colonel House in a conversation on this point 
Ke said: 

•\Mr. Wilson is firm in his determination to 
v.in this war. He has three years to do it in, AH 
the Premiers of the other AUied nations do not 
know at what moment thej- may lose their power. 
But the President has three years that he is sure 
of, and he is going to do it — to ^"in the war. He 
will use all his authority to attain that end If 
a War Council bill is passed, he can veto it, 
and if it is passed over his veto he can appoint 
men whom he knows he can trust, who wiU share 
his views. The main fact is that he has the power 
and the will to win the war. He may be ham- 
pered ; he may be badgered and annoyed- But if 
he has any sort of support from the people, he 
wiU carr}' out their wishes to a successful con- 
clusion. He will win the war.'' 

It may be said with absolute authority that 
there has been no other thought in the President's 
head since April 2, 191 7. Elected as a peace 
President, on a platform of peace and largely for 
his efforts in having kept the country at peace, 
Mr. Wilson, when pressed too far by the arro- 
gance of German autocracy, became as fierce a 
militant as the Kaiser himself, but a militant in 

241 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

the cause of justice, of the oppressed and the 
weak of the earth. He will not be deterred or put 
aside. He will not falter in his intentions. He 
will not suffer the effects of militarism to halt or 
overthrow the splendid development of liberalism 
which has attended his Administration. He is 
going to prove to the world that it is possible for 
a great free people, for a great free democracy, 
to gird up its loins and fight with the professional 
warriors of Imperialism, and then, after the re- 
establishment of right, return to the factory and 
the plow, the courtroom and the workshop. He 
hopes to see the republic emerge from the strug- 
gle vitalized and chastened by suffering and 
service. 

One of Colonel House's cardinal principles for 
doing anything successfully is to work hard and 
say nothing. He believes that is the way to win 
the war, and that the hardest thing for democ- 
racies to learn is the harm done by too much 
talking. 

"If Woodrow Wilson wanted to come to New 
York and make a speech, saying 'To hell with the 
Kaiser!* he could make a tremendous effect and 
stir the enthusiasm of the country," Colonel 
House puts it. ''But he wants to win the war — 
so he doesn't. As it happens, that isn't the way 
wars are won. 

"Personally, I don't believe in talking. That 
242 



HIS SHARE IN THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR 

is the trouble with democracies. They always 
show a tendency toward government by mouth. 
When I was in politics in Texas, I made it a rule 
never to have a meeting of the full Committee, 
for if they had all met they would have done 
nothing but talk till the end of the campaign. 
Instead, I would select a few representative men 
— a Jew, let us say, and somebody from the Bap- 
tists, a Methodist, perhaps, and some one repre- 
senting the large foreign population we have in 
Texas — and have them thrash things out. 

"The more I see of life, the more I am im- 
pressed that the great handicap on so many states- 
men is their love of talking for effect. They like 
to say something that will attract the attention 
of the crowd, and then sit idle for a week and 
read over their speech complacently. When I 
can, I do away with that sort of thing. It means 
lost motion, wasted effort, and frequently foolish 
statements which are hard to live down." 

Although it is not generally known. Colonel 
House was one of the earliest supporters of the 
strategic theory of attacking the Central Powers 
from within with propaganda designed to stir the 
masses to rebellion and to drive wedges between 
Germany and Austria. Long before the United 
States entered the war, he advocated this policy 
in informal talks with the statesmen of the En- 
tente countries, but they declined to see the possi- 

243 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

bilitles in it. A few spasmodic attempts were 
made, but for the most part the Allied Govern- 
ments persisted in believing that there was no 
difference between the German Government and 
the German people. They insisted all through 
the first two years of the war in talking about 
annihilating Germany, rearing an economic bar- 
rier to stifle German trade, and partitioning Aus- 
tria. Of course, this was playing directly into the 
hands of the German military clique, who, when- 
ever the national spirit flagged, could point to 
the outgiving of some enemy statesman and say : 

''There, you fools! Look at that. You may 
not like us, but if you don't play up for us, that 
is what you will get." 

It was not until President Wilson began to 
influence the management of the diplomacy of the' 
Entente Allies in the summer of 191 7 that any 
real effort was made to undermine the morale of 
the German people by intellectual means. The 
results of Mr. Wilson's policy of fighting behind 
the enemy's lines are already becoming apparent, 
but the full effects of his attacks with the pen are 
not yet realized, even in the Teutonic countries. 
Such methods are slow in development, but in- 
sidious in the ever-widening sphere of their influ- 
ence and defying limitation of their taint. 

"I could never see any reason why the Entente 
Allies should not make use of this weapon of 

244 



HIS SHARE IN THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR 

propaganda behind the German lines," com- 
mented Colonel House. "The Germans have used 
precisely the same means to sap the fighting 
stamina of Russia and Italy and to try to gain 
like results in France. If they can do it, then we 
can do it. But our allies could not see the ad- 
vantage of this idea until Mr. Wilson gave a 
demonstration of it. It stands to reason that the 
German Government must be vulnerable, like 
every other Government, although perhaps not in 
so great a degree. But if we keep hammering 
away at the weak links, sooner or later they are 
going to give, and the side which breaks up from 
within is the side which will lose the war." 

Looking back over the history of the war, it is 
hard to understand how the Germans survived 
their frequent blunders. German statesmen 
have admitted to Swiss diplomats that the viola- 
tion of Belgian neutrality at the insistence of the 
military clique was the worst thing they could 
have done and may very well have cost them the 
war. The policy of frightfulness inaugurated by 
the military chiefs to cow the inhabitants of the 
occupied territory in Belgium and northern 
France likewise was deplored by the cooler heads 
at Berlin as calculated to react against Germany 
outside of Europe, while many influential Ger- 
mans condemned energetically the submarine 
warfare advocated by von Tirpitz, foreseeing the 

245 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

estrangement of the United States and the rest of 
civilize^ tion, together with Germany's best mar- 
kets in North and South America and the East. 
In a srrictly miHtary sense, the failure of the 
German high command in France in the summer 
and fall of 19 14 was paralyzing to German pride 
at the time. For a few months, the German 
morale tottered, and had it been attacked in the 
right spirit from outside must have fallen, with 
disastrous consequences to the Central Powers. 
But gradually Germany recovered, regained her 
spirits, and became endowed with the super- 
human strength of desperation — all this more 
than anything else through the series of errors 
and misfortunes which befell the Entente nations, 
some of them preventable, some of them appar- 
ently beyond the reach of human limitation. 



246 



CHAPTER XXII 

AT THE HEAD OF THE AMERICAN WAR MISSION 

DURING the summer of 1917 conditions 
abroad developed the need of closer co- 
operation between the Allies, and in September it 
was suggested that Colonel House should make a 
fourth trip to Europe. The questions which the 
Allied governments desired to confer with him 
upon included all the various elements essential 
to success against the Central Powers — food and 
fuel distribution, munitions, shipping, man- 
power, and military and naval strategy. They 
were highly technical, and Colonel House fore- 
saw that if he attempted to deal with them in 
detail he would be swamped and in the long run 
nothing would be accomplished. So he proposed 
as an alternative plan that a regular commission 
of experts in the several fields should be consti- 
tuted, with himself at the head of it, to attend 
the projected Inter-Allied War Conference at 
Paris. This was the genesis of the American 
War Mission, the first American Mission which 
ever sat in European councils. It was, in its way, 
a step in the development of our foreign policy 

247 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

no less momentous than the declaration of war 
against Germany. 

The Inter- Allied War Conference was designed 
primarily as a means to bring about greater unity 
of effort among the Allies. The pressing need 
for it was pointed with dramatic force by the 
Italian collapse in the last week of October. Ger- 
many could formulate policies and direct the war 
on all fronts from a single room in Berlin. But 
hitherto the Entente Allies had scrambled along 
as best they could, each one more or less for him- 
self, with only the most primitive machinery for 
interchanging resources and bracing the weak 
spots when they appeared. The closing events of 
191 7, no less than the Allied disasters in the past, 
were cogent arguments in favor of a closer link- 
ing of Allied endeavors. 

The President's choice of Colonel House to 
head the American Mission to the Conference 
was received with some indignation by the pro- 
fessional Republicans. Of course, the bare fact 
that Colonel House knew the European states- 
men, whom he would have to meet, better than 
any other American citizen, carried no weight at 
all with those who objected to him. He was a 
rank outsider. He did not even boast a diplo- 
matic title. He had never worn the toga of a 
Senator or possessed the privileges of the House 
of Representatives. They boiled with rage. 

248 



AT HEAD OF THE AMERICAN WAR MISSION 

Here was a man, a mere private citizen, mind 
you, being sent to confer with the Premiers of 
the great European nations. It was an insult to 
our Allies. Never mind if the British and French 
Governments would rather have House head the 
Mission, anyway. They were simply trying to 
be courteous under great provocation. It was 
intolerable that this unknown man from Texas, 
this unlettered ranchman, this mysterious Colonel, 
should receive preference over the nation's elect. 
And to say truth, there were quite a few profes- 
sional Democrats who agreed heartily, if in pri- 
vate, with their professional brethren of the op- 
posing faith. 

In the choice of the other members of the 
American Mission the professional objectors 
found other causes for complaint. Admiral W. 
S. Benson, Chief of Naval Operations, as naval 
adviser, and Gen. Tasker H. Bliss, Chief of Staff 
of the army, as military adviser, could not be 
criticised. But the objections of mediocrity or 
obscurity were raised against Oscar T. Crosby, 
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury; Vance C. 
McCormick, chairman of the War Trade Board; 
Bainbridge Colby, of the United States Shipping 
Board; Dr. Alonzo Taylor, representing the Food 
Controller; Thomas Nelson Perkins, represent- 
ing the Priority Board, Paul D. Cravath, and 
Gordon Auchincloss, as secretary of the Mission. 

249 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

Mr. Auchincloss, as it happens, is Colonel House's 
son-in-law. He is also one of the best-known of 
the younger members of the New York bar and 
an expert in international law. His services cost 
the Government nothing. 

It was even alleged that the Democrats had 
gobbled the entire personnel of the Mission, and 
that there was not a single Republican member. 
It is true that in selecting his assistants Colonel 
House had given no thought to their political 
creeds, but when this talk reached his ears, after 
their arrival in London, he made a quiet canvass, 
which disclosed that of the nine ranking mem- 
bers, including himself, four were Democrats, 
four were Republicans, and one a Progressive, a 
very fair distribution, although unpremeditated. 
The fact is that the members of the American 
Mission were chosen with great care, not for their 
political repute or experience, but for their ability 
in the several lines of policy which were to be 
settled. The results of the Mission — perhaps the 
most successful of its kind which the United 
States has ever sent abroad — amply vindicated 
his judgment. 

The Mission left the United States on October 
27 and arrived in London on November 6, and 
promptly began a series of conferences and con- 
sultations with members of the British Govern- 
ment. Colonel House had mapped out his pro- 

250 



AT HEAD OF THE AMERICAN WAR MISSION 

gram of work so as to insure the maximum 
amount of all-round efficiency. In the first place, 
he barred talking altogether. The Mission was 
there to work, not to orate. In the second place, 
he urged the members not to go out to entertain- 
ments. He, himself, set the example, by rigidly 
avoiding all public entertainments and confining 
himself to a few private luncheons and dinners 
with King George, Premier Lloyd George, and 
other leaders, at which, as a rule, as much busi- 
ness was worked through as in a committee meet- 
ing. In the third place, he arranged that the dif- 
ferent experts of the Mission should deal direct 
with their opposites of the British Government, 
and that in every case only the men immediately 
interested in a problem should handle it. This 
was to prevent useless debating. 

*'Ten or twelve men around a table take so 
much longer to decide a question than three or 
four," says Colonel House. "If you can, always 
reduce your work to sub-committees. The smaller 
the number of men handling a proposition, the 
more direct are the results obtained." 

The quiet, modest efficiency with which the 
Mission tackled the jobs awaiting it in London 
made a genuine impression upon British senti- 
ment and spoke louder for American earnestness 
and determination than could whole pages of 
speeches. Of the effect produced by Colonel 

251 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

House's tactics, a dispatch to the New York 
Times remarked : 

"Never in history has any foreigner come to 
Europe and found greater acceptance or wielded 
more power. Behind this super-Ambassador, 
whose authority and activities are unique, stands 
the President, now rated in Europe as the world's 
greatest living statesman, and behind the Presi- 
dent stands the country, whose measureless re- 
sources and unshakable will are counted a sure 
shield against the successful sweep of Prussian- 
ism." 

The original date set for the convening of the 
Inter- Allied War Conference was November i6, 
but it was necessary to postpon - it twice. When 
the American Mission reached London, Premier 
Lloyd George was absent in Italy, whither he had 
gone with Premier Painleve of France and the 
French and British military chiefs to do what he 
could to repair the shattered Italian armies. It 
will be remembered that it was in the course of 
this visit of the British and French Premiers to 
Italy that at a conference held at Rapallo an 
agreement was entered into by the British, 
French, and Italian Governments for the setting 
up of a Supreme War Council, which would sit 
at Versailles and exercise a general supervision 
over the conduct of the war on all fronts. 

This measure was hailed with enthusiasm in 
252 




ENTRANCE TO DEVONSHIRE HOUSE. LONDON 

Placed at the disposal of Colonel House by the British Government on the occasion of his 
visit to London in November. 1917, at the head of the American War JNIission. 



AT HEAD OF THE AMERICAN WAR MISSION 

France, where the evils of divided command had 
been felt for some time, and it was equally ac- 
ceptable to the Administration in Washington. 
Both the French Government and our own had 
come to the conclusion that unity of command was 
as necessary as unity of effort and distribution 
of resources. In other words, the time had come 
when the Entente Allies must reconcile them- 
selves to pooling armies, more or less, as they 
were undertaking to pool ships, coal, and food. 
But the idea aroused intense and bitter opposition 
in many quarters in England. It became ap- 
parent that Premier Lloyd George might find it 
difficult to remain in office if he countenanced 
England's participation in such a plan, with its 
implied subordination of British armies to alien 
commanders. 

On November i8. Colonel House let it be 
known in London that he had received a cable- 
gram from the President, stating emphatically 
that the United States Government considereTl 
unity of plan and control between the Allies and 
the United States to be essential in order to 
achieve a just and permanent peace. On the same 
day it was announced that the President had 
asked Colonel House to attend the first meeting 
of the Supreme War Council, with General Bliss 
as his military adviser. On the next day, when 
the onslaught was made upon Lloyd George by 

253 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

his opponents in the House of Commons, the Brit- 
ish Premier was able to satisfy all objections by 
pointing to the favorable opinion of the United 
States regarding the new plan of unified military 
control. 

But there came very near being a Cabinet crisis 
in London notwithstanding the President's cable. 
Through an oversight the statement disclosing 
the receipt of the cable was not given to one news 
agency in London, and this agency, for reasons 
which suited itself, in the afternoon of Novem- 
ber 19 issued a dispatch from Washington which 
asserted that the President had denied sending 
any such cable to Colonel House. This dispatch 
only appeared in two London evening papers, but 
that was enough to let loose the enemies of the 
Supreme War Council plan. 

As it happened, Colonel House had intended 
the next day, November 20, to attend the formal 
conference of the American Mission with the 
members of the British War Cabinet in the Cab- 
inet Room at No. 10 Downing Street, the historic 
official residence of the British Prime Minister. 
But the uproar created by the false dispatch from 
Washington occupied all his time that day, and 
instead of attending the conference he was 
obliged to interview and reassure an endless 
string of newspaper proprietors, ministers, mem- 
bers of Parliament and anxious friends. To all 

254 



AT HEAD OF THE AMERICAN WAR MISSION 

he gave the same counsel : wait twenty- four hours 
until we can hear from Washington, He knew 
very well that the faked report would be denied, 
but he admits that he has passed few more stren- 
uous intervals of twenty-four hours. 

The true reason for his absence from the con- 
ference in Downing Street was not known at the 
time, and in order to account for it a humorous 
story was circulated that he had stayed away be- 
cause he dreaded having to play up as oratorical 
opposite of Lloyd George, a spell-binder of the 
dynamic Roosevelt type. As it happens, this is 
not true. Colonel House is accustomed to speak- 
ing at small gatherings of men, when straight- 
from-the-shoulder words are required. He does 
it all the time, did it again and again during his 
last trip abroad. He was quite prepared to speak 
in Downing Street, but it is to be doubted if he 
would have orated. 

' Oratory, as distinct from plain speaking, is a 
luxury which the Colonel has always denied him- 
self. He doesn't like it. More, he is convinced 
past argument that he is a failure at it. It is 
repugnant to the innate distaste for attracting 
public notice which is one of the foundation stones 
of his character. He has been known to "orate" 
only once, and that was two weeks later, when 
the Inter-Allied Conference broke up in Paris, 
and Premier Clemenceau requested him as a spe- 

255 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

cial favor to nake a little speech to the delegates, 
alleging the good effects it would have upon 
France, worn and battered by her tragic three 
years' journey on the Via Dolorosa. 

''I couldn't help it," Colonel House said almost 
plaintively afterward. ''There wasn't any way 
to get out of it." 

Of course, as long as he had to do it, he did it 
well. And inasmuch as it is the only real speech 
he ever made, it is justifiable to quote it here, 
especially as it is as direct and to the point as a 
sword-thrust. People who heard it reported that 
it was received with enthusiasm, but the people 
to whom it meant most, after all, were the mil- 
lions who read it in the newspapers and who were 
impressed by a few words from this silent man 
as they would not have been by reams of verbiage 
from another. All that he said was this : 

"M. Clemenceau, the President of the French 
Council, in welcoming the delegates to this con- 
ference, declared that we had met to work. His 
words were prophetic. There has been coordina- 
tion and unity of purpose which promised great 
results for the future. It is my deep conviction 
that by unity and by concentrated effort we shall 
be able to arrive at the goal which we have set 
out to reach. 

"In behalf of my colleagues, I want to avail 
myself of this occasion to thank the officials of 

256 



AT HEAD OF THE AMERICAN WAR MISSION 

the French Government and through them the 
French people for the warm welcome and great 
consideration they have shown us. In coming to 
France we have felt that we have come to the 
house of our friends. Ever since our Govern-, 
ment was founded there has been a bond of inter- 
est and sympathy between us — a sympathy which 
this war has fanned into a passionate admira- 
tion. 

"The history of France is a history of courage 
and sacrifice. Therefore the great deeds which 
have illuminated the last three years have come 
as no surprise to us of America. We knew that 
when called upon, France would rise to splendid 
achievement and would add new luster to her 
name. ' 

"America salutes France and her heroic sons, 
and feels honored to fight by the side of so gal- 
lant a comrade." 

Probably the greatest diplomatic success of 
Colonel House's career up to that time was the 
conduct of the Inter-Allied War Conference at 
Paris. As originally forecast it was a somewhat 
clumsy gathering of delegates of all the Allied 
nations, a dozen or fifteen of them, comprising 
150 individuals. It was necessary to devise a 
method of procedure which would permit the 
accomplishment of the greatest possible amount 
of work in the limited time a»vailable. In a 

257 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

gathering of this character, Colonel House knew 
from experience that there was a constant 
temptation to talk. In fact, many of the dele- 
gates had come primed with elaborate speeches 
setting forth what their countries had achieved 
in the war. Quietly and without any ostentation, 
Colonel House set out to thwart the orators and 
clear the decks of the Conference for a business- 
like schedule of work. 

The Conference finally met in Paris on No- 
vember 29, having been postponed a second time 
by the downfall of the Painleve Ministry and the 
interval required to form and organize the new 
Cabinet of M. Clemenceau. By a strange coinci- 
dence, the last editorial which Clemenceau wrote 
for his newspaper, U Homme Libre ^ before tak- 
ing office, was an appreciative discussion of a 
statement issued by House upon his arrival in 
England, in which House had made the point that 
his mission had come to work, not to talk. Upon 
his arrival in Paris, Colonel House mentioned 
this to M. Clemenceau, and was delighted to find 
that the French Premier was still in complete 
agreement with him on this theory. 

He suggested to M. Clemenceau the same 
methods which he had practiced so successfully 
in London — the same methods which he had used 
in Texas politics. Oratory was arbitrarily ruled 
out. There were an opening speech by M. Cle- 
menceau and two closing speeches, one by M. 

258 



AT HEAD OF THE AMERICAN WAR MISSION 

Clemenceau and one by Colonel House, himself 
— perhaps that was the way the disappointed ora- 
tors got back at the Colonel. Otherwise, the dele- 
gates worked. They were divided up into com- 
mittees and sub-committees, dealing each with a 
specific subject or some phase of a specific sub- 
ject. In the words of Lord Northcliffe, who was 
one of the British delegates : 

"Colonel House had reduced the vast assem- 
blage of Allied nations to a series of small busi- 
ness committees, and thus hot air was entirely 
eliminated at the start. I cannot reveal the con- 
ference secrets, but when I looked at the gilded 
chamber where it first met, and realized that 
every man was loaded with a speech, my heart 
went out in gratitude to the wise Colonel, who 
had dammed the flood. As it was. Premier Cle- 
menceau, in his opening address, took less than 
two minutes, and soon our meeting broke up and 
everybody settled to work." 

As a matter of fact, the first meetmg of the 
Conference lasted about half an hour, just long 
enough to map out the program of the commit- 
tees. 

After attending the first meeting of the Su- 
preme War Council at Versailles with General 
Bliss, and helping to pave the way for the later 
evolution by which centralized staflF command of 

259 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

the Allied armies and the formation of an inter- 
Allied reserve army or mass of maneuver, to use 
the French technical phrase, were brought about, 
Colonel House visited the American army in 
France and spent several days with General Per- 
shing. He was back in New York on December 
15, some six weeks after his departure, with a 
tremendous achievement to his credit and a clear- 
cut outline of the needs of the situation for the 
President. 

At home, the results of the Mission's labors 
were the speeding up of essential war work, the 
centralization of effort in those fields demanding 
priority, and a concrete realization of the out- 
standing requirements of our Allies : 

( 1 ) Food. 

(2) Shipping. 

(3) American troops as fast as they could be 
trained and equipped. 

Abroad, the result of the Mission's visit was 
to hearten the peoples of the Allied nations, to 
convince the Allied Governments of our purpose 
and to establish definitely the most efficient means 
of waging the war. It marked an end to the era 
of fighting in the dark. Henceforth the Allied 
efifort was to be directed intelligently and with 
full knowledge of the circumstances attending 
every move and policy, the might and resources 

260 



AT HEAD OF THE AMERICAN WAR MISSION 

of the several nations being swung as one gigantic 
club against the enemy. 

The cost of this Mission to the United States 
Government was $12,000. 



261 



CHAPTER XXIII 

PREPARING FOR THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

IN September, 191 7, the President appointed 
Colonel House to organize the laborious task 
of gathering and tabulating the mass of data 
which will be required by the American delegates 
to the Peace Conference at the end of the war. 
His intercourse with foreign governments and 
statesmen had convinced Colonel House that 
when the final peace conference came — as come 
it must, no matter how dark may be the imme- 
diate horizon — the American delegates should be 
in a position to match wits on equal terms with 
the leading diplomats of Europe. Also, he knew 
that for two years and more European chancel- 
leries had been at work collecting information on 
the moot points which would have to be settled, 
and had so much the start on the United States, 
wholly aside from the fact that every European 
country, including Germany and Austria, pos- 
sessed diplomats whose knowledge of world pol- 
itics, through long training and experience, was 
superior to that possessed by American states- 
men, who, very naturally, had never had occasion 

262 



PREPARING FOR THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

to familiarize themselves with the ethnic, geo- 
graphical, or commercial problems of Europe and 
Asia, or the conflicting colonial claims of the 
white races in Africa. 

"The theory of this undertaking," Colonel 
House said, in outlining his preparations for 
peace, **is that it is better to be in a position to 
view intelligently what you are trying to do, than 
to be obliged to jump blindfolded. In any con- 
ference the people come oflf best who are most 
thoroughly equipped, who hold the highest cards 
in the way of knowledge of what they are about. 
It is our intention that the American delegates 
to the peace conference shall be so equipped. We 
shall endeavor to supply them with all the infor- 
mation they may require, even regarding points 
in which it is quite probable that the United 
States may take no active interest. It is always 
advisable to understand thoroughly what is going 
on, although you may not be directly concerned in 
the event 

"The fact that this work is going forward does 
not mean that we anticipate peace soon, or at any 
definite date. It may be this year, or next year, 
or the year after that. The governments of our 
Allies began this work of preparation long ago, 
when peace was even more remote than it is to- 
day. You might describe our attitude as the re- 
verse of the old saying, 'In time of peace prepare 

263 



THE RE.\L COLONEL HOUSE 

for war.* \\'e are preparing in time of war for 
peace." 

Before Colonel House went to Europe in Oc- 
tober to attend the Inter- Allied Conference, and 
the tirst sitting of the Supreme War Council, at 
\'ersailles. he had the work of his peace inquiry 
well under way. The scheme adopted was to 
unite the ablest minds in the countr}- under the 
direction of an Executive Committee, and a few 
specialists, in different fields, who. in turn, were 
directly super\-ised by Colonel House himself. 
Bv this arransrement he was relieved of the bur- 
den of details, and could devote himself to the 
high lights of the undertaking. 

He found that individuals, societies, univer- 
sities, and colleges were glad to cooperate with 
him, and those persons and institutions possess- 
ing the necessan,' funds eagerly volunteered to 
defray the expenses of whatever work they were 
given to do. The faculties and research ma- 
chinery of practically every important higher in- 
stitution of learning, the Library- of Congress, the 
New York Public Librar}-, the American Geo- 
graphical Societ}-, and the National Board for 
Historical Ser\-ice, with many other similar or- 
ganizations, were placed at his disposal. 

The Executive Committee is headed by Dr. 
Mezes, president of the College of the City of 
New York, and brother-in-law of Colonel House, 

264 



PREP-\RI\G FOR THE PEACE COVFEREXCE 

as director, with \\'alter Lippman, lormerly one 
of the editors of the Xew Republic, and writer on 
international topics, as secretar\-. Colonel House 
is particularly fortunate in having Dr. Mezes 
available as his right-hand man. Besides being a 
scholar of great attainments and wide range of 
leafming, especially in history', economics, and 
international relations, Dr. Mezes has the pe- 
culiar distinction of standing toward Gjlonel 
House in precisely the same relation which Colo- 
nel House occupies with the President In other 
words, his mind works along the same lines. He 
sees things in the same perspective. Colonel 
House can ask him to do something, and be 
sure that in Dr. Mezes's hands the work will have 
the same treatment as he wotlld give it himself. 
\\'hen Colonel House went to Europe the last 
time he was able to leave the super^-ision of the 
newly-created inqtiin.- in charge of his brother- 
in-law, without worr\-ing over the possible mis- 
takes in polio.- or distortion of his intentions. He 
could have placed such confidence in no other 
individual. 

The research consultant of the Executive Com- 
mittee is Prof. James T. Shotwell, professor of 
histor\-, at Columbia University.-, author of "The 
Religious Revolution of To-day," assistant gen- 
eral editor of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, and 
editor of "Records of Ci\-ilization, Sources and 

265 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

Studies." The gathering of material on territorial 
questions is in charge of Dr. Isaiah Bowman, the 
geographer. Prof. A. A. Young, ex-director of 
research of the War Trade Board, is in charge of 
investigations in international economies. Ques- 
tions in international law are handled by D. H. 
Miller, of the New York Bar, assisted by many 
others. It would be impossible to give a com- 
plete list of all the scientists, trade experts, stu- 
dents, and scholars who are combining in this 
work, most of them without any remuneration 
from the Government. 

The first aim has been to do the work well. 
The second has been to do it inexpensively. In 
this respect, it may be said that, thanks to the 
whole-hearted cooperation w^hich has been ex- 
tended to the Government by universities and so- 
cieties, the net expense will be negligible. 

For example, the services of the American 
Geographical Society's expert map-makers have 
been placed at the disposal of the inquiry, a fa- 
cility of the utmost importance. When the Amer- 
ican delegates go to the peace conference they 
will take with them an immense assortment of 
maps illustrating every phase of the territorial, 
economic, and ethnologic problems at stake. They 
will be able to turn at need, say, to Map X4, de- 
picting racial distribution in Bessarabia, and see 
the exact proportion of the Rumanian, Jewish, 

266 



PREPARING FOR THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

and Slavonic stocks, and how they are dispersed 
geographically. Or they can ask for Map Y2 and 
find the areas of land suitable for white coloniza- 
tion in equatorial Africa. Of course, both these 
instances are purely imaginary, but they show the 
system, and how it will work in application. 

Besides maps and charts, investigators have ac- 
cumulated quantities of data on every subject 
which might be considered within the purview of 
the peace conference, and an elaborate card-index 
will permit the ready consultation of the mine of 
information by American delegates who may wish 
to ascertain the conditions in a given tract of ter- 
ritory, regarding which a difference of opinion 
exists. This means that the American repre- 
sentatives will not be obliged to depend upon in- 
formation from any other delegation, be it from 
an allied nation or an enemy nation, in reaching 
an opinion on any subject. Complete independ- 
ence of outlook is thus assured to our representa- 
tives, without the sacrifice of intelligence or 
breadth of vision. 

The most difficult part of the undertaking was 
the necessity of having all the data mobilized, so 
that the facts and figures regarding any region 
or question could be pulled out from the total and 
brought to bear on any phase of that particular 
region or question, in order to give an exact pic- 
ture of it, not only in so far as that one point was 

267 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

concerned, but as it was related to adjoining coun- 
tries and problems. This difficulty was met by 
making the basis of calculation the least unit of 
Government, corresponding to the American 
county, whatever it was called and however ad- 
ministered. These counties or primary units are 
listed separately in each area under discussion, 
and the data dealing with them can be obtained 
at once, either separately for each unit or alto- 
gether for the entire region. 

Colonel House and his assistants have ap- 
proached this big proposition in the spirit of 
modern research and scholarly efficiency. They 
have left nothing to chance. They quarter every 
field of speculation and analyze each contested 
subject from every side. No country has gone at 
the problem of preparing for peace in such a 
whole-souled, open-minded mood. Foreign gov- 
ernments, no matter how pure their motives, have 
some pet hobbies and secret ambitions mingled 
with their war aims, and they are inclined to 
stress these in laying their foundations for peace. 
But the United States is going to the peace con- 
ference without a single selfish motive. The 
President is just as determined to secure justice 
for Germany as he is for Belgium, but he is going 
to be in a position to form his own judgment of 
Germany's rights and not have to depend upon 
the Kaiser's delegates. 

268 



PREPARING FOR THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

The only ambition of the United States is to 
help in rearranging the world's affairs so that 
war will be made impossible — or so difficult and 
expensive that the most arrogant nation will hesi- 
tate ever again to resort to the sword. And as a 
means to its end, the representatives of the United 
States must be acquainted with all the questions 
which will come up for discussion, whether the 
United States expects to have anything to say 
about them, or not — because it stands to reason 
that unless the Government knows all there is to 
know about a question it will be impossible to 
decide whether we should speak about it. 

When Colonel House and his assistants had 
determined the main outlines of their work, they 
turned to concrete problems. To begin with, they 
decided that there were certain regions of ur- 
gency, presenting questions of pressing impor- 
tance, the evidence regarding which should be 
collected as rapidly as possible. For one thing, 
there was Alsace-Lorraine. The peace investi- 
gators have made a painstaking study of the en- 
tire subject of Alsace and Lorraine, in their rela- 
tion to France and to Germany. 

Elaborate records and statistics of the popula- 
tion have been accumulated, indicating the pro- 
portion of French and German inhabitants in the 
two provinces, in the communes, in the rural and 
in the urban districts; the proportions in which 

269 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

;French and German, respectively, are spoken; 
and the records of elections, with regard to the 
demonstration therein of the spirit of independ- 
ence; the movement of trade and commerce dur- 
ing association with France and after the annexa- 
tion to Germany. The result is an orderly array 
of facts on practically every aspect of the history 
of Alsace-Lorraine, and on the treatment of like 
questions in the past. 

Of , the regions of urgency, probably none pre- 
sents more difficulties in the way of settlement 
than that comprising the lands between the Per- 
sian Gulf and the Baltic Sea. There, where the 
Germans are trying to rear a row of barrier 
states, subordinate to themselves economically 
and acting as buffers to ward off the newly- 
awakened spirit of Russian liberalism, where 
Turkey is endeavoring to wrest back the lands of 
Armenia, Georgia, and the Caucasus conquered 
from her by Russia, a myriad of vexed problems, 
submerged racial desires, national antipathies, re- 
ligious animosities, and fruits of bygone oppres- 
sions are lying in wait to trip the unwary states- 
man. There, where Germany's new ambitions lie, 
the astute and unscrupulous diplomats of Berlin 
will make their bitterest fight for dominance, in 
the hope that their wrecked commercial empire in 
the west may be built up anew on a Russia and 
Turkey economically enslaved. American states- 

270 



PREPARING FOR THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

men know very little about this part of the world, 
and the data Colonel House's inquiry will have 
ready for them should be of the greatest value. 
It will put them in a position to check up on every 
statement made in their presence. 

A second region of urgency is the Central 
African Colonial area. The conquest of Ger- 
many's enormous African territories is one of the 
minor trump cards held by the Entente Allies. 
Public opinion in England and France seems to 
be divided on the question of returning these 
lands after the war, if the Allies win and can dic- 
tate their own terms. In British South Africa, 
the idea of retaining at least German South West 
Africa is openly advocated, and in some quarters 
it has been hinted that an order to return the 
lands won by General Smuts would be disobeyed. 
Although the United States has no commercial 
or political stake in Africa, this problem certainly 
will exert a big influence at the final settlement, 
and it will be necessary for the representatives of 
the United States to be able to judge of the value 
of the conflicting statements and claims which 
will be put forward. So Colonel House's assist- 
ants are studying the entire question of the Cen- 
tral African colonies, French, Belgian, Portu- 
guese, and British, as well as German, the climate 
of different sections, the products, the native 
tribes, the past conduct of the white governments 

271 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

towards their charges, the possibilities for white 
colonization, the circumstances of settlement and 
so forth. 

Still another important subject of study is the 
economic needs of the Central Powers. The Teu- 
tonic Allies may be relied upon to make a plea for 
special consideration, in view of their sufferings 
in the war, and to attempt to cast responsibility 
for the struggle on their enemies by alleging eco- 
nomic repression in the past. The delegates of 
the United States will be provided with full sta- 
tistics covering a period of years, showing the 
various economic needs of Germany and Austria- 
Hungary, how they may be satisfied and the exact 
amount of their natural resources which must be 
supplemented from outside. 

The freedom of the seas is the fifth question 
which is occupying the inquiry's attention. This 
truly momentous problem, upon which may very 
well depend the future peace of the world, is be- 
ing examined from every angle of law, commerce, 
and history. The researches of the peace investi- 
gation will enable the American delegates to pre- 
sent the case for the well-known theories of the 
United States with weight and precision. 

The claims of the Jews in Palestine; the age- 
old struggle of the rival Slav nationalities in the 
Balkans; the fate of the Czecho-Slavs, Slovaks, 
Dalmatians, Italians, and other subject races of 



PREPARING FOR THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

Austria; the Rumanian lands held by the Dual 
Monarchy; the future of Poland and Greece; 
Arabia, and the subject races of Turkey — these 
are some of the matters regarding which the ex- 
perts of Colonel House's Committee are inquir- 
ing at length, with patience and resource. All the 
plans which have been put forward at one time or 
another for the prevention of war have been 
placed under examination, with a view to ascer- 
taining their practicability or usefulness, with due 
emphasis upon the rival claims of a w^orld 
court or an international league of peace, or 
any other scheme for enforcing the standards of 
civilization. 

"It is not that we are trying to find a way to 
peace," said Colonel House, "or to settle off-hand 
the difficulties of the world. We are simply try- 
ing to lay the basis for our country's share in 
ending the war on terms which will be so fair and 
equitable that they will leave a minimum of heart- 
burnings and jealousies to disturb the genera- 
tions which will come after us." 



^n 



CHAPTER XXIV 

HIS ESTIMATE OF PRESIDENT WILSON 

COLONEL HOUSE has the reputation of 
being phlegmatic and reserved. Nothing 
could be further from the truth. Those who 
really know him agree that he is unusually warm- 
hearted and emotional in temperament. He is 
easily stirred to enthusiasm, for instance, in dis- 
cussing Woodrow Wilson. He regards the Presi- 
dent as the greatest living statesman in the world, 
the foremost exponent of progress in this genera- 
tion, a ruler who will be linked in American his- 
tory with Washington and Lincoln. He thinks, 
too, that Americans have not yet come to a clear 
realization of Mr. Wilson's greatness, which has 
grown — and is still growing — to keep pace with 
the demands made upon the President, demands 
such as no President ever had to meet. Perhaps 
the nearest approximation to the situation which 
confronted Mr. Wilson in the first two years of 
the war was the plight of the infant republic in 
the days of Washington's Administration, when 
the British on one side and the French on the 
other strove to force American participation in 
the war against the Directorate. 

274 



HIS ESTIMATE OF PRESIDENT WILSON 

Washington, with Hamilton's cool brain be- 
hind him, contrived to steer a skillful course 
amidst all the shoals and traps set by the con- 
flicting forces surrounding him, and in spite of 
the intrigues of his fellow-countrymen was able 
to avoid the reefs of disaster which inevitably 
must have wrecked the Republic's hopes had he 
suffered it to be compromised in the concerns of 
Europe. 

Wilson, like Washington, was hampered by in- 
trigue, by the apathy of the masses, by treachery, 
by covert sedition, by partisan politics, and by 
deluded fools. One is tempted to compare him to 
Washington also in the austere remoteness of his 
character, in the lack of understanding which met 
his early efforts. Again, in Colonel House he had 
a trusted adviser, as Washington had in Hamil- 
ton, essentially opposed though these two ad- 
visers may be in their attitude toward popular 
government. But there is this difference in 
the two situations : instead of the feeble, sprawl- 
ing nation of 3,000,000 souls that Washington 
ruled, Mr. Wilson had behind him 100,000,000, 
and once public sentiment was welded in the 
crucible fires lit by German lawlessness, the mil- 
lions became a unit for the defence of liberty 
and civilization, with the might to impose their 
will on all who opposed them. 

One of the most persistent fables concerning 
275 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

the relationship between the President and Colo- 
nel House depicts House as an acquiescent indi- 
vidual whose influence is based upon his capacity 
for agreeing with the Presidential decisions. As 
a man of supreme independence and pugnacious 
adherence to his own views, nothing galls Colonel 
House more than this. 

"I know people say I have the faculty of always 
agreeing with the President," he says. ''They say 
I find out what he wants to hear and then say it 
to him. That is ridiculous. How long do you 
suppose I — or anybody else — would last with a 
man like Woodrow Wilson, if I played the part 
of echo? And if all that the President wanted 
was a man who would agree with him, who would 
be his echo, he could find ten, a hundred, or a 
thousand men, more agreeable personally than L, 
It is preposterous to suppose that a man of the 
President's disposition would tolerate an ac- 
quaintance based on such conditions. The person 
who gives heed to gossip of this kind confesses 
his ignorance of the President's character. 

"It is true that we do not disagree very often, 
because our minds run parallel on most subjects, 
but we have disagreed in the past and we still 
disagree on some subjects. I do not think w^e 
have ever failed to think alike on anything of 
great importance, but if we should I would not 
hesitate to say so, and I am sure the President 

276 




• V^jfjji,;^!^ 



THE LATEST PICTURE OF COLONEL HOUSE WITH THE 
PRESIDENT, TAKEN SEPTEMBER, 1917, AT COLONEL HOUSE's 
SUMMER HOME AT MAGNOLIA, MASS. 



HIS ESTIMATE OF PRESIDENT WILSON 

would expect me to. He would have very little 
respect for the opinions of a man who was not 
willing to abide by his own judgment. 

"1 never argue with the President when we 
disagree, any more than with any other man, be- 
yond a certain point. When we have talked a 
matter over and we find that we are opposed upon 
it, I drop it — unless and until I come across some 
new piece of evidence to support my views. A 
great deal of time is lost in useless argument. If 
two men, each reasoning conscientiously from the 
same basis of facts, reach conflicting viewpoints, 
then it is usually impossible to dissuade one or 
other of them without the development of new 
facts or of some eventuality from the facts pre- 
viously known. This is a general theory of 
conduct." 

In this, as in all similar misapprehensions, 
Colonel House is exercised not over what is said 
about himself, but over the distortion of the 
President's personality in the popular mind. He 
eflfaces himself absolutely where the President is 
concerned. The end he set for himself, when he 
first became Mr. Wilson's friend, was to do all 
that he could to assist Mr. Wilson in the working 
out of the policies which both of them felt the 
country needed. Personal credit was the last 
thing Colonel House desired. It is something 
which means nothing to him now. The only rea- 

277 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

son why he permits any disclosures about him- 
self and the part he has taken in contemporary 
events is his belief that no opportunity should be 
given to opponents of the Administration to at- 
tack the President through him. 

His estimate of Mr. Wilson is summed up in 
these words : 

"He is a wonderful man. Think of a man with 
his equipment, his brain, his learning, his ideas, 
being President! All his life he had been de- 
veloping his mind, schooling himself in theoreti- 
cal problems of government, studying the prece- 
dents of the past. At the end of that time, still 
in the full possession of his powers, rugged ia 
health, with his mind open and his eyes un- 
dimmed, he was given the opportunity to write 
a new chapter in the world's affairs. I have never 
entirely recovered from my surprise that he 
should have been elected. It has always seemed 
too good to be true. But it is only fair to say that 
it is a vindication of popular government and the 
discrimination of the individual voter. 

"Sometimes early in his first term, the Presi- 
dent was uneasy, for he was and is very humble 
in his heart. But I always knew that he had 
nothing to worry about. I was sure that he 
would make a lasting impression upon the history 
of the country and the world. He will, too, 
and before he retires from public life, I look 

278 



HIS ESTIMATE OF PRESIDENT WILSON 

to see this judgment accepted, not only by the 
great majority of his fellow-citizens, but by the 
world at large. 

"Woodrow Wilson has that rare combination 
of ideas and judgment, with fearlessness of the 
politicians, that is worth everything else there is. 
Few leaders have ever dared to take that stand, 
and that is why he has been so successful. From 
the start his policy was, never mind the politi- 
cians, play to the people. It was his own idea; 
nobody had to suggest it to him. He had been 
doing it in New Jersey, before he was elected 
President. It was in him — the vision to see that 
true leadership consisted in 'talking direct to the 
people,' as he put it, himself. Any leader who 
has the courage to disregard the politicians can- 
not help succeeding. 

"Personally, he is one of the most fascinating 
men I have ever met, a great thinker, a great doer, 
a great gentleman. 

"You know, there are two kinds of men who 
lead. In one class you find the man of action, 
endowed with the animal magnetism which bends 
other men to accept his will. Give the man of 
this type an idea, and he can drive it to accom-" 
plishment; but he, himself, is never a man of 
vision. He cannot see any farther than the goal 
he has set himself for immediate attainment. It 
is strange how these men of brute force compel 

279 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

the obedience of men of far greater intellectual 
powers. I have seen one such man by sheer 
physical force dominate a group of men which 
contained several who were incomparably his su- 
periors intellectually. Mr. Wilson is in the other 
class, the class of men, limited in numbers, who 
combine driving power, magnetism, and vigor 
with vision. 

i "Where the President excels is in his union of 
the capabilities of the dreamer, the seer, and the 
man of action. He can study the future and con- 
ceive great plans of economic and social better- 
ment, and then he can undertake to make his 
vision real. Such a union of powers is seldom 
seen. Men of this type are almost never put in 
positions where they can work for the good of 
mankind. But the chance came to Mr. Wilson, 
and he has turned it to an advantage, w^iich is 
little understood even now. Only in later genera- 
tions, when his policies are seen through the per- 
spective of time, will there be an adequate percep- 
tion of the debt the world owes him. 

*'In Europe, they recognized him long ago as 
the greatest constructive statesman of our age, a 
man whose eyes peer far into the clouded future, 
whose actions are freed of the clinging pettinesses 
of convention. He has been named by the for- 
ward-moving nations as the chief advocate of 
civilization, and he has won their support by force 

280 



HIS ESTIMATE OF PRESIDENT WILSON 

of intellect alone. I think there never was an 
instance of a man who obtained such universal 
respect by the righteousness of his actions. It is 
as comforting a sign of the inherent sanity and 
health of civilization as his election and reelection 
were of the independence and liberalism of Amer- 
icans. 

"Here at home, I fear, there have been some 
who doubted his honesty of purpose. I am not 
speaking now of the professional politicians, or 
that small class who viewed with jealousy any 
step for the protection of the rights of the many, 
as contrasted with the privileges of the few. I 
mean men high-souled and honorable, honestly 
doubting, themselves. To such w^e can only say : 
'Look carefully over the President's every act. 
Examine every policy. Consider the many-sided 
aspects of the problems he had to solve. Then 
judge if he ever acted other than as he sincerely 
believed to be for the well-being of all concerned.' 
If they are not convinced, we can say no more. 
The cards are on the table. And the whole trend 
of history so far has upheld the President's 
course. 

"I know he has been assailed for his attitude 
toward business. There have never been more 
unjust attacks or more wicked perversions of the 
truth. Ever since he was elected, Mr. Wilson has 
been the firm friend of honest business — yes, and 

281 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

of Big Business. He was the first President who 
ever came out and said that he held nothing 
against Big Business, if Big Business was con- 
ducted as honestly as Little Business. He would 
not subscribe to abuse of large corporations sim- 
ply because they were large corporations. His 
unfailing test for any enterprise was the justness 
and probity of its conduct. He has been the first 
President to come out and speak for the railroads. 
When the railroads were suffering most, he had 
the courage to approve publicly of their need for 
higher rates — something no other President had 
done. Legitimate business has nothing to fear 
from him. On the contrary it has everything to 
thank him for. He secured the enactment of the 
first adequate banking and currency laws the 
country ever had, laws which will prevent the oc- 
currence of disastrous and causeless financial 
panics such as have crippled business at intervals 
in the past. It seems to me the record shows that 
Mr. Wilson has been just as much the friend of 
honest business, whether big or little, as he has 
been the friend of the working man. 

"For myself, though, I like best to think of him 
as the man, rather than the President. My asso- 
ciation with him has been something that I shall 
look back upon, if I live, with pride and without 
a single regret. He has been kind, loyal, and 
unselfish. I said before that he is a great gentle- 

282 



HIS ESTIMATE OF PRESIDENT WILSON 

man. He is the greatest, I think, I have ever 
known. And with it all, he has the power to 
reach the minds and souls of multitudes. He has 
political intuition of the highest order, and an 
imagination which enables him to know, in spite 
of the seclusion of office, what ordinary men and 
women are thinking and feeling. 

"His courtesy is instinctive. His first thought 
is always for the welfare of his friends. He is 
stanch in supporting any one he knows. You 
might select plenty of instances in the events of 
the last five years to prove this. One of the surest 
ways to make him stick by a man is to attack that 
man. And the beautiful thing about his friend- 
ship is that he never advertises it. He has done 
things for me, gone to my defence when he 
thought I was wronged, without ever speaking a 
word to me about it. The only way in which I 
learned of his help was by a chance word from 
some one else or indirectly after a long time had 
passed. 

"He is always solicitous about my health, 
always reluctant to place new work in my hands, 
for fear that it may be over-burdening me, always 
cautioning me not to undertake any more than I 
deem myself able to do without strain. In little 
things he is equally solicitous. The last time I 
went to the theater with him, some people in the 
box in front of us moved back, evidently because 

283 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

they thought they might interfere with the Presi- 
dent's view of the stage. He was quick to per- 
ceive this, and instantly he leaned over and 
begged the party to move their chairs to the front 
of the box, assuring them that he was not incon- 
venienced. 

"To me the inspiring thing about him is that 
he has no petty side. He is big every way you 
look at him. He is so big that he is willing to 
take help from others — and that is a true test of 
greatness. He has been the most successful po- 
litical leader the Democratic party ever had. 
More than that, he has been the most successful 
leader the American people ever had, and I know 
that millions of Republicans will support that 
assertion. It was fortunate for America, for- 
tunate for civilization, that Woodrow Wilson was 
elected in 1912." 

I The friendship between the two Is as complete 
as it is unquestioning. Periodically there are re- 
ports that the President has broken with Colonel 
House or that Colonel House has refused to en- 
dorse some policy of Mr. Wilson's; but there has 
never been the slightest foundation for these 
statements. They always come towards the end 
of the summer, when Colonel House has been 
driven by the heat to suspend his visits to 
Washington, and he and the President have not 
met for several months. The last story of this 

284 



HIS ESTIMATE OF PRESIDENT WILSON 

kind appeared in September, 191 7, and to the 
Boston reporter who rushed to Colonel House's 
summer home to confirm it, House administered 
a mild rebuke. 

''You are behind your schedule, my friend," 
he said. ''This story has always come out in Au- 
gust. Remember that next time." 



285 



CHAPTER XXV 

METHODS OF WORK AND WAYS OF 
RELAXATION 

COLONEL HOUSE makes his home when 
in New York at 115 East 53d Street, an 
unpretentious apartment house between Park and 
Lexington Avenues, in no wise different from 
thousands of similar buildings which dot the up- 
per districts of the island of Manhattan. People 
who have heard of the House "millions" are al- 
ways astonished and a little disappointed when 
they first visit his modest apartment of six or 
seven rooms. In fact, Colonel House tells with 
quiet amusement of the remark made by a well- 
known Senator, who came from Washington to 
confer with him on some pending question of 
legislation. 

**Why, Colonel," exclaimed the Senator, "I 
stopped at the door downstairs and started to go 
away. I thought you lived in a palatial private 
house, and when I saw this apartment building on 
a side-street I was sure I must have come to the 
wrong address." 

It is Colonel House's pride that the work he 
286 



METHODS OF WORK 

does is his voluntary contribution to the country. 
But he does experience a certain amount of diffi- 
culty in getting it done on his private means. He 
can afford only one secretary, and with such slen- 
der assistance, no matter how able it may be, he 
is always taxed to keep up with the work which 
pours in on him from all directions. No phase of 
his mission to Europe in the early winter of 1917 
pleased him more than the luxury of having every 
available facility for getting work done promptly 
and well. He had plenty of trained secretaries, 
competent subordinates, experts in every field of 
discussion at his elbow. It was a relief to a man 
who likes above all things to see a job executed 
efficiently. 

''That was one of the pleasantest experiences 
of my life," he said afterwards. "Everything 
went the way it ought to go. I gave just two 
instructions to the members of the Mission : Don't 
let there be any differences among yourselves, and 
let us work rather than entertain ourselves. They 
pulled together, and they pulled hard. They were 
a splendid lot of fellows, and I don't suppose so 
many men ever did more work in a given ispace 
of time than they did." 

During the eight months of the year which 
Colonel House spends in New York he gives prac- 
tically all his time to the work of helping the Ad- 
ministration. It is not only matters connected 

287 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

with international politics which come within 
his ken, but practically every conceivable sort of 
problem. He sees people who otherwise would 
demand some of the President's time, and blocks 
them off, digesting their information for Mr. 
Wilson's ear, or discarding it, if it is valueless. 
He is a very fast worker, and manages to handle 
an enormous mass of correspondence, besides 
seeing anywhere from ten to twenty people in a 
day. Social service, labor questions, as well as 
politics and Administrative detail — all come be- 
fore him. The other day a man arrived from 
Boston, after telegraphing for an appointment in 
regard to Liberty Loan matters. To him was 
given a scant five minutes and he departed, with 
instructions to embody his views in a memoran- 
dum. 

"Like a lot of other people, he could have 
spared himself the trouble of the trip," com- 
mented Colonel House, as he turned to the next 
on his list of appointments, "but they always seem 
to have the idea that they cannot make their 
points unless they talk to you face to face. I 
usually have to tell them all the same thing : put 
your thought in a memorandum, and I will lay 
it before whoever is the interested official in the 
case." 

Naturally, Colonel House's days are mapped 
out with rigid precision. To begin with, he al- 

288 



METHODS OF WORK 

lows himself nine hours' sleep a night, for sleep, 
he asserts, is the first requirement of good health. 
In the morning he plows through his mail, and 
then goes out for a walk of half an hour's dura- 
tion. Usually, upon his return from this exer- 
cise, he is in a position to begin with his appoint- 
ments, and, more often than not, even the lunch- 
table is utilized for an informal conference. After 
luncheon he begins the first of a series of inter- 
views, which continue until dinner time, with 
another brief intermission of half an hour for a 
walk. In the evening he reads reports. State 
documents, and the digests of the news which 
have been sent to him from Washington. Rarely 
he goes out with Mrs. House or some friend for 
a little relaxation. He likes a good play, and is 
not above appreciating the movies, tastes which 
he has in common with his friend, the President. 
One thing he will not tolerate is being lionized. 
He does not like to go to dinners or social affairs 
where more than from six to eight are present. 
He likes society, but he cannot afford to waste 
the time and energy it requires, and if he went 
out to one party he would offend somebody by 
refusing an invitation to another. Now and then 
he takes time off to go out for luncheon with a 
group of men — generally old acquaintances in 
politics or chums at college — at a club. He en- 
joys this sort of thing very much, as he does chats 

289 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

with congenial spirits about his own fireside at 
home. He is a member of some half-dozen clubs 
in New York, but he says himself he would have 
to be introduced to the doorman of every one of 
them before he could gain admittance. 

"I haven't been south of 23d Street in fifteen 
or twenty years," he once said. "I never call 
on anybody because I haven't time to do it, and if 
I called on one man, I should have to call on 
others. People are kind enough to come to me, 
and this enables me to see more of them, to know 
better what they are thinking, and to accumulate 
valuable suggestions and information. Another 
reason for me to stay at home is that I should 
soon exhaust my strength if I tried to go out con- 
tinually. And one more reason — if one more is 
necessary — is that there is a great advartage to 
people in knowing that I am always on tap here. 
My friends know they can reach me at any hour 
of the day or night, unless I happen to be out for 
a walk or at luncheon, or something like that." 

Colonel House's workroom is a tiny study in 
one corner of the apartment, a room perhaps fif- 
teen feet long and ten feet wide. It is just larcre 
enough to contain a desk, two or three chairs, and 
a lounge. The walls are lined with book-shelves, 
and over the shelves are rows and rows of auto- 
graphed photographs of the great men of the 
present and portraits of the leaders of the past — 

290 



METHODS OF WORK 

Washington, Lincoln, Lee, Stonewall Jackson. 
On top of the desk is a row of war books, of 
which Colonel House receives about two a day 
— more than he can possibly read, with the best 
intentions in the world and the liveliest appre- 
ciation of the authors' remembrance of him. His 
own reading tastes are shown to be sufficiently 
catholic by the titles of the books on the shelves 
opposite. 

Kipling's "The Day's Work" is next to Cham- 
berlain's ''Foundations of the Nineteenth Cen- 
tury." Plato, Charles Lamb, John Stuart Mill, 
"The Spoon River Anthology," "Capt. Bill Mc- 
Donald, Texas Ranger," "Men Around the 
Kaiser," by Frederick Wile, and Brand Whit- 
lock's "Forty Years of It" are others near by. 
In ordinary times. Colonel House is a steady 
reader, with a tendency to favor the philosophical 
and historical; but he is seldom able to indulge 
himself this way nowadays. Practically the only 
reading diversion left open to him is the Ameri- 
can short story, of which he is a great admirer. 
He finds relaxation in spending an odd half-hour, 
when the pressure lets up temporarily, over O. 
Henry or some contemporary like Richard Wash- 
burn Child or Booth Tarkington. 

In addition to books, Colonel House is deluged 
with copies of speeches — he receives an average 
of one copy of every other speech delivered in 

20I 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

the United States — and begging letters. The 
first are sources of amusement, if nothing more. 
The latter are an embarrassment, for which he 
has to thank the ridiculous stories of his fabulous 
wealth. 

Visitors who have appointments with Colonel 
House are generally ushered into the study, but 
sometimes appointments overlap, and then the 
parlor is used, as well. The study has been the 
scene of some important decisions. Here in one 
day Colonel House has conferred with the Am- 
bassadors of three foreign countries — not all at 
the same time, of course. Here he has received 
and talked with practically every distinguished 
visitor to the United States from abroad. It is 
not an exaggeration to say that most of the well- 
known men and women of this country have sat 
in that little room, including President Wilson 
hirnself and the majority of the members of the 
Cabinet. 

When the President used to visit him, Colonel 
House cleared everybody out of the apartment 
except the servants. Mrs. House went to stay 
with one of her daughters, and the two friends 
were left by themselves to talk at their ease. The 
President always enjoyed these little parties 
d deux, and when public affairs were not too 
pressing he never failed to come to New York 
several times in the winter for them. In the 

292 



METHODS OF WORK 

seclusion of Colonel House's apartment, with 
secret service men in the hall and downstairs to 
shoo away visitors and the telephone discon- 
nected, they could discuss matters with a freedom 
impossible in Washington. But the rush of 
events in these turbid days keeps the President 
in Washington and the two friends are no longer 
able to mingle work with recreation in the little 
apartment in East 53d Street. 

In his own home. Colonel House is the ideal 
host. He has the courtesy of the old school, 
which was most strikingly developed in the South. 
It is the courtesy which means gentility, gentle- 
ness, which makes no distinctions between infe- 
riors, equals, and superiors. He is as courteous to 
a servant or a messenger-boy as he is to the Presi- 
dent. In manner he is quiet, almost deferential. 
He is compact in build and slim, moving with an 
agility unusual at his age. He is about the 
middle height, and he would not be at all re- 
markable in appearance, if it were not for his 
head and his eyes — particularly his eyes. They 
are the feature which stamps itself upon the mem- 
ory. As Norman Hapgood wrote in a recent 
sketch in Leslie's Weekly: 

**It is a kind face, bright, eager, and gentle, 
that goes with manners that never injured 
stranger or friend. As one looks at the whole 
man, the blue eyes are the center of attention. 

293 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

Outside of these luminous eyes there is no ex- 
ternal feature that commands attention. It is, 
perhaps, not so much an object that confronts one 
as a presence, an atmosphere created by expres- 
sion and by manner." 

Colonel House's head is narrow, with promi- 
nent, almost Mongolian, cheek-bones, and a deli- 
cately carved jaw. Of late years his hair and 
close-cropped mustache have grown from gray 
to white, and the wrinkles have come thickly on 
his face. He has perfect control over his facial 
muscles, and when he wishes to disguise his feel- 
ings, not a quiver reveals the thoughts passing 
through his brain. At such times his face be- 
comes a mask, and his eyes take on a blank look 
which is singularly disconcerting. He may not 
like the comparison, but one cannot help feeling 
that, if fate had cast him for a role on the old 
frontier, he would have made an excellent 
gambler of the traditional type. Certainly, no- 
body would ever have guessed whether he held 
a royal flush or a pair of deuces. 

He speaks in a low, clear voice — which is sel- 
dom raised — with a trace of the pleasant slurring 
Southern accent. His choice of language, his 
method of thought, his nicety of phrase, are all 
those of the gently bred. To know Colonel House 
at close range is to know the reason for his un- 
broken chain of successes in diplomatic work 

^94 



METHODS OF WORK 

abroad. He has the savoir faire which so many 
Americans lack, and his unusually wide acquaint- 
anceship and close study of men of all classes, to- 
gether with his travels in many lands, have given 
him the ability to get along in any company. He 
has always been as much at home, whether dining 
with King George in Buckingham Palace, chat- 
ting with the Kaiser at Potsdam, or lunching at 
the Elysee Palace, as he was in the days when 
his library in Austin was the gathering-place of 
the men who governed Texas. 



295 



CHAPTER XXVI 

HIS POLITICAL AIMS AND HIS FUTURE 

THE political aims and future of Colonel 
House excite almost as much interest in 
professional political circles of all parties as those 
of President Wilson himself. You hear on one 
side the assertion that Mr. Wilson is grooming 
Colonel House for exploitation as his successor — 
a statement which receives the derision it deserves 
from those who possess Colonel House's confi- 
dence, and is probably as amusing to the Presi- 
dent. On the other hand, several small Republi- 
can newspapers in the rural districts have been 
spreading broadcast the announcement that the 
real reason for Colonel House's delay in return- 
ing to Europe to resume his seat on the Supreme 
War Council was his chagrin and humiliation 
over the showing he made in Paris and London 
in comparison with the foreign statesmen he had 
to deal with. They say that he has begged the 
President not to send him back, because he antici- 
pates a repetition of this humiliation. They are 
rather difficult to reconcile, those two statements, 
although they both spring from the brains of his 
political enemies. 

296 



HIS POLITICAL AIMS AND HIS FUTURE 

The bitterness displayed against Colonel House 
by Republican politicians is not remarkable, but it 
is distinctly unfair. They look upon him as the 
arch-priest of Democracy, the grand strategist 
who has twice defeated them in the face of over- 
powering odds. And in their anger they have not 
scrupled to make use of any and every weapon 
which came to hand, slander, lies, traductions 
of the wickedest kind. They have ignored the 
sturdiness with which he has stood for Republi- 
can rights, especially since the country entered 
the war, and the undeniable purity of his motives. 

One of the most frequent charges, which has 
been given currency in the past, is the assertion 
that Colonel House's fortune is founded upon 
prison labor. As usual in such matters, there is 
just enough of truth in this slander to make it 
acceptable to the kind of mentalities that delight 
in smirching the names of public men. Many 
years ago, while Colonel House was still in part-, 
nership with his two older brothers and before 
their father's estate had been partitioned among 
'them, one of their plantations was worked at 
times by prison labor. In those days prison labor 
was widely used in Texas, because, as in most 
newly, settled States, labor was hard to get in 
sufficient quantities. 

Colonel House himself did not approve of it. 
He regarded the employment of prison labor as 

297 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

an economic fallacy, let alone a social error, and 
he endeavored to prove this to his brothers. They 
agreed with him that prison labor actually was 
more costly and less productive than free labor, 
but they pointed out that it possessed the advan- 
tage of being obtainable whenever it was needed. 
This latter argument was unanswerable. In after 
life, when Colonel House had become a power in 
political affairs at Austin, he led the fight against 
the State system of farming out its convicts, and 
succeeded in effecting substantial reforms. 

To speak the plain truth. Colonel House has 
no political prejudices. He happens to be a Dem- 
ocrat because he conceives that the principles of 
the Democratic party approach closer to the ideal- 
istic aims he has set for himself than the prin- 
ciples of the Republican party, with their increas- 
ing drag toward conservatism and tendency to 
rebel against the march of progress. But if the 
Democratic party went wrong, and the Re- 
publican party espoused the cause of the many 
and the liberal ideas of to-day, one might predict 
that Colonel House would be found among the 
standard bearers of the Republicans. As it is, he 
does not have any feeling against a man solely 
because that man is a Republican. He has used, 
himself, and secured the use by others, of a con- 
siderable number of Republicans in the last year. 
He is just as anxious to make use of a Republi- 

298 



HIS POLITICAL AIMS AND HIS FUTURE 

can who wants to serve his country as he is to 
employ a Democrat. He says, frankly, that he 
would appoint many more Republicans to office 
if it was possible to do so under the existing sys- 
tem of American government. 

He greets all kinds of men openly, without re- 
gard to party affiliations. He is ready to heed 
"ny man's advice and take it, too. Many 
Republican leaders have sat in the little study 
at 115 East 53d Street and given their views on 
the problems of national efficiency in the war. In 
this respect, Colonel House is much more open- 
minded than the President, who is disposed to be 
a strict party man, and to distrust the employ- 
ment of political opponents — not from any sordid 
or antagonistic motive, be it understood, but 
simply because he considers that American politi- 
cal methods require a leader to have the backing 
of men of his own beliefs and policies, if success 
is to be obtained. 

Colonel House is equally free from prejudice in 
regard to color, an extraordinary virtue in a man 
from the South, whose ancestors were slavehold- 
ers. The colored people of the United States are 
as free to bring their troubles and desires to him 
as their white brethren, and they do — men like 
Major Moton, of Tuskegee, for instance. The 
fact that they are black means nothing to Colonel 
House. The same holds true of the different 

299 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

white races and of creeds. The Pole, the poly- 
glot Austrian, the German, the Russian, the Ital- 
ian, are all on the same footing with him. He ac- 
cepts the Jew as he does the Roman Catholic. 
He has no bias against labor or capital ; his views 
on these important problems are practically iden- 
tical with the President's. He would punish a 
dishonest labor union just as swiftly and severely 
as he would a dishonest corporation, and he 
would give an honest corporation opportunity to 
grow and expand precisely as he would assist an 
honest union to obtain its justified desires. 
Finally, he is particularly open to the multiplying 
voices of the vast, seething mass of woman work- 
ers, who are gradually assuming shape as the 
most potential political force of the future. 

The questions have been asked : What are Colo- 
nel House's political ambitions? What is the 
goal he strives f 9r ? Surely, it would seem, both 
questions have been answered in these chapters ; 
but lest there be any misunderstanding, let the 
answer be reiterated, definitely and concretely. 
Colonel House seeks nothing for himself, no of- 
fice, no honor, no emolument. He is sixty years 
old, approaching the twilight of his life. His 
wants are few, and such as they are, he has the 
means to satisfy them. He wishes only, like every 
other honorable man, to achieve some unselfish 
service for his country, for civilization, for hu- 

300 



HIS POLITICAL AIMS AND HIS FUTURE 

manity. All his life he has served, and he would 
like to cap his life of service by something worth 
remembering. All that he has in him he is giving, 
has given, to this end. His effort is governed 
only by his strength, and it irks him that he can- 
not work harder. If he lives — as all good Ameri- 
cans must devoutly pray — his silent labors for 
sanity, for reasoned authority and for justice and 
right must operate to restore the world's balance 
and put down oppression. No private citizen in 
this country or any other has the power that he 
exerts; no voice is listened to like his. And this 
strange influence is based entirely on the under- 
standing of him here set forth. 

One of Colonel House's pet beliefs is that any 
man's ideas are exhausted after six or eight 
years' work in one job. It will be remembered, 
too, that he destroyed the system in Texas politics 
of nominating the Attorney-General to succeed 
the retiring Governor. And in addition to this, 
you will recall that after he had elected four 
Governors of Texas he eliminated himself from 
State politics, because he thought that it would 
be wrong for one man to try to dominate the 
party organization any longer. He has not 
abandoned this theory, and he has every inten- 
tion of dropping out of national politics after Mr. 
Wilson retires. He will never play in another 
Administration the part he has played in this one 

301 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

since 1912. Wholly aside from his modest belief 
that he will have exhausted his usefulness by eight 
years' work along certain lines, he considers that 
it would be as bad a precedent for him to maintain 
his position with another Administration as it 
would have been for him to have retained his 
grasp on the Democratic machinery in Texas 
after the election of Governor Lanham. 

It is conceivable, of course, that he will still be 
called upon, after 1920, to aid his party in an 
advisory capacity, but the active direction of af- 
fairs must be taken up by younger hands. When 
Colonel House makes a decision he stands by it, 
and his sense of right and wrong is markedly 
developed. He could not be induced to reconsider 
any decision, after he had convinced himself that 
his first judgment was in accordance with the 
justice of the case. 

H Colonel House has achieved nothing else in 
his connection with national politics, he has puri- 
fied the conduct of campaigns and set an example 
of clever strategy and resourceful leadership, in 
place of blind expenditure of millions. He has 
demonstrated that a party can win in the na- 
tional elections without wholesale debauchery and 
by placing the issues squarely before the voters. 
He has illustrated, with sensational success, the 
shift in the political center of the country and the 
increasing weight which must be attached to the 

302 



HIS POLITICAL AIMS AND HIS FUTURE 

march of progressive doctrines in the West. Best 
of all, he has taken the Democratic party out of 
the solid South and made it really a representative 
party, controlling States in every section of the 
Union. 

It may be illuminating to set down here some 
of his political maxims by adherence to which he 
gained his victories. 

"What is bad morally is bad politically," he 
says. "Politics ought to be as honest as business. 
I haven't any use for bribery in politics — I have 
never paid a cent to a newspaper or a man in any 
of my campaigns. Personally, I never handle a 
cent of money. I have always made that the first 
stipulation in consenting to participate in any 
campaign. I will not collect funds or account for 
them, but I insist on knowing what is done with 
the money. Even when I went to Europe with 
the War Mission I asked the State Department 
to send along an expert accountant to keep track 
of disbursements. I will not bother with money 
in connection with public work. It is bad enough 
having to manage your own affairs. 

"I wouldn't promise a man an office in return 
for his political support, no matter what might be 
the exigency of the situation. It is bad business, 
practically as well as morally. It is likely to 
create ill-feeling in other men when it becomes 
known. Politics, when you come right down to it, 

303 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

is largely a question of organization. You have 
got to build up your organization from the bot- 
tom, as carefully as you can, and the more care- 
ful you are and the more elaborately you are able 
to build, the better will be your chances of suc- 
cess. But, of course, with the best organization 
usually you can't win unless you have good issues 
and clean candidates. 

"I make it a rule never to argue about politics 
or religion. Even in a Presidential campaign I 
will not argue about politics. I find out what is a 
man's special interest, and then I talk to him 
about that. You can always find a common 
ground to meet on, if you look for it. Political 
arguments are waste of time and energy." 

The fine charity of Colonel House's judgment 
of men is one of the attributes of his character 
which make a lasting impression. Of a European 
statesman, who had been in serious trouble at one 
time, and yet had been able to live down the scan- 
dal and attain new heights of fame and public 
trust, he said: 

"Because a man makes a great mistake is not 
a reason for believing him unable to retrieve him- 
self later on. The world would not be worth liv- 
ing in if one mistake, no matter how tremendous, 
was proof of failure. There are too many in- 
stances to prove the fallacy of this idea." 

He is singularly reluctant to talk about his own 
304 



^pB-y-'^ 



HIS POLITICAL AIMS AND HIS FUTURE 

triumphs. Pressed once for an analysis of the 
way in which he had gained one of his most re- 
markable victories in Texas, he would only say: 

"Well, you see, our crowd got together, and 
we picked some good issues. After a while the 
opposition just dropped out." 

He thinks, himself, that one cause of his suc- 
cess has been his freedom from worry. He has 
most remarkable self-control, and has schooled 
himself by will-power to avoid the pitfalls of 
nervous unrest which bother most leaders. 

"I never worry about a thing, no matter how 
big it is," he declared. "I do what I think is right, 
and that is all I can do. Sometimes it takes me a 
long time to reach a decision; sometimes I can 
make up my mind almost at once. But when I 
have decided and made such dispositions as seem 
called for, why, then, the matter is out of my 
hands, and I refuse to worry over it. The rela- 
tive size of the proposition means nothing. There 
is no more reason for worrying over an important 
problem than over a trivial one. I would make a 
decision affecting all the people in the world with 
no more hesitation than one affecting everybody 
in this building. But I should be just as careful 
about the second decision as the first. In fact, 
it might take me longer." 

His eyes twinkled. 

"At the same time, I am always glad when 
305 



THE REAL COLONEL HOUSE 

things turn out right," he continued. "I remem- 
ber I went to bed and slept well the night after 
the President read his war-aims address to Con- 
gress, but I was very happy the next morning 
to wake up and find that it had received the en- 
dorsement anticipated for it." 

He is reticent when asked what he intends to do 
after he retires from public life. 

"I don't know," he says. "There will be a lot 
to think about. Perhaps, I shall write my 
memoirs or put my theories for remodeling the 
Government — Pm an iconoclast in that respect — 
in a book." 

Then, irrelevantly: 

"I have always wanted to die with my boots on. 
I dread the thought of dying in bed. You know, 
Pm a frontier Texan, after all." 



306 
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